Priority document can inherently support subject matter first disclosed in later application
| October 27, 2016
Yeda Research and Development Co. Ltd. v. Abbott GmbH & Co. KG
September 20, 2016
Before Reyna, Wallach and Hughes. Opinion by Reyna
Summary:
In a case arising out of an interference, validity of the patent in question turned on the question of whether structural features of a protein, which were newly added in the U.S. application, were inherently supported by the priority document. Here, it was found that the priority document did inherently support the claimed protein, and any structural features thereof, even if it did not disclose the specific claimed structural features. This is because there was only one protein that could possibly be described by the priority document.
Details:
Abbott is the owner of U.S. Patent No. 5,344,915, which claims priority to German applications P39 15 072 and P29 22 089. The ‘915 patent discloses a protein called TBP-II, which neutralizes TNF-α, a key protein in immunological diseases. The key claim is as follows:
1. A purified and isolated TNFα-binding protein which has a molecular weight of about 42,000 daltons and has at the N terminus the amino acid sequence
Xaa Thr Pro Tyr Ala Pro Glu Pro Gly Set Thr Cys Arg Leu Arg Glu
where Xaa is hydrogen, a phenylalanine residue (Phe) or the amino acid sequences Ala Phe, Val Ala Phe, Gln Val Ala Phe, Ala Gln Val Ala Phe, Pro Ala Gln Val Ala Phe or Leu Pro Ala Gln Val Ala Phe.
Meanwhile, the German priority documents to which the ‘915 patent claims priority do not disclose the complete N-terminus sequence. These Germans priority documents disclosed a partial N-terminus sequence, as well as how the protein is obtained from its biological source, and several physical properties of the protein.
This case arises out of an interference between Abbott’s ‘915 patent and Yeda’s application in 1996. In 2000, the Board assigned Abbott the filing date of the ‘915 patent, not the date of the German priority applications. The Board concluded that the patent was invalidated by an intervening prior art reference (Engelmann). Engelmann disclosed the TBP-II protein and distinguished it from a similar protein, TBP-I. In 2008, Abbott appealed to district court, which indicated that one of the German priority document inherently discloses the TBP-II protein, and sufficiently supports the ‘915 patent. In 2010, the Board held that the other German priority document sufficiently discloses the TBP-II protein. Yeda then appealed to district court, which agreed with the Board, and then appealed to the CAFC.
Since Engelmann would be invalidating prior art, the question of validity of the ‘915 patent turns on whether the German priority documents provide written description support. Yeda first argued that the Board applied the wrong standard. Specifically, Yeda argued that for the priority document to support the ‘915 claims, the skilled artisan would have to understand that the partial sequence of the priority document includes the amino acids recited in the ‘915 claim. On the other hand, Abbott argued that the priority document only needs to sufficiently describe the TBP-II protein itself, and the partial sequence disclosure can be coupled with other characteristics.
The CAFC agreed with Abbott and held that the German priority document inherently supports the ‘915 claims. Citing to Kennecott v. Kyocera, 835 F.2d 1419 (Fed. Cir. 1987), the CAFC indicated that when a “specification describes an invention that has certain undisclosed yet inherent properties, that specification serves as an adequate written description to support a subsequent patent application that explicitly recites the invention’s inherent properties.” It was not disputed that TBP-II is the only protein with the partial sequence and characteristics described in the priority document. The CAFC distinguished over two cases cited by Yeda (Hyatt v. Boone, 146 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 1998) and In re Wallach, 378 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2004)), indicating that unlike in those cases, here, it is undisputed that the invention of the earlier application is exactly the same as the invention of the later patent. Thus, the priority document sufficiently supports the claims reciting the full N-terminal sequence.
