Problems That May Arise When Inventor Changes Employment: Obviousness-type Double Patenting
| March 13, 2013
In Re Jeffery Hubbell
March 7, 2013
Panel: Newman, O’Malley and Wallach. Opinion by O’Malley. Dissent by Newman.
Summary
Most patent practitioners would not be worried about an issued patent having a much later filing date than the application they are prosecuting. However, this case illustrates that such a patent can ultimately bar their application from issuing due to the doctrine of obviousness-type double patenting.
Tags: common assignees > common ownership > double patenting > inventorship > obviousness-type double patenting > terminal disclaimer
Direct infringement requires that party exercises “control or direction” over performance of each claimed step, but inducement does not have single-entity requirement
| March 11, 2013
Move, Inc. v. Real Estate Alliance Ltd.
March 4, 2013
Panel: Rader, Lourie and Moore. Opinion by Lourie
Summary:
REAL owns the ’989 patent, directed to methods for locating real estate properties using a zoom-enabled map on a computer. Move operates websites that allow users to search for available real estate properties. REAL alleged that the functions employed by Move’s websites infringed REAL’s claims. In the recent en banc decision of Akamai, CAFC decided an issue of divided infringement under § 271(b). On the issue of direct infringement under § 271(a), CAFC found that there is no genuine issue of material fact that Move does not control or direct the performance of each step of the claimed method. Therefore, Move is not liable for direct infringement. However, CAFC vacated the summary judgment regarding indirect infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b). In en banc in Akamai, all the steps of a claimed method must be performed in order to find induced infringement, but that it is not necessary to prove that all the steps were committed by a single entity. Since the district court summarily concluded that because Move, as a single party, was not liable for direct infringement, it could not be liable for joint infringement. However, in Akamai, a single-entity requirement is not required in the inducement context.
Real社はコンピュータ上で拡大することが可能な地図を使用して、不動産物件の所在地を示す方法に関する特許を所有していた。一 方、Move社らは、ユーザーが不動産物件を探すことができるウェブサイトを運営していた。Real社は、Move社のウェブサイト機能がReal社の特 許を侵害すると主張した。
CAFCは特許法271条(b)項における共同侵害の成立要件に関して、昨年、Akamai判決（大法廷）を下し たが、本件では、Move社はクレーム方法の各ステップの実行を監督したり指示したりしていないので、特許法271条(a)項の直接侵害に関しては事実関 係についての実質的な争いはない。したがって、Move社の直接侵害はないと判断した地裁判決は正しい。
しかしながら、誘発侵害成立のため には、方法クレームの全てのステップが実行されることが条件ではあるが、全てのステップが単独で被告によって実行されていることは必ずしも要件ではないこ とをAkamai判決では判示した。ところが、本件の地裁判決は、Move社が単独で直接侵害がないがゆえに、共同侵害もないと判断している。 Akamai判決に従うならば、被告が単独で全てのステップを実施したかどうかは誘発侵害成立の要件にはならない。よって、特許法271条(b)項の間接 侵害に関する地裁のサマリージャッジメントを破棄し、誘発侵害の認定を地裁に差し戻した。
Tags: direct infringement > divided infringement > indirect infringement > method claims
A District Court application of Therasense
| February 28, 2013
Caron and Spellbinders Paper Arts Company, LLC vs. QuicKutz, Inc.
United States District Court for the District Of Arizona
November 13, 2012, Decided
SUMMARY
In Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Company, 649 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2011) the CAFC ruled that District Courts must find intent and materiality separately, i.e., weighing the evidence of intent to deceive independently from analysis of materiality.
Here, in one of the few cases since Therasense, a District Court applies separate analyses for each of intent and materiality. In addition, the District Court applied the exception to the but-for materiality requirement in cases of affirmative egregious misconduct.
Knowingly not naming the inventors was held to be inequitable conduct.
Declarations by persons not skilled in the art were held to be inequitable conduct.
Declarations that did not disclose financial relationships with the inventors were held to be inequitable conduct.
A Declaration where the Declarant, when he made the declaration, did not know whether the statements in the declaration were true or not was held to be inequitable conduct.
Tags: but-for test > declaration > egregious conduct > inequitable conduct > inventorship
Entirely reasonable? “Black box” claim interpretation by split Federal Circuit panel leaves us in the dark
| February 13, 2013
Harris Corp. v. Fed Ex Corp. (non-precedential)
January 17, 2013
Panel: Lourie, Clevenger, and Wallach. Opinion by Clevenger. Dissent by Wallach
Summary:
Over a dissent, the Federal Circuit panel makes a strict interpretation of “antecedent basis,” which results in a reversal of the District Court’s claim interpretation, and a remand to re-evaluate the infringement issue.
Harris’s patents cover methods and systems for using spread spectrum radio signals to send flight data from a plane’s “black box” to an airport receiver at the end of the flight. The invention includes steps of generating, accumulating and storing flight data in the plane during the flight, followed by a step of “transmitting the accumulated, stored generated aircraft data” once at the airport.
