Summary Judgment improperly granted in trade secret misappropriation case
| September 7, 2012
Raytheon Company v. Indigo Systems Corp. and FLIR Systems, Inc.
August 1, 2012
Panel: Linn, Dyk and O’Malley. Opinion by Linn.
Summary
Raytheon sues Indigo for misappropriation of trade secrets in selling an infrared imaging camera to a general contractor on the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program. The district court grants Indigo’s motion for summary judgment that the statute of limitations (3 years) had lapsed. Former employees of Raytheon started up Indigo to produce infrared imaging cameras. The district court impermissibly drew inferences against the non-moving party (Raytheon) in granting the summary judgment motion. Further, the summary judgment motion should not have been granted because Texas and California law state that the discovery rule for the statute of limitations is a question of fact and not of law.
Tags: statute of limitations > trade secret > trade secret misappropriation
When should incorporation by reference language be taken care of?
| July 11, 2012
Hollmer v. Harari
June 7, 2012
Panel: Prost, Mayer, O’Malley. Opinion by Prost
Summary
During the interference proceedings, Harari relied on the disclosure of 07/337,579 (‘579 application) which had been originally incorporated by the earliest 3rd great grandparent application 07/337,566 (‘566 application) of the subject application 09/310,880 (‘880 application). The ‘566 application included the disputed incorporation statement and had been abandoned. Two intervening applications copied the same statement and had been patented. The subject application (‘880 application) included the copy of the statement, but Harari corrected the incorporation statement by preliminary amendment which, according to Hollmer, was new matter because it would newly introduce the disclosure of ‘579 application. CAFC decided for Harari by applying the relaxed “reasonable examiner” standard (Harari I, 602 F.3d 1348). However, Harari was not allowed to claim the benefit of the filing date of the ‘566 application because CAFC found that the intervening applications in the chain leading back to the earlier ‘566 application did not comply with the written description requirement due to the ambiguous incorporation statement by applying the strict “person of ordinary skill” standard.
本件は、米国特有の”incorporation by reference”プラクティスに関するものである。インターフェアレンス手続において、Harariは最先の出願(566出願)が”incorporation by reference”によって引用した米国出願(579出願)の開示内容に依存した。566出願は不十分な”incorporation by reference”の記述を含んでいたがそのまま放棄された。566出願の出願日の利益を主張する出願がその後5代に渡って続き、全ての出願は当該不十分な”incorporation by reference”の記述をコピーしていた。Harariは5代目の本願(880出願)を予備補正して”incorporation by reference”の記述を訂正したが、2代目と3代目の中間の出願はそのような訂正を経ずに特許になってしまっていた。本願に関する予備補正が新規事項の追加になるか否かの争いについて、CAFCは、ゆるやかな「審査官の観点」の基準を適用して予備補正が適切であると判断した。一方、本願が特許法第120条の利益を享受して最先の出願日に遡るためには全ての中間の出願が” written description requirement”の要件を満たす必要がある。この要件が不十分な”incorporation by reference”によって妨げられるか否かの争いについて、CAFCは、より厳しい「当業者の観点」の基準を適用して第120条の利益を認めなかった。
[実務上の指針] 最先の出願日に遡るためには、その間にある全ての中間の出願を補正して適切な”incorporation by reference”の記述を含むようにしておくことが必要。
Tags: §120 > Incorporation by reference > written description
Presumption of validity attaches to all issued patents, even incorrectly issued patents
| July 5, 2012
Sciele Pharma Inc. v. Lupin Ltd.
July 2, 2012
Panel: Lourie, Prost, Moore. Opinion by Moore
Summary
Shionogi (new name for Sciele Pharma) obtained US Patent No. 6,866,866 (“the ‘866 patent”) which included broader claims that were intended to be cancelled in favor of narrower claims in response to a rejection. Shionogi brought suit against Lupin for infringement of the ‘866 patent including claims that were to be cancelled. Lupin began selling the alleged infringing product and Shionogi moved for a preliminary injunction. The District Court granted Shionogi’s request for preliminary injunction and Lupin appealed. On appeal, the CAFC stated that even though the ‘866 patent issued with the incorrect claims, the ‘866 patent nonetheless had a presumption of validity and that the clear and convincing evidentiary standard applied for invalidating the patent. The CAFC also stated that there is not a heightened standard just because references were considered by the PTO. With the proper clear and convincing evidentiary standard applied to the ‘866 patent, the CAFC stated that Lupin has raised a substantial question of invalidity, and thus, the preliminary injunction is vacated.
