Joint Inventorship Gone Up In Smoke For Want of Significant Contribution
Fumika Ogawa | June 16, 2023
HIP, INC. v. HORMEL FOODS CORPORATION
Decided: May 2, 2023
Before Lourie, Clevenger, and Taranto. Opinion by Lourie.
Summary
The CAFC held that an alleged inventor did not make a contribution sufficiently significant in quality to establish joint inventorship to an issued patent, where the alleged contributed concept was only minimally mentioned throughout the entirety of the patent document including the specification, drawings and claims.
Details
Hormel Foods Corporation (“Hormel”) owns U.S. Patent 9,980,498 (the “’498 patent”) relating to production of precooked bacon. While a traditional bacon producer would “precook” or prepare the bacon prior to sale by a certain type of oven, such as microwave or steam oven, the invention uses a two-step, hybrid oven system to improve the precooking process. FIG. 1, reproduced below, depicts a principle embodiment where a microwave oven 40 initially heats bacon so as to form a coating of melted fat around the meat piece, followed by a super heated steam oven 60 equipped with external steam source 61 for further cooking to a finishing temperature:
Per the ‘498 patent, the first step of forming the “fat barrier” protects the underlying meat from condensation and resulting dilution of flavor, whereas the second step using the external gas source prevents the oven’s internal surfaces from becoming hotter than the smoke point of bacon fat, which would otherwise cause off flavor of the resulting product.
The ’498 patent includes independent claims 1, 5 and 13, defining the inventive method using slightly different languages from each other. As relevant on appeal, claims 1 and 13 both recite a particular mode of cooking in the first step of the hybrid system as “preheating … with a microwave oven,” whereas claim 5 recites three alternative preheating techniques using a Markush language, “selected from the group consisting of a microwave oven, an infrared oven, and hot air.”
As part of its R&D efforts toward the improved precooking process, Hormel contacted Unitherm Food Systems, Inc. (“Unitherm”), now HIP, a manufacturer of cooking machinery such as industrial ovens. The parties jointly agreed to develop an oven to be used in a two-step cooking process. The alleged inventor in question, David Howard of Unitherm, was involved in those meetings and testing process where he allegedly disclosed an infrared heating concept to Hormel. As Hormel’s further R&D—including testing with their own facility instead of Unitherm’s facility—eventually led to the discovery of the inventive two-step process, Hormel filed for a patent. The resulting ’498 patent named four inventors, which did not include Howard.
HIP sued Hormel in the District Court for the District of Delaware, alleging that Howard was either the sole inventor or a joint inventor of the ’498 patent. HIP argued, among other things, that Howard contributed to preheating with an infrared oven, the concept recited in independent claim 5. The district court held that although Howard was not the sole inventor, his contribution of the infrared oven concept made him a joint inventor of the ’498 patent. Hormel appealed.
On appeal, Hormel argued, among other things,[1] that Howard was not a joint inventor because the infrared oven concept was well known, and his alleged contribution was insignificant in quality relative to the extent of the full invention.
Specifically, the joint inventorship issue was argued based on the three-part test set forth in Pannu v. Iolab Corp., 155 F.3d 1344, 1351. Under Pannu, to qualify as an additional joint inventor, one must have:
(1) contributed in some significant manner to the conception of the invention;
(2) made a contribution to the claimed invention that is not insignificant in quality, when that contribution is measured against the dimension of the full invention; and
(3) did more than merely explain to the real inventors well-known concepts and/or the current state of the art.
Hormel asserted that Howard met none of the three factors, and HIP countered that each and every factor was met so as to establish joint inventorship.
The CAFC ultimately sided with Hormel. The CAFC focused its analysis on the second Pannu factor, noting specific circumstances:
- Small # of times mentioned in the specification: The alleged contribution, preheating with an infrared oven, is “mentioned only once in the … specification as an alternative heating method to a microwave oven.”
- Small # of times mentioned in the claims: The alleged contribution is “recited only once in a single claim” whereas the two other independent claims recite preheating with a microwave oven, with no mention of an infrared oven.