Yeda then argued that the prosecution history precludes reliance on inherent disclosure. Specifically, Yeda argued that in “the context of priority determinations, the allegedly inherent limitation cannot be material to the patentability of the invention,” relying on Hitzeman v. Rutter, 243 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2011). Yeda argued that since Abbott relied on the amino acids in question to distinguish over Engelmann, they are material to patentability. In prosecution, the Examiner relied on cited art showing a protein with the same source, weight and function as that claimed. In response, Abbott pointed to Engelmann to show that TBP-I and TBP-II are different. Abbott also relied on Engelmann to show that TBP-II has five different amino acids than TBP-I, and that these were included in the claimed sequence. However, three out of the five TBP-II-unique amino acids disclosed in Engelmann were in fact also disclosed in the priority document. Thus, the sequence of the priority document alone was sufficient to distinguish over the art on its own. Therefore, Yeda’s argument fails.
Lastly, Yeda argued that the district court was incorrect in holding that the Board’s decision was supported by substantial evidence. However, the CAFC again reiterated that the priority document disclosed nine of the 15 amino acids of the claimed N-terminus sequence and various biological characteristics. Furthermore, it was undisputed that no other known protein besides TBP-II has this structure and characteristics. Thus, the CAFC concluded that the Board’s decision was supported by substantial evidence.
Take away
In many cases, adding a new disclosure to a US application, beyond what is disclosed in a priority application, can result in a breaking of the chain of priority. But here, because the priority document inherently disclosed the subject matter first disclosed in the US application—and only that subject matter—the claims had written description support as of the priority date. However, the outcome would have likely been different if the description of the protein in the priority document was later found to correspond multiple proteins, such as stereoisomers having different functions.
Abbott was saved by the fact that they disclosed not only the partial sequence of the protein, but also how it is obtained from its biological source, and several physical properties of the protein. Thus, in emerging technologies, it is best to try to claim the subject matter as completely as possible to insulate the applicant from written description problems in the future, and to provide the flexibility to claim the subject matter in terms newly added in a later application.
The term “processing system” does not render the claims indefinite
| October 14, 2016
Cox Communications, Inc., et al. v. Sprint Communication Company LP, et. al.
September 23, 2016
Before Prost, Newman, and Bryson. Opinion by Prost. Concurring opinion by Newman
Summary:
The District Court for the District of Delaware granted a summary judgment of invalidity, finding that the claim term “processing system” renders the asserted patents indefinite under 35 U.S.C. 112, ¶ 2. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (“the CAFC”) reversed, finding that the term “processing system” does not render the claims indefinite, because the scope of the claims can be understood, and the meaning would not discernably change, even if the word “processing system” were removed from the claims. The CAFC held that reading the claims in light of the specification and the prosecution history, the term “processing system” does not prevent a person of ordinary skill in the art from understanding the scope of the invention with reasonable certainty.
デラウェア州地裁は、クレーム中の「processing system」という用語は不明瞭であるとして、特許法第112条第2段落に基づき、主張特許は無効であるというサマリージャッジメントを下した。控訴審において、連邦巡回控訴裁判所（CAFC）は、クレームより「processing system」という語を削除したとしても、クレーム範囲を理解することができるため、「processing system」という用語はクレームを不明瞭していないとして、地裁の判断を覆した。また、CAFCは、明細書と中間手続の内容をクレームと照らし合わせると、「processing system」という用語が、当業者の発明範囲についての理解を妨げることはないと結論付けた。
AUTOMATED PROCESSES ARE NOT INELIGIBLE SIMPLY BECAUSE THEY ARE PERFORMED ON A GENERAL PURPOSE COMPUTER
| October 4, 2016
McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games America Inc. et al.
September 13, 2016
Before Reyna, Taranto, and Stoll. Opinion by Reyna.
Summary:
McRO appealed a grant of judgment on the pleadings under FRCP 12(c) that the asserted claims of 6,307,576 (“the ’576 patent”) and 6,611,278 (“the ’278 patent”) are invalid under §101 by the District Court for the Central District of California. The District Court held that the asserted claims are directed to patent-ineligible subject matter and are therefore invalid under under §101. However, the Federal Circuit reversed the decision and held that the claims are not directed to an abstract idea and recite subject matter as a patentable process under §101 because an “order combination of claimed steps using unconventional rules” is not directed to an abstract idea and is therefore patent-eligible subject matter under §101.