Tags: clear and convincing standard > enablement > injunction > obviousness > preliminary injunction > presumption of validity > validity
Rule 4(k)(2) Personal Jurisdiction Over a Foreign Defendant
| June 13, 2012
Merial Limited v. Cipla Limited
May 31, 2012
Panel: Lourie, Schall, and Reyna. Opinion by Lourie. Dissent by Schall.
Summary:
Foreign defendant Cipla chose not to respond to plaintiff Merial’s 2007 lawsuit for patent infringement because Cipla believed there was no personal jurisdiction under Georgia’s long arm statute. The Georgia district court entered a default judgment and permanent injunction against Cipla. During a subsequent contempt proceeding to enforce the injunction, the Georgia court found that Cipla was subject to personal jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2) instead of the Georgia long-arm statute. Cipla’s consent to jurisdiction in another forum (the Northern District of Illinois) during the contempt proceedings did not defeat the Georgia court’s reliance on Rule 4(k)(2) because the Federal Circuit held that Cipla failed to show that jurisdiction would have been proper in that other forum at the time of filing of the complaint in Georgia, regardless of Cipla’s later consent to jurisdiction in Illinois. This Federal Circuit decision clarifies that a foreign defendant, to defeat personal jurisdiction under Rule 4(k)(2), must not only identify another forum where suit is possible, but also show that suit is possible in that other forum at the time the suit was filed. A later consent to jurisdiction in another forum may not be enough to defeat personal jurisdiction under Rule 4(k)(2).
A showing of causal nexus is required between infringement and alleged harm to patentee
| May 23, 2012
Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., et al.
May 14, 2012
Panel: Bryson, Prost, and O’Malley. Opinion by Bryson. Concurrence-in-part and dissent-in-part by O’Malley.
Summary
Apple filed suit against Samsung alleging infringement of Apple’s U.S. Design Patent Nos. D593,087 (“the D’087 patent”), D618,677 (“the D’677 patent”), D504,889 (“the D’889 patent”), and U.S. Patent No. 7,469,381 (“the ’381 patent”). Apple’s iPhone embodies the design in the D’087 patent and D’677 patent, and Apple’s iPad embodies the design in the D’889 patent. Both iPhone and iPad embody a software feature known as the “bounce-back” feature of the ‘381 patent. The district court denied Apple’s motion for a preliminary injunction with respect to each of the accused devices and all four asserted patents. Apple appealed. The CAFC affirms the denial of a preliminary injunction with respect to the D’087, D’677, and ’381 patents, but vacates and reminds with respect to the D’889 patent.
アップル社は、サムスン社がアップル社の米国意匠特許第D593,087号（D’087特許）、D618,677号（D’677特許）、D504,889号（D’889特許）と米国特許第7,469,381号（’381特許）を侵害しているとして訴えた。D’087特許及びD’677特許は、アップル社のiPhoneに係わる意匠で、D’889特許は、iPadに係わる意匠である。また、’381特許は、iPhone及びiPadに係わるソフトウェアである。アップル社は、サムスン社のイ号製品について仮差し止めの申し立てをしたが、地裁はこれを却下した。控訴審でCAFCは、D’087特許、D’677特許及び’381特許に関しては地裁の判決を支持したものの、D’889特許についての判決は破棄・差し戻しした。
Tags: design > design patents > evidence > injunction > preliminary injunction
If at first you don’t succeed ….
| May 18, 2012
In Re Baxter International, Inc.
(Reexamination No. 90/007,751)
May 17, 2012
Panel: Newman, Lourie, Moore. Opinion by Lourie. Dissent by Newman
Summary
The CAFC’s decision in In re Baxter Int’l, Inc. (Fed. Cir. 2012) highlights the distinction between a reexamination and a district court proceeding. Specifically, the CAFC affirmed the Board of Patent Appeal and Interferences (“Board”) determination in a reexamination proceeding that claims 26-31 of U.S. Patent No. 5,247,434 (“the ‘434 patent”) are invalid – despite having previously held in a parallel litigation proceeding that the same claims were not invalid – because the courts and the USPTO use different standards to address validity. However, the CAFC cautioned that had the claims been found to be invalid in the litigation proceeding after all appeals had been exhausted, then the PTO “ideally should not arrive at a different conclusion” during a parallel reexamination proceeding when presented with the same arguments.
Tags: BPAI > parallel litigation > reexamination > standard of proof > standard of review
Supreme Court Sides with Inventors in Kappos v. Hyatt
| May 16, 2012
David J. Kappos v. Gilbert P. Hyatt
April 18, 2012
Affirmed 9-0 (CAFC en banc 7-2 decision). Opinion by Justice Thomas. Concurring opinion by Justice Sotomayor joined by Justice Breyer.
