CAFC’s majority says that a PTO’ decision to institute IPR is not appealable even after a final decision and a broadest reasonable interpretation rule applies in IPR
| July 22, 2015
In Re Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC
July 8, 2015
Before: Newman, Clevenger, and DYK. Opinion by DYK. Dissenting opinion by Newman.
Summary
Garmin filed in the PTO a petition to institute an inter partes review (IPR) on patented claims owned by Cuozzo. The PTO granted the petition to institute the IPR and concluded that the claims at issue were obvious over prior art. Cuozzo appealed to CAFC, arguing: (1) the petition was defective as failing to identify prior art references for each claim; and (2) a broadest reasonable interpretation (BRI) standard should not be applied in the obviousness determination. CAFC held: (1) the statute prohibits a review on the PTO’s decision to institute the IPR even the final decision was on appeal; and (2) the BRI standard applies in IPR.
Japanese Summary
本判決は、（１）第三者の請求に基づく特許付与後レビュー（inter partes review; IPR）においてその請求書の内容に問題があった場合にそれをCAFCが審査できるか否か、および（２）クレーム解釈の基準として、最大限に広い合理的な解釈（a broadest reasonable interpretation: BRI）をIPRの審査に使用してよいか否かという争点に関するものである。
IPRは2段階の手続きであり、まず特許庁は第三者が提示した請求内容がIPRでの審査を開始するための要件を満足しているかを決定し、レビューを開始すると決定した場合、特許クレームが無効であるか否かを決定する。本件では、文献の引用が一部欠落しているクレームに対して特許庁がレビューを開始し、無効の結論を出した。特許権者はレビュー開始の決定が違法であるとして控訴したが、CAFCは、特許庁がレビューを開始するという決定は控訴可能な対象ではなく、特許庁が正しい引用例で結論を出したので問題ではないと判断した。
またIPRではクレーム補正の機会は制限され、従前の再審査よりも司法手続きに近い制度である。特許権者は、補正制限等のあるIPRでは、クレーム解釈の基準として、最大限に広く合理的な解釈（BRI）を使用すべきではないと主張した。CAFCは、IPRを含めて特許庁における付与後見直しにBRIの基準を使用することは長年の運用で認められており、法律上も問題ないと判断した。
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Tags: BRI > broadest reasonable interpretation > institution > inter partes review > IPR
Indefiniteness kills patent, as expert testimony cannot compensate for the failure of intrinsic evidence to provide a “reasonably certain” meaning to claim term.
| July 15, 2015
Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc.
June 18, 2015
Before: Moore, Mayer, Wallach. Opinion by Moore. Dissent by Mayer.
Summary
The validity of Teva Pharmceuticals’ patent hinged on the definiteness of the term “molecular weight”. Under a the old “insolubly ambiguous” standard, the Federal Circuit had determined once before that the term was indefinite. The Supreme Court vacated this indefiniteness determination in Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831 (2015) (Briefed by John Wang ). The Federal Circuit was found to have erred by not giving proper deference to the lower court’s factual findings in construing the term “molecular weight”. Teva Pharmaceuticals’ short-lived victory lasted until the Federal Circuit once again reached the same conclusion that the term “molecular weight” was indefinite, this time under the new “reasonably certain” standard of Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120 (2014).
Inventive concept standing alone is not patent eligible
| July 10, 2015
Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc.,
June 23, 2015
Before: Newman (Opinion author), Moore and Reyna.
Summary
Claims to a method which allows the use of a conventional web browser Back and Forward button functions without loss of data were not patent eligible under 35 U.S.C. 101 because the inventive concept recited in the claim was not limited to any mechanism and thus remained abstract.
Tags: 35 U.S.C. § 101 > abstract ideas > inventive concept > patent eligible subject matter > significantly more
CAFC says reissued patent can’t sail into safe harbor
| July 8, 2015
G.D. Searle LLC et al. v. Lupin Pharmaceuticals, Inc., et al.
June 23, 2015
Before: Prost, Bryson, and Hughes. Opinion by Bryson
Summary
The CAFC strictly construes the “safe harbor” provision of 35 USC § 121 and casts doubt on whether there are any circumstances in which reissue can be used to correct failure to file a divisional application.
“Strong Presumption” Not So Strong After all
| June 25, 2015
Williamson v. Citrix
June 16, 2015
Opinion by Linn (joined by nine other Judges), Dissenting Opinion by Newman-Decided.
Summary:
En banc CAFC expressly overrules the “strong” presumption that a limitation lacking the word “means” is not subject to § 112, para. 6 and applies the presumptions prior to Lighting World, which do not require any heightened evidentiary showing. CAFC also overrules the strict requirement of “a showing that the limitation essentially is devoid of anything that can be construed as structure.”
When a claim term does not recite the word “means,” the presumption can be overcome and § 112, para. 6 will apply if one demonstrates that the claim term fails to “recite sufficiently definite structure” or recites “function without reciting sufficient structure for performing that function.” That is, the standard is “whether the words of the claim are understood by persons of ordinary skill in the art to have a sufficiently definite meaning as the name for structure.”
