Prosecution Argument Bars Later Recapture Through Broadening Reissue
| August 29, 2012
Greenliant Systems, Inc. v. Xicor LLC
August 22, 2012
Panel: Linn, Plager and Dyk. Opinion by Dyk
Summary:
Xicor obtained a patent claiming a semiconductor device with a tunneling layer formed by low pressure chemical vapor (CVD) deposition using tetraethylorthosilicate (TEOS). Xicor sought and obtained reissue of the patent with device claims that did not recite the use of TEOS. Subsequently, Greenliant sued Xicor for declaratory judgment of invalidity of the reissue claims based on recapture rule, which prohibits recapture via reissue of subject matter surrendered in order to overcome prior art during prosecution of the original patent. The District Court held the reissue claims invalid, and the Federal Circuit affirms. Xicor had repeatedly argued during prosecution of the original patent that the product-by-process limitation of using TEOS imparted structural limitations to the final product. This is sufficient for the recapture rule to apply, even if Xicor now recognizes that the structure of the tunneling layer does not actually depend on the material used for the CVD process, but on deposition conditions such as temperature and pressure.
Tags: broadening reissue > estoppel > prosecution argument > prosecution history estoppel > recapture > reissue > Reissue Claim
Can an open-ended claim range be enabled?
| August 22, 2012
Magsil Corp. and MIT v. Hitachi Global
August 14, 2012
Panel: Rader, O’Malley, Reyna. Opinion by Rader.
Summary
The U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware granted summary judgment finding claims 1-5, 23, 26 and 28 of appellants’ U.S. Patent No. 5,629,922 (the ‘922 patent) invalid as a matter of law for lack of enablement and therefore non-infringed. At issue was whether the specification enabled the broad scope of the claimed “open-ended” range of values having a lower threshold, but no upper limit, defined by “a change in the resistance by at least 10% at room temperature”.
Magsil appealed the district court’s decision. On appeal, the CAFC affirmed the district court’s finding that claims 1-5, 23, 26 and 28 of the ‘922 patent are invalid for lack of enablement.
Tags: criticality of ranges > enablement > open-ended claim range > ranges
Fractured CAFC panel again affirms patent eligibility of isolated DNA, and applies Mayo
| August 21, 2012
Association for Molecular Pathology et al. v. U.S.P.T.O. et al.
August 16, 2012
Panel: Lourie, Bryson and Moore. Majority opinion by Lourie, concurrence by Moore, dissent by Bryson.
Less than a month after hearing oral arguments, the CAFC panel of Judges Lourie, Bryson and Moore last week issued an updated decision in the controversial AMP v. USPTO (Myriad genetics) case. The CAFC reached the same conclusion as they did last year: (1) the Plaintiffs do have standing, (2) the isolated DNA and cDNA claims are patent eligible, (3) the “analyzing” and “comparing” method claims are not patent eligible and (4) the screening method claim is patent eligible.
As with the decision last year, the panel reached a unanimous conclusion with respect to the issues of standing, subject matter eligibility of the cDNA claims, and subject matter eligibility of the method claims. However, the panel reached different conclusions with respect to the composition claims which recite isolated DNA. Since the opinions of the Court are very similar to the opinions issued in 2011, this article will focus on the Judges’ views with respect to the impact of Mayo v. Prometheus (English summary; Japanese summary) on the claims in question, and particularly with respect to the isolated DNA claims.
Tags: §101 > bilski > biotech > cDNA > DNA > law of nature > Myriad > patent eligible subject matter > Supreme Court
Using Trademark in Categories Other than the One as Filed May Result in Abandonment
| August 15, 2012
LENS.COM, INC. v. 1-800 CONTACTS, INC.
August 3, 2012
Panel: Newman, Linn and Moore. Opinion by Linn.
Summary
Lens.com, Inc. (“Lens.com”) appeals a decision of the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (“Board”) granting a motion for summary judgment by 1-800 Contacts, Inc. (“1-800 Contacts”) and ordering the cancellation of Lens.com’s registration for the mark LENS due to nonuse. The mark was filed to be used in connection with computer software, but the business of Lens.com is in the field of retail sales of contact lenses. The issue at dispute is whether software incidentally distributed in connection with retail business in the context of an internet service constitutes a “good in commerce.” The court applies a three-prong test established in non-internet-related case law to the current case in finding nonuse of the mark, and distinguishes the current case from an Eleventh Circuit decision.