Summary:
The Hyatt decision is a victory for patent applicants. Any patent applicant dissatisfied with a decision of the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (or Patent Trial and Appeal Board after enactment of the AIA) may file a civil action against the Director of the PTO in federal district court and introduce new evidence beyond what was submitted to the PTO. The new evidence is subject to de novo review.
Tags: appeal > de novo > evidence > procedural issues > standard of review > Supreme Court
In a dispute over a patent licensing agreement, CAFC refuses to deny enforcement of an arbitration clause based on a technicality
| March 29, 2012
Promega Corporation et al. v. Life Technologies Corporation et al.
March 28, 2012
Panel: Newman, Dyk. Opinion by Dyk. Dissent by Moore.
Summary
Despite an oversight relating to transfer of a patent licensing agreement during a licensee’s merger proceedings, the Federal Circuit held that the licensee retained its right to demand arbitration in a dispute with a sub-licensee. Although the licensee ultimately did not suffer any negative legal consequences due to this oversight, this case provides a good reminder to corporate IP counsel to carefully review all tech transfer agreements during mergers or reorganizations. Here, a single letter to the sub-licensee could have saved the licensee from significant distraction.
Interpretation of statutory two-year time limit for enlarging the scope of claim in a continuing reissue application filed after the two-year window
| March 14, 2012
In re Erik P. Staats and Robin D. Lash
March 5, 2012
Panel: Dyk, O’Malley and Reyna. Opinion by Dyk. Concurrence by O’Malley.
Summary:
In 1999, a patent was issued to Staats (assigned to Apple Computer) based on an application for his invention regarding isochronous data transfer in a computer. The patent discloses two embodiments. Staats then filed a first reissue application within two years from the issue date of the patent, broadening the scope of claims related to a first embodiment. Outside the two-year window, he further filed other broadening reissue applications as continuations. In 2007, almost seven years after the original patent issued, the last broadening reissue application was filed, which is related to a second embodiment. The PTO’s board held that the last continuing reissue application was not filed within the two-year window because it was not related to the first embodiment which was timely presented within the two-year window. The CAFC reversed and remanded this case, affirming their precedent case which holds that the statutory two-year limit applies to only the filing date of a reissue application, not to the date that broadened claims are presented.
出願人は、コンピュータのデータトランスファーに関する発明を出願し、特許を取得した。その後、クレーム範囲を広げる再発行特許出願を行った。特許出願の明細書には、発明の2つの態様が開示されていた。最初の再発行特許は第1の態様に関するものであり、審査の結果、再発行特許として発行された。その第1の再発行特許が許可される前に出願人は、継続出願として、第2の再発行出願を行い、さらに第2の再発行出願が許可される前に、第3の再発行出願を行った。この第3の再発行出願には、最初の出願もしくは第1の再発行出願でクレームされていた第1の態様とは異なる第2の態様がクレームされていた。特許庁は、第3の再発行出願は最初の再発行出願とは関係のない発明のクレーム範囲を拡大しようとするものであるから、クレーム範囲の拡大は最初の特許発行日から2年以内にのみ可能であるという米国特許法251条の規定に違反するとして拒絶し、審判部もその拒絶を維持した。CAFCは、審判部の判断は誤りであり、クレームを拡大するための最初の再発行出願が2年以内に行われていたか否かが問題であり、その後の継続再発行出願のクレーム内容が最初の再発行出願のクレーム内容と関係があるか否かは問題ではないと判断した。
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Tags: broadening reissue > reissue > two-year window
KSR Reigned In For A Preliminary Injunction
| January 18, 2012
Celsis in Vitro, Inc. v Cellzdirect, Inc. and Invitrogen Corp.
January 9, 2012
Panel: Rader, Gajarsa, and Prost. Opinion by Rader; Dissent by Gajarsa.
Summary:
While Rader’s majority opinion affirmed the district court’s grant of a preliminary injunction despite defendant’s obviousness challenge, Gajarsa’s dissenting opinion asserts that the majority’s decision disregards the Supreme Court’s KSR flexible guidelines regarding the finding of obviousness in the mere repetition of well-known techniques to achieve a desired result, and in the application of “obvious to try.” Gajarsa’s dissent also notes that this is a preliminary injunction, and the standard is not whether defendant has shown obviousness by clear and convincing evidence, but rather, whether defendant has shown a “substantial question of invalidity” to defeat a preliminary injunction. Perhaps, the strongest position for the majority opinion is its consideration of the showing of a “teaching away” in the record, as well as deference given to the district court’s determinations of credibility of the parties’ expert witnesses.
Tags: common sense > injunction > KSR > obvious to try > obviousness > preliminary injunction > teaching away