Tags: 112 6th paragraph > 112(f) > en banc > functional claiming > Means for > means plus function > strong presumption
CBM Petitions – Second Chances Can Be Tough
| June 17, 2015
Travelocity.com L.P., Priceline.com Inc., and Expedia, Inc. v. Cronos Technologies, LLC (Case CBM2015-00047)
June 15, 2015
Before: Jennifer S. Bisk, James B. Arpin, and Lynne E. Pettigrew, Administrative Patent Judges. Opinion by Arpin.
Summary
The Patent Trial & Appeal Board (“PTAB”) decided not to institute a covered business method patent review (“CBM”) of any challenged claim of U.S. Pat. No. 5,664,110 (“the ‘110 patent”). Travelocity, Priceline, and Expedia’s (“Petitioner”) joint request was denied because the Petition included “substantially similar arguments presented and the same references applied” in CBM2014-00082, an earlier Petition filed by Petitioner that was denied by the PTAB.
The PTAB expressly cautioned against taking a “second bite at the apple” and remarked that “a decision on a petition for covered business method review is not simply part of a feedback loop by which a petitioner may perfect its challenges through subsequent filings.”
Reissue cannot modify Claim Construction determined for repeated Original Patent Claims
| June 3, 2015
ArcelorMittal France v. AK Steel Corp. et al.
May 12, 2015
Before: Dyk, Wallach and Hughes. Opinion by Hughes.
Summary
ArcelorMittal had filed suit on the ‘805 patent against the appellees. However, the construction of a key term “very high mechanical resistance” was unfavorable to ArcelorMittal and a jury subsequently found the claims of the ‘805 patent not infringed and invalid. During appeal of the decision ArcelorMittal filed a Reissue application at the USPTO which included a new dependent claim with a broader construction of “very high mechanical resistance” than that construed during the judicial action. The CAFC affirmed the District Court’s claim construction but remanded the case on other grounds.
ArcelorMittal filed new suits based on the Reissue patent, but the District Court granted Summary Judgment invalidating the claims on the basis that the term “very high mechanical resistance” was earlier construed during the ‘805 litigation narrower than the subsequent claims of the Reissue patent. The CAFC affirmed the District Court asserting that under the law-of-the-case-doctrine and mandate rule, ArcelorMittal could not use the Reissue process at the PTO to broaden construction after the decision on the ‘805 patent.
In a design patent infringement case, 35 U.S.C. §289 authorizes the award of total profit from the article of manufacture bearing the patented design
| May 27, 2015
Apple Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. et al.
May 18, 2015
Before: Prost, O’Malley and Chen. Opinion by Prost.
Summary
The CAFC affirmed the jury’s verdict on the design patent infringements and the validity of utility patent claims, and the damages awarded for these infringements appealed by Samsung. However, CAFC reversed the jury’s findings that the asserted trade dresses are protectable. Regarding the design patent infringement issue, Samsung proposed that functional aspects of the design patents should be “ignored” in their entirety in a design patent infringement analysis, the CAFC disagreed. Moreover, the CAFC found that the district court did not err by allowing jury to award damages based on Samsung’s entire profits on its infringing smartphones.
サムスン社は、控訴審において、意匠特許の機能的部分は意匠特許侵害の分析において無視されるべきであると主張した。CAFCは、機能的部分の装飾的な特徴は意匠特許によりカバーされるため、意匠特許侵害の分析において機能的部分を無視すべきというサムスン社の主張には同意しなかった。また、サムスン社は、意匠特許侵害の損害賠償は、侵害商品の全体としての利益（entire profit）に基づいて計算されるべきでないと主張したものの、特許法第289条は、意匠特許侵害の損害賠償を侵害商品の全体としての利益（entire profit）に基づいて計算することを可能としているため、CAFCはこの主張にも同意しなかった。
Under the AIA, a False Marking Action Can Be Brought by a Potential Competitor who Suffers a Competitive Injury
| May 20, 2015
Sukumar v. Nautilus, Inc.
May 4, 2015
Before: Prost, Newman and Reyna. Opinion by Prost.
Summary
The CAFC herein affirms the District Court grant of Nautilus’ motion for summary judgment to dismiss Sukumar’s false marking suit. The District Court held that Sukumar had not suffered a competitive injury and thus, lacked standing to enforce 35 U.S.C. 292. The CAFC herein determines who has standing to bring a false marking action.
PTO Need Not Terminate Inter Partes Re-exam Even After Parties Have Settled on Validity.
| May 18, 2015
Automated Merchandising Sys. v. Lee
April 10, 2015
Before: Prost, Taranto, Fogel; Opinion by Taranto
Summary:
Inter partes re-exams were initiated during the litigation. Parties settled the litigation, and the court issued consent judgment. Patentee requested PTO to terminate the re-exams, but PTO refused to terminate alleging that there was no “decision” by the court. Patentee sued PTO under Administrative Procedure Act (APA). District court granted summary judgment in favor of PTO. CAFC affirmed the summary judgment.
侵害訴訟中に当事者系再審査が開始された。その後当事者は和解し、それに基づいて地裁は和解判決を下した。特許権者は、米国特許庁に当事者系再審査の中止を請求したが、米国特許庁は、特許の有効性に関して裁判所の判決がなかったとして、中止を認めなかった。特許権者は、米国特許庁を行政手続法に基づいて訴えた。地裁は、米国特許庁の決定を維持するサマリ・ジャジメントを下した。CAFCもサマリ・ジャジメントを維持した。
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