Lens.com公司就商标裁决上诉委员会批准关于注销 LENS 商标登记的动议提出上诉。 该动议由1-800 Contacts公司提出，称lens.com已停止使用该商标。该商标注册为“计算机软件相关业务”的商标，而Lens.com仅在隐形眼镜零售领域开展业务。该案中的争议问题是互联网零售业务中偶尔附带发送的软件是否构成“商品”。法院利用了建立在非互联网相关案件的判例法上的“三因素测试”认定该商标已停止使用， 并且将本案与第十一巡回法庭判决的一个互联网相关案件加以对比区分。
Tags: abandonment > cancellation > Trademark > use in trade
A Federal Circuit Lesson on the Structuring of Employment Agreements to Ensure That a Company Owns Its Employees’ Inventions
| July 25, 2012
Preston v. Marathon Oil Company and Thomas Smith
July 10, 2012
Panel: Bryson, Dyk and O’Malley. Opinion by O’Malley.
Summary
In this case, an employee, Yale Preston (“Preston”), executed an employment agreement about one month after starting to work as an employee for Marathon Oil Company (“Marathon”). Whether or not the execution of an agreement after starting employment requires further consideration beyond “continued employment” varies based on state law. Here, the Federal Circuit held that no further consideration was required under Wyoming state law and that the employer, Marathon, owned the invention at issue by virtue of the employment agreement. The Federal Circuit further held that Preston did not breach the employment agreement by failing to later sign a subsequent assignment because the employment agreement included the language “does hereby assign” in relation to future inventions, whereby the invention at issue was assigned to Marathon by the employment agreement regardless of whether the invention was after the execution of the employment agreement.
Tags: assignment > contract > employee > employment contract > ownership
CLS Bank v. Alice Corporation: An attempt in formulating the abstractness of the “abstract ideas” test to patent eligibility
| July 18, 2012
CLS Bank v. Alice Corporation
July 9, 2012
Panel: Linn, Prost and O’Malley. Opinion by Linn. Dissent by Prost.
Summary
The district court for the District of Columbia held that claims to computer systems, computer readable medium and claims to methods of using a computer of the asserted patents were all invalid as “abstract ideas.” In so holding, the district court ignored the limitations recited in the claims and boiled the invention down to a mere abstract concept “of employing an intermediary to facilitate simultaneous exchange of obligations in order to minimize risk.” On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment of invalidity under 35 U.S.C. § 101. The Federal Circuit, after considering each asserted claim “as a whole”, found that it was not “manifestly evident” that the claims of the asserted patent were drawn to “abstract ideas.” Therefore, the Federal Circuit held that claims must not be deemed inadequate under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Tags: §101 > abstract idea > algorithm > bilski > business method > computer product > computer system > mathematical formula > mental process > patent eligible subject matter
When should incorporation by reference language be taken care of?
| July 11, 2012
Hollmer v. Harari
June 7, 2012
Panel: Prost, Mayer, O’Malley. Opinion by Prost
Summary
During the interference proceedings, Harari relied on the disclosure of 07/337,579 (‘579 application) which had been originally incorporated by the earliest 3rd great grandparent application 07/337,566 (‘566 application) of the subject application 09/310,880 (‘880 application). The ‘566 application included the disputed incorporation statement and had been abandoned. Two intervening applications copied the same statement and had been patented. The subject application (‘880 application) included the copy of the statement, but Harari corrected the incorporation statement by preliminary amendment which, according to Hollmer, was new matter because it would newly introduce the disclosure of ‘579 application. CAFC decided for Harari by applying the relaxed “reasonable examiner” standard (Harari I, 602 F.3d 1348). However, Harari was not allowed to claim the benefit of the filing date of the ‘566 application because CAFC found that the intervening applications in the chain leading back to the earlier ‘566 application did not comply with the written description requirement due to the ambiguous incorporation statement by applying the strict “person of ordinary skill” standard.
本件は、米国特有の”incorporation by reference”プラクティスに関するものである。インターフェアレンス手続において、Harariは最先の出願(566出願)が”incorporation by reference”によって引用した米国出願(579出願)の開示内容に依存した。566出願は不十分な”incorporation by reference”の記述を含んでいたがそのまま放棄された。566出願の出願日の利益を主張する出願がその後5代に渡って続き、全ての出願は当該不十分な”incorporation by reference”の記述をコピーしていた。Harariは5代目の本願(880出願)を予備補正して”incorporation by reference”の記述を訂正したが、2代目と3代目の中間の出願はそのような訂正を経ずに特許になってしまっていた。本願に関する予備補正が新規事項の追加になるか否かの争いについて、CAFCは、ゆるやかな「審査官の観点」の基準を適用して予備補正が適切であると判断した。一方、本願が特許法第120条の利益を享受して最先の出願日に遡るためには全ての中間の出願が” written description requirement”の要件を満たす必要がある。この要件が不十分な”incorporation by reference”によって妨げられるか否かの争いについて、CAFCは、より厳しい「当業者の観点」の基準を適用して第120条の利益を認めなかった。
[実務上の指針] 最先の出願日に遡るためには、その間にある全ての中間の出願を補正して適切な”incorporation by reference”の記述を含むようにしておくことが必要。
Tags: §120 > Incorporation by reference > written description
Presumption of validity attaches to all issued patents, even incorrectly issued patents
| July 5, 2012
Sciele Pharma Inc. v. Lupin Ltd.
