CLS Bank v. Alice Corporation: An attempt in formulating the abstractness of the “abstract ideas” test to patent eligibility
| July 18, 2012
CLS Bank v. Alice Corporation
July 9, 2012
Panel: Linn, Prost and O’Malley. Opinion by Linn. Dissent by Prost.
Summary
The district court for the District of Columbia held that claims to computer systems, computer readable medium and claims to methods of using a computer of the asserted patents were all invalid as “abstract ideas.” In so holding, the district court ignored the limitations recited in the claims and boiled the invention down to a mere abstract concept “of employing an intermediary to facilitate simultaneous exchange of obligations in order to minimize risk.” On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment of invalidity under 35 U.S.C. § 101. The Federal Circuit, after considering each asserted claim “as a whole”, found that it was not “manifestly evident” that the claims of the asserted patent were drawn to “abstract ideas.” Therefore, the Federal Circuit held that claims must not be deemed inadequate under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Tags: §101 > abstract idea > algorithm > bilski > business method > computer product > computer system > mathematical formula > mental process > patent eligible subject matter
When should incorporation by reference language be taken care of?
| July 11, 2012
Hollmer v. Harari
June 7, 2012
Panel: Prost, Mayer, O’Malley. Opinion by Prost
Summary
During the interference proceedings, Harari relied on the disclosure of 07/337,579 (‘579 application) which had been originally incorporated by the earliest 3rd great grandparent application 07/337,566 (‘566 application) of the subject application 09/310,880 (‘880 application). The ‘566 application included the disputed incorporation statement and had been abandoned. Two intervening applications copied the same statement and had been patented. The subject application (‘880 application) included the copy of the statement, but Harari corrected the incorporation statement by preliminary amendment which, according to Hollmer, was new matter because it would newly introduce the disclosure of ‘579 application. CAFC decided for Harari by applying the relaxed “reasonable examiner” standard (Harari I, 602 F.3d 1348). However, Harari was not allowed to claim the benefit of the filing date of the ‘566 application because CAFC found that the intervening applications in the chain leading back to the earlier ‘566 application did not comply with the written description requirement due to the ambiguous incorporation statement by applying the strict “person of ordinary skill” standard.
本件は、米国特有の”incorporation by reference”プラクティスに関するものである。インターフェアレンス手続において、Harariは最先の出願(566出願)が”incorporation by reference”によって引用した米国出願(579出願)の開示内容に依存した。566出願は不十分な”incorporation by reference”の記述を含んでいたがそのまま放棄された。566出願の出願日の利益を主張する出願がその後5代に渡って続き、全ての出願は当該不十分な”incorporation by reference”の記述をコピーしていた。Harariは5代目の本願(880出願)を予備補正して”incorporation by reference”の記述を訂正したが、2代目と3代目の中間の出願はそのような訂正を経ずに特許になってしまっていた。本願に関する予備補正が新規事項の追加になるか否かの争いについて、CAFCは、ゆるやかな「審査官の観点」の基準を適用して予備補正が適切であると判断した。一方、本願が特許法第120条の利益を享受して最先の出願日に遡るためには全ての中間の出願が” written description requirement”の要件を満たす必要がある。この要件が不十分な”incorporation by reference”によって妨げられるか否かの争いについて、CAFCは、より厳しい「当業者の観点」の基準を適用して第120条の利益を認めなかった。
[実務上の指針] 最先の出願日に遡るためには、その間にある全ての中間の出願を補正して適切な”incorporation by reference”の記述を含むようにしておくことが必要。
Tags: §120 > Incorporation by reference > written description
Presumption of validity attaches to all issued patents, even incorrectly issued patents
| July 5, 2012
Sciele Pharma Inc. v. Lupin Ltd.
July 2, 2012
Panel: Lourie, Prost, Moore. Opinion by Moore
Summary
Shionogi (new name for Sciele Pharma) obtained US Patent No. 6,866,866 (“the ‘866 patent”) which included broader claims that were intended to be cancelled in favor of narrower claims in response to a rejection. Shionogi brought suit against Lupin for infringement of the ‘866 patent including claims that were to be cancelled. Lupin began selling the alleged infringing product and Shionogi moved for a preliminary injunction. The District Court granted Shionogi’s request for preliminary injunction and Lupin appealed. On appeal, the CAFC stated that even though the ‘866 patent issued with the incorrect claims, the ‘866 patent nonetheless had a presumption of validity and that the clear and convincing evidentiary standard applied for invalidating the patent. The CAFC also stated that there is not a heightened standard just because references were considered by the PTO. With the proper clear and convincing evidentiary standard applied to the ‘866 patent, the CAFC stated that Lupin has raised a substantial question of invalidity, and thus, the preliminary injunction is vacated.