- Presence of a more significant alternative in the disclosure: The alternative to the alleged contribution, preheating with a microwave oven, “feature[s] prominently throughout the specification, claims, and figures.”
- Specification focused on the alternative: All the specific examples disclosed in the specification are limited to embodiments using preheating with a microwave oven.
- Drawings focused on the alternative: All the figures, including Figure 1 primarily depicting the operating principles of the claimed invention, are limited to embodiments based on preheating with a microwave oven.
Noting that the entirety of the ’498 patent disclosure supports insignificance in quality of the alleged contribution per the second part of Pannu test, the CAFC concluded that Howard did not qualify as a joint inventor. Lastly, the CAFC noted that there was no need to address the other Pannu factors “as the failure to meet any one factor is dispositive on the question of inventorship.”
Takeaway
This case provides a reminder of the role a patent disclosure may play in determining the question of joint inventorship. In particular, although the second Pannu factor requires the inventor’s contribution to be “not insignificant in quality” (emphasis added), in certain circumstances, the amount of mentions made of the alleged contributed concept in the patent, along with other considerations such as the primary focus of the patent as discerned from the entire disclosure, may influence the determination of joint inventorship.
[1] Hormel’s second main argument challenges insufficiency of corroboration of Howard’s testimony, the question rendered moot due to the decision on the significance of the alleged contribution.
CAFC upheld ITC’s ruling under the ‘Infrequently Applied’ Anderson two-step test regarding the enablement of open-ended ranges
Adele Critchley | June 8, 2023
FS.com Inc. v. ITC and Corning Optical Corp.
Decided: April 20, 2023
Before Moore, Prost and Hughes. Opinion by Moore.
Summary:
Corning filed a complaint with the ITC alleging FS was violating §337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended (19 U.S.C. 1337), (a.k.a ‘unfair import’) by importing high-density fiber optic equipment that infringed several of their patents – U.S. Patent Nos. 9,020,320; 10,444,456; 10,120,153; and 8,712,206. The patents relate to fiber optic technology commonly used in data centers.
The Commission ultimately determined that FS’ importation of the high-density fiber optic equipment violated §337 and issued a general exclusion order prohibiting the importation of infringing high-density fiber optic equipment and components thereof and a cease-and-desist order directed to FS.
Subsequently, FS appealed the Commission’s determination that the claims of the ’320 and ’456 patents are enabled and its claim construction of “a front opening” in the ’206 patent.
ISSUE 1: ENABLEMENT
FS challenges the Commission’s determination that claims 1 and 3 of the ’320 patent and claims 11, 12, 15, 16, and 21 of the ’456 patent are enabled. These claims recite, in part, “a fiber optic connection density of at least ninety-eight (98) fiber optic connections per U space” or “a fiber optic connection of at least one hundred forty-four (144) fiber optic connections per U space.” FS argued these open-ended density ranges are not enabled because the specification only enables up to 144 fiber optic connections per U space.
A patent’s specification must describe the invention and “the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains . . . to make and use the same.” 35 U.S.C. § 112(a). To enable, “the specification of a patent must teach those skilled in the art how to make and use the full scope of the claimed invention without undue experimentation.”
In determining enablement, the Commission applied the two-part standard set forth in Anderson Corp. v. Fiber Composites, LLC, 474 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2007):
[O]pen-ended claims are not inherently improper; as for all claims their appropriateness depends on the particular facts of the invention, the disclosure, and the prior art. They may be supported if there is an inherent, albeit not precisely known, upper limit and the specification enables one of skill in the art to approach that limit.
Although the CAFC acknowledged that the Anderson test is infrequently applied, both FS and Corning agreed that the test governed their legal dispute. In applying this standard, the Commission determined the challenged claims were enabled because skilled artisans would understand the claims to have an inherent upper limit and that the specification enables skilled artisans to approach that limit.