Tags: §101 > automated process > judgment on the pleadings under FRCP 12(c) > preemption > technological improvement
It is arbitrary and capricious for PTAB to deny a motion to amend a patent claims alleging that patentee failed to address whether each newly added feature in each proposed claim was independently known in the prior art.
| September 20, 2016
Veritas Techs. v. Veeam Software
August 30, 2016
Before Lourie, O’Malley and Taranto. Opinion by Taranto.
Summary
U.S. Patent No. 7,024,527 is owned by Veritas Technologies LLC. In October 2013, Veeam Software Corp. filed a petition for an inter partes review of several claims of the ’527 patent. The Board instituted the review in April 2014.
After institution, the patent owner (Veritas) filed a conditional motion to amend, seeking to add new claims if the Board ultimately concluded that the challenged existing claims are unpatentable. In the final decision of April 2015, the Board rejected all of the challenged claims for obviousness over the prior art.
The Board denied the motion to amend without making an evidentiary determination of patentability of the proposed new claims. It concluded that Veritas (and its expert declarant) had failed to address whether each newly added feature in each proposed claim, as distinct from the claimed combination of features, was independently known in the prior art.
CAFC vacated the Board’s denial of Veritas’s motion to amend because the Board was arbitrary and capricious in its sole ground for denying the motion. CAFC remanded for the Board to consider the patentability of the proposed claims, which have the narrower claim scope.
当事者系レビューにおいて、特許権者は、争われているクレームが無効とされたときに備えて、クレームを追加する補正の申立をした。米国特許庁審判部は、争われたクレーム全てを無効にしたが、特許権者の補正の申立も認めなかった。その理由は、特許権者が、新クレームで追加される個々の構成要件が公知であったかどうかを述べていなかったというものであった。CAFCは、証拠に照らして、追加されるクレームの特許性を論ずることなく、そのような理由で補正の申立を認めないことは、恣意的であり、裁量権を逸脱していると判決した。
Surviving Alice with a Non-Conventional and Non-Generic Arrangement
| September 16, 2016
Bascom Global Internet Services, Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC
June 26, 2016
Before Newman, O’Malley, and Chen. Opinion by Chen.
Summary
This is the third case, besides DDR and Enfish, where the Federal Circuit found a software related claim patent eligible under 35 USC §101. In doing so, the Federal Circuit provided another example of how step two of the Alice/Mayo two-part test is to be applied. In particular, by focusing on the specificity of claimed features, it can be argued that the claims recite a “non-conventional and non-generic arrangement” that is patent eligible.
Written Description Requirement raised when the claimed invention is limited to one of the disclosed embodiments
| September 8, 2016
Scriptpro LLC, v. Innovation Associates, Inc
August 15, 2016
Before Moore, Taranto and Hughes. Opinion by Moore
Summary:
ScriptPro alleges that the specification does not limit the claimed invention to “sorting and storing prescription containers by patient-identifying information.” The district court interpreted the ’601 patent’s specification as limited to sorting by patient-identifying information and invalidated ‘601 patent for lacking written description requirement. The CAFC reversed the case by describing the reasons that the specification contemplated many objectives and embodiments other than the one asserted by Innovation Associates; the original claims which would mostly provide written description were not limited by the patient-identifying information feature; and the present case should be distinguished from Gentry Gallery and ICU Medical.