Tags: clear and convincing standard > enablement > injunction > obviousness > preliminary injunction > presumption of validity > validity
Seagate Objective-Reckless Standard is Question of Law to be Decided by Judge and Subject to De Novo Review
| June 28, 2012
Bard Peripheral v. W.L.Gore (on rehearing)
June 14, 2012
Panel: Newman, Gajarsa, and Linn. Opinion by Gajarsa. Dissent-in-Part by Newman.
Summary:
Enhanced damages on willful infringement can be awarded under 35 U.S.C. § 284. For determining willful infringement, In re Seagate established a two-pronged test requiring showing that (1) the infringer acted despite an objectively high likelihood of infringement, and that (2) the infringer knew or should have known the risk. CAFC established the rule that prong (1) tends not to be met where an infringer relies on a reasonable defense. According to CAFC, while an assessment of prong (2) may be a question of fact, determination of prong (1) entails an objective assessment of potential defenses based on the risk, and in considering prong (1) of Seagate, the court is in the best position for making the determination of reasonableness. Thus, CAFC ruled that the objective recklessness is best decided by the judge as a question of law subject to de novo review, even though there are underlying mixed questions of law and fact.
米国特許法284条により、判事は故意侵害に対して損害賠償額を増額することができる。Seagate判決は、故意侵害の立証として、 (1)客観的に侵害可能性が高いにも関らず侵害者が行動したこと、及び(2)侵害者がそのリスクを認識していたこと、を求める二要因基準を確立した。また、侵害者が合理的な抗弁に依存している場合は、要因(1)は通常満足されないことも確立してきている。要因(2) は事実問題であるが、要因(1)の判断は、侵害のリスクに関する、潜在的な抗弁の客観的な評価を含む。したがって、客観的無謀さは、法律と事実の混合した問題に基づくものではあるが、法律問題として、判事が判断するのが最善であり、控訴において全面的に見直されるものである。
For our discussion of the CAFC’s previous holding in this case, please click here.
Tags: §284 > objective recklessness > willful infringement
CAFC pointers on proving lack of “substantial non-infringing uses” in pleading contributory infringement
| June 20, 2012
Toshiba Corporation v. Imation Corp.
Jun 11, 2012
Panel: Dyk, Schall, and Moore. Opinion by Moore. Dissent by Dyk.
Summary:
(1) Grant of summary judgment of non-infringement as to contributory infringement of ‘751 patent affirmed because plaintiff did not meet burden of proof that there was a lack of substantial non-infringing uses.
(2) Grant of summary judgment of non-infringement as to induced infringement of ‘751 patent vacated because district court erred as a matter of law in holding that the existence of a substantial non-infringing use precludes a finding of induced infringement.
(3) Grant of summary judgment of non-infringement of ‘966 patent vacated because it was based on erroneous claim construction.
(4) No clear “take away” on claim construction from discourse between majority and dissent.
Tags: claims construction > contributory infringement > induced infringement > infringement > substantial non-infringing use
Rule 4(k)(2) Personal Jurisdiction Over a Foreign Defendant
| June 13, 2012
Merial Limited v. Cipla Limited
May 31, 2012
Panel: Lourie, Schall, and Reyna. Opinion by Lourie. Dissent by Schall.
Summary:
Foreign defendant Cipla chose not to respond to plaintiff Merial’s 2007 lawsuit for patent infringement because Cipla believed there was no personal jurisdiction under Georgia’s long arm statute. The Georgia district court entered a default judgment and permanent injunction against Cipla. During a subsequent contempt proceeding to enforce the injunction, the Georgia court found that Cipla was subject to personal jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2) instead of the Georgia long-arm statute. Cipla’s consent to jurisdiction in another forum (the Northern District of Illinois) during the contempt proceedings did not defeat the Georgia court’s reliance on Rule 4(k)(2) because the Federal Circuit held that Cipla failed to show that jurisdiction would have been proper in that other forum at the time of filing of the complaint in Georgia, regardless of Cipla’s later consent to jurisdiction in Illinois. This Federal Circuit decision clarifies that a foreign defendant, to defeat personal jurisdiction under Rule 4(k)(2), must not only identify another forum where suit is possible, but also show that suit is possible in that other forum at the time the suit was filed. A later consent to jurisdiction in another forum may not be enough to defeat personal jurisdiction under Rule 4(k)(2).