The CAFC agreed, understanding the Commission’s opinion as determining there is an inherent upper limit of about 144 connections per U space. See Appellant’s Opening Br. at 51 (“The only potential finding by the Commission of an inherent upper limit to the open-ended claims is approximately 144 connections per 1U space.”). Specifically, that determination was based on the Commission’s finding that skilled artisans would have understood, as of the ’320 and ’456 patent’s shared priority date (August 2008), that densities substantially above 144 connections per U space were technologically infeasible. This was supported by expert testimony.
ISSUE 2: CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
The Commission construed “a front opening” in claim 14 of the ’206 patent as encompassing one or more openings. FS argued the proper construction of “a front opening” is limited to a single front opening and therefore its modules, which contain multiple openings separated by material or dividers, do not infringe claims 22 and 23. The CAFC disagreed.
The CAFC held that, generally, the terms “a” or “an” in a patent claim mean “one or more,” unless the patentee evinces a clear intent to limit “a” or “an” to “one.” 01 Communique Lab’y, Inc. v. LogMeIn, Inc., 687 F.3d 1292, 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2012). The CAFC concluded here that the claim language and written description did not demonstrate a clear intent to depart from this general rule.
Comments:
- Open-end ranges are not automatically improper. If such a range is required/desired during prosecution, apply the two-part standard set forth in Anderson: (1) is there inherent, albeit not precisely known, support for an upper limit and (2) does the specification enables one of skill in the art to approach that limit.
- The terms “a” or “an” in a patent claim remain to mean “one or more,” unless the patentee evinces a clear intent to limit “a” or “an” to “one.”
File your patent application before attending a trade show to showcase your products
Sung-Hoon Kim | May 26, 2023
Minerva Surgical, Inc. v. Hologic, Inc., Cytyc Surgical Products, LLC
Decided: February 15, 2023
Summary:
Minerva Surgical, Inc. sued Hologic, Inc. and Cytyc Surgical Products, LLC in the District of Delaware for infringement of U.S. Patent No. 9,186,208 (“the ’208 patent”). Hologic moved for summary judgment of invalidity, arguing that the ’208 patent claims were anticipated under the public use bar of pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). The district court granted summary judgment that the asserted claims are anticipated under the public use bar of pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) because the patented technology was “in public use,” and the technology was “ready for patenting.” The Federal Circuit held that the district court correctly determined that Minerva’s disclosure of their constituted the invention being “in public use,” and that the device was “ready for patenting.” Therefore, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment.
Details:
Minerva Surgical, Inc. sued Hologic, Inc. and Cytyc Surgical Products, LLC in the District of Delaware for infringement of U.S. Patent No. 9,186,208 (“the ’208 patent”).
The ’208 patent is directed to surgical devices for a procedure called “endometrial ablation” for stopping or reducing abnormal uterine bleeding. This procedure includes inserting a device having an energy-delivery surface into a patient’s uterus, expanding the surface, energizing the surface to “ablate” or destroy the endometrial lining of the patient’s uterus, and removing the surface.
The application for the’208 patent was filed on November 2, 2021 and claims a priority date of November 7, 2011. Therefore, the critical date for the ’208 patent is November 7, 2010.
The ’208 patent
Independent claim 13 is a representative claim:
A system for endometrial ablation comprising:
an elongated shaft with a working end having an axis and comprising a compliant energy-delivery surface actuatable by an interior expandable-contractable frame;
the surface expandable to a selected planar triangular shape configured for deployment to engage the walls of a patient’s uterine cavity;
wherein the frame has flexible outer elements in lateral contact with the compliant surface and flexible inner elements not in said lateral contact, wherein the inner and outer elements have substantially dissimilar material properties.
The appeal focused on the claim term, “the inner and outer elements have substantially dissimilar material properties” (“SDMP” term”).
District Court
After discovery, Hologic moved for summary judgment of invalidity, arguing that the ’208 patent claims were anticipated under the public use bar of pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).