July 2, 2012
Panel: Lourie, Prost, Moore. Opinion by Moore
Summary
Shionogi (new name for Sciele Pharma) obtained US Patent No. 6,866,866 (“the ‘866 patent”) which included broader claims that were intended to be cancelled in favor of narrower claims in response to a rejection. Shionogi brought suit against Lupin for infringement of the ‘866 patent including claims that were to be cancelled. Lupin began selling the alleged infringing product and Shionogi moved for a preliminary injunction. The District Court granted Shionogi’s request for preliminary injunction and Lupin appealed. On appeal, the CAFC stated that even though the ‘866 patent issued with the incorrect claims, the ‘866 patent nonetheless had a presumption of validity and that the clear and convincing evidentiary standard applied for invalidating the patent. The CAFC also stated that there is not a heightened standard just because references were considered by the PTO. With the proper clear and convincing evidentiary standard applied to the ‘866 patent, the CAFC stated that Lupin has raised a substantial question of invalidity, and thus, the preliminary injunction is vacated.
Tags: clear and convincing standard > enablement > injunction > obviousness > preliminary injunction > presumption of validity > validity
Seagate Objective-Reckless Standard is Question of Law to be Decided by Judge and Subject to De Novo Review
| June 28, 2012
Bard Peripheral v. W.L.Gore (on rehearing)
June 14, 2012
Panel: Newman, Gajarsa, and Linn. Opinion by Gajarsa. Dissent-in-Part by Newman.
Summary:
Enhanced damages on willful infringement can be awarded under 35 U.S.C. § 284. For determining willful infringement, In re Seagate established a two-pronged test requiring showing that (1) the infringer acted despite an objectively high likelihood of infringement, and that (2) the infringer knew or should have known the risk. CAFC established the rule that prong (1) tends not to be met where an infringer relies on a reasonable defense. According to CAFC, while an assessment of prong (2) may be a question of fact, determination of prong (1) entails an objective assessment of potential defenses based on the risk, and in considering prong (1) of Seagate, the court is in the best position for making the determination of reasonableness. Thus, CAFC ruled that the objective recklessness is best decided by the judge as a question of law subject to de novo review, even though there are underlying mixed questions of law and fact.
米国特許法284条により、判事は故意侵害に対して損害賠償額を増額することができる。Seagate判決は、故意侵害の立証として、 (1)客観的に侵害可能性が高いにも関らず侵害者が行動したこと、及び(2)侵害者がそのリスクを認識していたこと、を求める二要因基準を確立した。また、侵害者が合理的な抗弁に依存している場合は、要因(1)は通常満足されないことも確立してきている。要因(2) は事実問題であるが、要因(1)の判断は、侵害のリスクに関する、潜在的な抗弁の客観的な評価を含む。したがって、客観的無謀さは、法律と事実の混合した問題に基づくものではあるが、法律問題として、判事が判断するのが最善であり、控訴において全面的に見直されるものである。
For our discussion of the CAFC’s previous holding in this case, please click here.
Tags: §284 > objective recklessness > willful infringement
CAFC pointers on proving lack of “substantial non-infringing uses” in pleading contributory infringement
| June 20, 2012
Toshiba Corporation v. Imation Corp.
Jun 11, 2012
Panel: Dyk, Schall, and Moore. Opinion by Moore. Dissent by Dyk.
Summary:
(1) Grant of summary judgment of non-infringement as to contributory infringement of ‘751 patent affirmed because plaintiff did not meet burden of proof that there was a lack of substantial non-infringing uses.
(2) Grant of summary judgment of non-infringement as to induced infringement of ‘751 patent vacated because district court erred as a matter of law in holding that the existence of a substantial non-infringing use precludes a finding of induced infringement.
(3) Grant of summary judgment of non-infringement of ‘966 patent vacated because it was based on erroneous claim construction.
(4) No clear “take away” on claim construction from discourse between majority and dissent.
Tags: claims construction > contributory infringement > induced infringement > infringement > substantial non-infringing use