本事件の争点を一言で表せば、クレームの対象とされた発明は、明細書の記載全体に鑑みて単一の実施形態へと狭く解釈されるべきであり、それよりも広い特許クレームは、Written Description Requirement の要件(サポートの問題)を満たさず、無効であるというものである。考え方としては、明細書の記載に基づいて、広いクレームを狭い実施形態の範囲へと限定解釈する際の議論と共通するものがある。明細書を作成する際に、単一の目的あるいは課題に限定しないことの重要性など、明細書作成に当たっての留意事項が再確認される事件である。
Patentee’s standing to sue for infringement evaporates after correction of inventorship
| August 25, 2016
Vapor Point v. Moorhead (Precedential)
August 10, 2016
Before O’Malley, Chen, Stoll (per Curiam, O’Malley concurrence)
Summary:
After NanoVapor filed patent applications on a VOC removal technology, naming only its in-house inventor, it was sued by two non-employees trying to be added as inventors through an inventorship correction action. NanoVapor countersued for patent infringement, but having tied its infringement action to the inventorship action, NanoVapor lost standing when it lost on the inventorship action.
Arbitration is Good, but it Needs Protection
| August 17, 2016
Verinata Health, Stanford & Illumina v. Ariosa & Laboratory Corp.
July 26, 2016
Before Reyna, Clevenger and Wallach. Opinion by Reyna.
Summary:
- Plaintiff Illumina and Defendant Ariosa entered into a supply agreement which contained a compulsory arbitration clause.
- Illumina sued Ariosa for patent infringement.
- Ariosa counterclaimed for breach of contract and breach of good faith, asserting that the supply agreement gave it a license to Illumina’s patent.
- Illumina moved the trial judge to order that the contract and good faith breach counterclaims go to compulsory arbitration.
- The trial judge denied Illumina’s motion that Ariosa’s counterclaims go to arbitration.
- The CAFC affirmed the trial judge’s denial of Illumina’s motion for arbitration.
Another fatality attributed to 35 U.S.C. §101 abstract idea
| August 5, 2016
Electric Power Group, LLC v Alstom
August 1, 2016
Before: Taranto, Bryson and Stoll. Opinion by Taranto.
Summary:
Electric Power Group sued Alstom alleging infringement of various claims of U.S. Patents Nos. 7,233,843; 8,060,259; and 8,401,710 directed to systems and methods for performing real-time performance monitoring of an electric power grid. On Alstom’s motion for summary judgment, the district court held that Electric Power Group’s asserted patent claims fail the standard for patent eligibility under §101. The CAFC affirmed finding the claims don’t go beyond the abstract idea of the collection, analysis, and display of available information in a particular field.
Burden of Proof does not shift to Patent Owner upon institution of an Inter Partes Review
| August 1, 2016
In Re: Magnum Oil Tools International, LTD.
July 25, 2016
Before Newman, O’Malley, and Chen. Opinion by O’Malley
Summary:
McClinton Energy Group, LLC (“McClinton”) filed a petition for inter partes review (“IPR”) of U.S. Patent No. 8,079,413 (“the ‘413 patent”) owned by Magnum Oil Tools International, Ltd. (“Magnum”). McClinton based the petition on two combinations of prior art references: (1) Alpha in view of Cockrell and Kristiansen, and (2) Lehr in view of Cockrell and Kristiansen. The petition primarily focused on the combination of Alpha, Cockrell and Kristiansen, and merely “incorporated by reference” the arguments based on Alpha for the arguments based on Lehr. The IPR was instituted based only on Lehr in view of Cockrell and Kristiansen, and in a final decision, the claims were found unpatentable. The CAFC reversed the PTAB decision stating that the arguments “incorporated by reference” are not sufficient for meeting the burden of proving obviousness by a preponderance of the evidence. Conclusory statements cannot satisfy the petitioner’s burden of demonstrating obviousness, and thus the PTAB did not have sufficient evidence on which to base its legal conclusion of obviousness. The PTAB improperly shifted the burden to Magnum to disprove obviousness without requiring McClinton to prove its assertion of obviousness. The CAFC also stated that it was improper for the PTAB to rely on an unpatentability theory that was not included in the petition.
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