The district court granted summary judgment that the asserted claims are anticipated under the public use bar of pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) because of the following reasons:
First, the patented technology was “in public use” because Minerva disclosed fifteen devices (“Aurora”) at an event, where Minerva showcased them at a booth, in meeting with interested parties, and in a technical presentation. Also, Minerva did not disclose them under any confidentiality obligations.
Second, the technology was “ready for patenting” because Minerva created working prototypes and enabling technical documents.
Federal Circuit
The Federal Circuit reviewed a district court’s grant of summary judgment under the law of the regional circuit (Third Circuit).
The Federal Circuit held that “the public use bar is triggered ‘where, before the critical date, the invention is [(1)] in public use and [(2)] ready for patenting.’”
The “in public use” element is satisfied if the invention “was accessible to the public or was commercially exploited” by the invention.
“Ready for patenting” requirement can be shown in two ways – “by proof of reduction to practice before the critical date” and “by proof that prior to the critical date the inventor had prepared drawings or other descriptions of the invention that were sufficiently specific to enable a person skilled in the art to practice the invention.”
The Federal Circuit held that disclosing the Aurora device at the event (American Association of Gynecologic Laparoscopists (“AAGL 2009”)) constituted the invention being “in public use” because this event included attendees who were critical to Minerva’s business, and Minerva’s disclosure of their devices included showcasing them at a booth, in meeting with interested parties, and in a technical presentation.
The Federal Circuit noted that AAGL 2009 was the “Super Bowl” of the industry and was open to the public, and that Minerva had incentives to showcase their products to the attendees. Also, Minerva sponsored a presentation by one of their board members to highlight their products and pitched their products to industry members, who were able to see how they operate.
The Federal Circuit also noted that there were no “confidentiality obligations imposed upon” those who observed Minerva’s devices, and that the attendees were not required to sign non-disclosure agreements.
The Federal Circuit also held that Minerva’s Aurora devices at the event disclosed the SDMP term because Minerva’s documentation about this device from before and shortly after the event disclosed this device having the SDMP terms or praises benefits derived from this device having the SDMP technology.
The Federal Circuit held that the record clearly showed that Minerva reduced the invention to practice by creating working prototypes that embodied the claim and worked for the intended purpose.
The Federal Circuit noted that there was documentation “sufficiently specific to enable a person skilled in the art to practice the invention” of the disputed SDMP term. Here, the documentation included the drawings and detailed descriptions in the lab notebook pages disclosing a device with the SDMP term.
Therefore, the Federal Circuit held that the district court correctly determined that Minerva’s disclosure of the Aurora device constituted the invention being “in public use” and that the device was “ready for patenting.”
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment because there are no genuine factual disputes, and Hologic is entitled to judgment as a matter of law that the ’208 patent is anticipated under the public use bar of § 102(b).
Takeaway:
- File your patent application before attending a trade show to showcase your products.
- Have the attendees of the trade show sign non-disclosure agreements, if necessary.
Tags: 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) > confidentiality > critical date > enablement > pre-AIA > prototype > public use > reduction to practice > summary judgment
Common Sense Still Applies In Claim Construction
John Kong | May 13, 2023
Alterwan, Inc. v Amazon.com Inc
Decided: March 13, 2023
Before Lourie, Dyk, Stoll (Opinion by Dyk)
Summary:
For a claim term “non-blocking bandwidth,” the district court accepted the applicant-as-his-own-lexicographer definition set forth in the specification to mean “a bandwidth that will always be available and will always be sufficient.” This meant that bandwidth must be available even when the Internet is down – which is impossible (and hence, the parties’ agreed-upon stipulation of non-infringement with this claim interpretation). Courts will not rewrite “unambiguous” claim language to cure such absurd positions or to sustain validity. But, when the claim language is “not unambiguous” concerning the disputed interpretation, common sense applies in claim construction, especially in view of the proper context for the source of the applicant-as-his-own-lexicographer definition.