CAFC defines “common sense” and warns against impermissible hindsight
| June 6, 2012
Mintz and Jif-Pak Manufacturing v. Dietz & Watson and Package Concepts and Materials
May 30, 2012
Rader, Newman, Dyk. Opinion by Rader.
Summary
This case highlights the important point that obviousness cannot be established by vague and unsubstantiated reliance on “common sense.” Rather, Judge Rader defines the term “common sense” as “knowledge so basic that it certainly lies within the skill set of an ordinary artisan.” The CAFC also warns against hindsight due to defining the problem to be solved based on the solution found by the inventors. Furthermore, the CAFC reminds us that when references from a secondary technical field are used in a rejection, the person of ordinary skill in the art is not a person familiar merely with this secondary technical field, but rather a person familiar with at least the primary technical field.
Tags: common sense > obvious to try > obviousness
Recapture Issues in a Reissue Application
| May 30, 2012
In Re Roger Youman and Marney Morris
May 8, 2012
Panel: Lourie, Schall and Prost. Opinion by Prost. Dissent by Lourie.
Summary:
Applicants filed a broadening reissue application within two years of the patent issuing. The examiner rejected the claims because applicants attempted to recapture surrendered subject matter. The Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (BPAI) affirmed the examiner’s rejection but the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) overturned the BPAI ruling and in doing so, clarified the three step process to determine if applicant is barred by the recapture rule.
Tags: §251 > Broadening > broadening reissue > Error Without Deceptive Intent > Intentional Surrender > Narrowing > recapture > reissue > Reissue Claim
A showing of causal nexus is required between infringement and alleged harm to patentee
| May 23, 2012
Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., et al.
May 14, 2012
Panel: Bryson, Prost, and O’Malley. Opinion by Bryson. Concurrence-in-part and dissent-in-part by O’Malley.
Summary
Apple filed suit against Samsung alleging infringement of Apple’s U.S. Design Patent Nos. D593,087 (“the D’087 patent”), D618,677 (“the D’677 patent”), D504,889 (“the D’889 patent”), and U.S. Patent No. 7,469,381 (“the ’381 patent”). Apple’s iPhone embodies the design in the D’087 patent and D’677 patent, and Apple’s iPad embodies the design in the D’889 patent. Both iPhone and iPad embody a software feature known as the “bounce-back” feature of the ‘381 patent. The district court denied Apple’s motion for a preliminary injunction with respect to each of the accused devices and all four asserted patents. Apple appealed. The CAFC affirms the denial of a preliminary injunction with respect to the D’087, D’677, and ’381 patents, but vacates and reminds with respect to the D’889 patent.
アップル社は、サムスン社がアップル社の米国意匠特許第D593,087号（D’087特許）、D618,677号（D’677特許）、D504,889号（D’889特許）と米国特許第7,469,381号（’381特許）を侵害しているとして訴えた。D’087特許及びD’677特許は、アップル社のiPhoneに係わる意匠で、D’889特許は、iPadに係わる意匠である。また、’381特許は、iPhone及びiPadに係わるソフトウェアである。アップル社は、サムスン社のイ号製品について仮差し止めの申し立てをしたが、地裁はこれを却下した。控訴審でCAFCは、D’087特許、D’677特許及び’381特許に関しては地裁の判決を支持したものの、D’889特許についての判決は破棄・差し戻しした。
Tags: design > design patents > evidence > injunction > preliminary injunction
If at first you don’t succeed ….
| May 18, 2012
In Re Baxter International, Inc.
(Reexamination No. 90/007,751)
May 17, 2012
Panel: Newman, Lourie, Moore. Opinion by Lourie. Dissent by Newman
Summary
The CAFC’s decision in In re Baxter Int’l, Inc. (Fed. Cir. 2012) highlights the distinction between a reexamination and a district court proceeding. Specifically, the CAFC affirmed the Board of Patent Appeal and Interferences (“Board”) determination in a reexamination proceeding that claims 26-31 of U.S. Patent No. 5,247,434 (“the ‘434 patent”) are invalid – despite having previously held in a parallel litigation proceeding that the same claims were not invalid – because the courts and the USPTO use different standards to address validity. However, the CAFC cautioned that had the claims been found to be invalid in the litigation proceeding after all appeals had been exhausted, then the PTO “ideally should not arrive at a different conclusion” during a parallel reexamination proceeding when presented with the same arguments.
Tags: BPAI > parallel litigation > reexamination > standard of proof > standard of review