At the District Court, a jury found that Fed Ex willfully infringed Harris’s patents by using a “design-around” system that transmits all flight data except an optional 5-minute segment.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit panel majority holds that Harris patent claims are limited to the transmission of “all data generated during the flight,” not just any data subset representative of the flight. The panel’s view is that the narrower interpretation is “entirely reasonable” since the transmitting step refers to the generating step.
In contrast, the dissent sees the claim language as open, so that it would be “counterintuitive” to require that all the generated data must be transmitted.
Tags: antecedent basis > claim construction > claim interpretation
Board Should Consider Appellee’s Grounds For Affirming Rejection Presented To Examiner During Reexamination, Even If Grounds Had Not Been Raised On Appeal
| February 6, 2013
Rexnord Industries v. Kappos
January 23, 2013
Panel: Newman, Lourie, Prost. Opinion by Newman.
Summary:
In 2003 Habasit filed an infringement suit against Rexnord in the United States District Court for the District of Delaware for infringement of its U.S. Patent No. 6,523,680 (the ’680 patent). Rexnord then requested inter partes reexamination of the ’680 patent, and the district court stayed the infringement suit pending completion of reexamination.
On reexamination, the examiner held all of the claims in the ’680 patent unpatentable for anticipation and obviousness. Habasit appealed the examiner’s decision to the United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (Board). On appeal, the Board reversed the examiner’s decision and held the claims patentable.
Rexnord appealed to the CAFC. The CAFC affirmed that the claims are not anticipated, and reversed the Board’s determination that the claimed invention is not obvious in view of certain prior art.
Tags: anticipation > appeal > obviousness > reexamination
Claim Construction and Expert Testimony in Pharmaceutical Patent Litigation
| January 31, 2013
Allergan, Inc. v. Barr Laboratories, Inc., Teva Pharmaceutical USA, Inc., and Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd. and Sandoz Inc.
January 28, 2013
Panel: Rader, Bryson and Wallach. Opinion by Bryson.
Summary
Barr Lab. and Sandoz Inc. etc. (collectively Defendants) filed a Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA), listing the patented product in Allergan’s ‘819 patent. Allergan filed an infringement suit against the Defendants. The district court ruled for Allergan, and the Defendants brought it to appeal.
One major point of dispute was about one moiety in the claimed compounds described in claim 5 of patent ‘819 as representable by –N(R4)2. The Defendants asserted that the two R4 moieties must be construed as identical. The district court and the CAFC both found for Allergan in holding that the R4 units did not need to be identical.
Another point of dispute was about the requirement for courts’ independent inquiry into “obviousness” type of patent invalidity case. The CAFC affirmed the district court’s decision that the expert testimony may be a required part of patent invalidity cases based on obviousness, and that independent review of a case involving complex technology, in absence of expert witness, is not required.
Barr Labs和Sandoz公司（以下统称被告）向联邦食品药品管理局提出简化新药申请（ANDA）中将Allergan公司的819专利所保护的专利药品列为仿制药。 Allergan公司对被告提起侵权诉讼。联邦地区法院裁定Allergan胜诉，被告遂到联邦巡回法庭提出上诉。
争议要点之一是，在专利819的权利要求5，对要求受保护药物的描述包括该化合物含有基团 “–N（R 4）2”。被告声称，这两个R4基团应该理解为相同基团。区法院和联邦巡回上诉法院都认同Allergan的理解，认定对R4基团定义应基于该专利文件中的具体描述，所以两个R4基团不一定相同。
另一个争议点是专利无效请求的案件中法院是否有义务进行独立调查。联邦巡回上诉法院肯定了地区法院的判决，即专家证词可能是专利无效案件的证据的必要组成部分，而当专利无效案件涉及复杂的技术时，在专利无效请求人未提供专家证人的情况下，法庭不需要独立调查案件即可直接判定专利无效请求人应证据不足败诉。
Tags: ANDA > claim construction > expert witness > markush group
Applicant’s failure to request claim construction under §112, 6th paragraph may invoke waiver of such claim construction
| January 23, 2013
In re Avid Identification Systems, Inc.
January 8, 2013
Panel: Lourie, Clevenger and Bryson. Opinion by Lourie. Dissent by Clevenger.
Summary:
The Examiner rejected claims of a patent at issue, and the PTO board maintained the rejection finding that a means-plus function limitation was found in prior art where its broadest reasonable meaning was given. CAFC affirmed the PTO decision, and denied the Applicants’ request for a claim construction under § 112, 6th paragraph, instead of the broadest reasonable interpretation. CAFC reasoned that the Applicants waived that claim construction by failing to raise the issue during the procedure in the PTO. The dissenting opinion pointed out that the claim construction according to § 112, 6th paragraph is mandatory as the statutory requirement where the claim term clearly invokes the application of § 112, 6th paragraph.