Procedural History:
Alterwan sued Amazon for patent infringement. After a Markman hearing and motions for summary judgment by both parties, the district court changed the claim construction for “cooperating service provider” at a summary judgment hearing to be a “service provider that agrees to provide non-blocking bandwidth.” The district court construed “non-blocking bandwidth” to be “a bandwidth that will always be available and will always be sufficient” which meant that the bandwidth will be available even if the Internet is down. With this updated construction, the parties filed a stipulation and order of non-infringement of the patents-in-suit. Amazon argued, and the patentee agreed, that if the claim required bandwidth provision even when the Internet is down, Amazon could not possibly infringe. The district court entered the stipulated judgment of non-infringement and the parties appealed.
Decision:
Representative claim 1 is as follows:
An apparatus, comprising:
an interface to receive packets;
circuitry to identify those packets of the received packets corresponding to a set of one or more predetermined addresses, to identify a set of one or more transmission paths associated with the set of one or more predetermined addresses, and to select a specific transmission path from the set of one or more transmission paths; and
an interface to transmit the packets corresponding to the set of one or more predetermined addresses using the specific transmission path;
wherein
each transmission path of the set of one or more transmission paths is associated with a reserved, non-blocking bandwidth, and
the circuitry is to select the specific transmission path to be a transmission path from the [sic] set of one or more transmission paths that corresponds to a minimum link cost relative to each other transmission path in the set of one or more transmission paths.
The specification states “the quality of service problem that has plagued prior attempts is solved by providing non-blocking bandwidth (bandwidth that will always be available and will always be sufficient)…” (USP 8,595,478, col. 4, line 66 to col. 5, line 2). Accordingly, “non-blocking bandwidth” was defined by the applicant, acting as his own lexicographer, to mean “a bandwidth that will always be available and will always be sufficient.”
Normally, “[c]ourts may not redraft claims, whether to make them operable or to sustain validity” (citing, Chef Am., Inc. v. Lamb-Weston, Inc., 358 F.3d 1371, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). In Chef America, the claim limitation “heating the resulting batter-coated dough to a temperature in the range of about 400°F to 850°F” would lead to an absurd result in that the dough would be burnt. Instead, the limitation would be made operable if it recited heating the dough “at” a temperature in the range of about 400°F to 850°F. However, since the limitation at issue was unambiguous, the court declined to rewrite the claim to replace the term “to” with “at.”
However, the court noted that, “[h]ere, the claim language itself does not unambiguously require bandwidth to be available even when the Internet is inoperable.” So, “Chef America does not require us to depart from common sense in claim construction.” Without “unambiguous” claim language requiring the disputed interpretation (“a bandwidth that will always be available and will always be sufficient”), the court proceeded to check the context for the support for the disputed interpretation. That “context” included specification discussion of wide area network technology that uses the internet as a backbone, and several “quality of service” problems that arise from the use of the internet as a backbone, including latency problems in the delays for critical transmission packets getting from a source to a destination over that internet backbone. The patent’s solution was to provide “preplanned high bandwidth, low hop-count routing paths” between sites that are geographically separated. These preplanned routing paths are a “key characteristic that all species within the genus of the invention will share.” It is after this discussion that the specification then concludes “[i]n other words, the quality of service problem that has plagued prior attempts is solved by providing non-blocking bandwidth (bandwidth that will always be available and will always be sufficient) and predefining routes for the ’private tunnel’ paths between points on the internet…”
Providing bandwidth even with the Internet being down is an impossibility. The specification describes operability and transmission over the Internet as a backbone and is completely silent about provision of bandwidth when the Internet is unavailable. In context, the definitional sentence for “non-blocking bandwidth” is addressing the problem of latency (when the Internet is operational), rather than providing for bandwidth even when there is no Internet. The court’s decision does not opine on what the meaning of non-blocking bandwidth is, but holds that “it does not require bandwidth when the Internet is down.”
Takeaways:
The court will not redraft claim language during claim construction to maintain operability or sustain validity when the claim language is unambiguous. But, when the claim language is “not unambiguous,” common sense applies, especially when looking at any source of the disputed interpretation in context.
« Previous Page — Next Page »