出願人はクレームが自明であるとして拒絶した特許庁審判部の判断を不服として、ＣＡＦＣに控訴した。問題のクレームには、ミーンズプラスファンクション（”means for”の用語を用いた限定 ）を記載がある。そのような記載があると通常、特許法112条第6パラグラフの適用があり、その機能限定は明細書に開示されている構造もしくはそれと均等な構造を記載していると限定解釈される。しかしながら、本件では、特許庁審査官および審判部は、そのミーンズプラスファンクションの限定を、一般的な構造限定のときのように合理的な範囲で最も広い意味（broadest reasonable meaning）の基準を用いて解釈した。この広い解釈に基づいてその機能限定は先行技術に記載されていると特許庁は判断した。この経緯に関してＣＡＦＣは、出願人は特許庁の手続きにおいて112条第6パラグラフの適用を自ら主張しなかったためその機会を放棄したと判断し、出願人の主張を退けた。ＣＡＦＣ裁判官の１人は、112条第6パラグラフの適用は制定法上の要求であり、出願人や審査官が同法に基づく限定解釈を要求しなくても先ずその解釈を採用すべきであるとの反対意見を述べた。
Tags: means > means-plus-function > procedural issues > waiver
The Non-Obviousness of Obviousness Determinations: Even In Simple Technologies, It Can Be Difficult to Draw a Line in Obviousness Determinations
| January 9, 2013
C.W. Zumbiel Company, Inc. v. Kappos and Graphic Packaging International, Inc.
December 27, 2012
Panel: Prost, Moore, and Wallach. Opinion by Wallach. Dissent byProst.
Summary:
This appeal arises out of an Inter Partes Reexamination before the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences, the decision. Both the patentee and the third-party requester appealed the Board’s decision, which indicated that certain claims were obvious and certain claims were nonobvious. In this case, the Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s entire decision. The technology at issue involved a carton for a pack of cans (such as, e.g., soda cans) having a perforated flap portion that is torn and folded down to dispensing the cans. This case highlights that even in non-complex technologies, it can be difficult to draw a line in obviousness determinations, and how when there are little possible variations in structure, if such variations lead to predictable results obviousness may be found (such as here in, e.g., claim 1), but that when there are little possible variations in structure, if other factors such as teaching away in the art, lack of incentive for such a modification exist, nonobviousness may be found (such as here in, e.g., claim 2).
Vitiation exclusion: a judicial determination ensuring that doctrine of equivalents does not overtake statutory function of claims in defining scope of exclusive rights
| January 2, 2013
Deere & Co. v. Bush Hog
December 4, 2012
Panel: Rader, Newman and Plager. Opinion by Rader.
Summary
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa, among other things, construed the claimed term “into engagement with” of ‘980 Patent to require direct contact and construed “being secured to” of ‘980 Patent as “fastened or attached.” Based on this construction, the district court granted Bush Hog & Co. LLC’s and Great Plains Inc.’s motions for summary judgment of noninfringement by holding that Deere did not raise a genuine issue of material fact as to literal infringement because the upper deck walls do not come into contact with the lower deck walls in any of the accused products. In addition, the district court held that Deere could not assert infringement under the doctrine of equivalents because doing so would vitiate the “into engagement with” limitation. Because in the context of the ‘980 Patent “into engagement with” encompasses indirect contact, the Federal Circuit vacated the district court’s construction of this term, reversed the grant of summary judgment, and remanded for further proceedings. Also, the Federal Circuit found that the district court invoked vitiation exclusion in error by refusing to apply the doctrine of equivalents because “a reasonable jury could find that a small spacer connecting the upper and lower deck walls represents an insubstantial difference from direct contact.” Therefore, the Federal Circuit also vacated the grant of summary judgment of no infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.
Tags: all elements rule > doctrine of equivalents > infringement > literal infringement > vitiation
Dealing with Different Embodiments of the Specification
| December 26, 2012
Sandisk Corp. v. Kingston Tech. Co., Inc.
October 9, 2012
Panel: Prost, Reyna and Wallach. Opinion by Prost. Dissent by Reyna.
Summary
The claim construction of the term “relative time” caused the issue whether one of two different embodiments of the specification should be excluded from the scope of literal infringement. The district court excluded the second embodiment, focusing on the claim term “time.” CAFC disagrees, emphasizing the significance of the claim term “relative.” Judge Reyna dissents.
明細書が2つの実施例を含んでいる場合に、クレームの文言が両方の実施例をカバーしているのか、それとも片方の実施例は除外されるべきかが問題となった事件である。この問題は、クレームに記載された「相対的な時間」(relative time)の文言解釈をどのように行うかによって判断が分かれた。地裁ならびにdissent(反対意見)は、クレームの「時間」(time)を厳格に解釈して第2実施例を除外すべきと判断した。CAFCは、クレームの「相対的」(relative)に重きを置き、第2実施例を除外すべきでないと判断した。「両方の実施例がクレームでカバーされる」という一言が明細書に含まれていれば、この問題は回避できたと思われる。
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Tags: claim construction > exclusion of embodiment > multiple embodiments
