Of Closed Pods, Open Cartridges, Single-Brew Coffee Machines, and Descriptive Issues
| June 5, 2017
Rivera v. ITC (Precedential)
May 23, 2017
Before Reyna, Linn and Chen. Opinion by Linn.
Summary:
The Federal Circuit affirmed an ITC decision that the asserted patent claims are invalid for lack of written description. The patent application as filed described only a coffee machine with a cartridge adapter configured to receive a closed “pod”, not a cartridge adapter with an open filter for ground coffee. Thus, the written description did not show possession by the inventors of a genus encompassing the open-filter cartridge adapters at the initial filing date.
Claims Directed to the Abstract Idea of Encoding/Decoding Image Data are Found Not Patent Eligible
| May 22, 2017
RecogniCorp v. Nintendo
April 28, 2017
Before Lourie, Reyna and Stoll. Opinion by Reyna.
Summary:
RecogniCorp sued Nintendo in district court for infringement of U.S. Patent No. 8,005,303 (“ the ‘303 patent”) directed to a method and apparatus for encoding/decoding image data. Nintendo filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, asserting that the claims were ineligible under 35 U.S.C. §101. The district court concluded that RecogniCorp’s claims failed the Alice test, and granted Nintendo’s motion. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) affirmed, finding that the ‘303 patent’s claims are directed to the abstract idea of encoding and decoding image data, and the claims do not contain an inventive concept sufficient to render the claims patent eligible.
The On-Sale Bar Under the America Invents Act Does Not Require a Public Disclosure of the Invention
| May 9, 2017
Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc.
May 1, 2017
Before Dyk, Mayer and O’Malley. Opinion by Dyk
Summary:
Helsinn Healthcare S.A.’s (“Helsinn”) patents were invalidated based on the on-sale bar of § 102. One of the patents invalidated is an AIA patent, so the CAFC addressed whether the law for the on-sale bar has changed under the AIA. The CAFC declined to adopt the change proposed by Helsinn to require that the invention be publicly disclosed in the terms of a sale agreement for the on-sale bar to apply. The CAFC essentially stated that if the law has changed under AIA it is only that the fact of the sale be public, not that the terms of the sale include a description of the invention that is made available to the public. In this case, the fact of the sale was made public without publicly disclosing details of the invention. The CAFC held that this is enough in this case for the on-sale bar to apply for both pre-AIA § 102 and AIA § 102.
Japanese Summary
本件は、米国改正法（ＡＩＡ）102(a)(1)条における新規性欠如要件の1つである「販売行為（on sale）」の解釈について争われたケースである。改正前では、発明を秘密にした状態の販売行為（secret sale）も場合により「販売行為」に該当し得るとされていた（判例法）。たとえば、出願可能な程度に発明が完成しており、第三者と販売のライセンス契約等が成立すると「販売あるいは販売の申し出」をしたことになる。しかし、改正により発明新規性の条文が大幅に変わり、102(a)(1)条においては「販売された」等に加えて「その他公に利用に可能とった（or otherwise available to the public）」発明には特許を付与しないと規定された。この「公に利用可能となった」のフレーズが挿入されたため、販売に際しても、いわゆる秘密販売を除外したと説明されているが（特許庁ガイドライン）、曖昧な点が多く、改正法下での判例法の蓄積が待たれている。
本件では、出願人と第三者との間で、出願前に発明薬剤の販売についてライセンス契約が行われ、そのライセンス契約の内容が公開された。しかし、クレームに記載されていた特定の投与量の情報は開示されなかった（ただし当事者間ではその投与量の使用に合意はあった）。
地裁は、ライセンス契約で特定の投与量の情報が開示されなかったため、クレームの発明が開示されたことにはならないとして、「販売された」の要件を満たさず、特許は有効と判断した。控訴審（ＣＡＦＣ）はその地裁の判断を覆した。ＣＡＦＣは、「販売された」というためには、発明の詳細（すべてのクレーム要素）が開示されている必要はないと判示し、上記ライセンス契約により特許は無効であると判決した。すなわち、改正法下でも「販売された」の意味は実質的に変わらず、「販売」の成立に際して、必ずしも発明が「公に利用可能となる」ことが要件ではないと示唆された。なお、本件では、契約内容が秘密である場合の秘密販売（secret sale）やいわゆる公用（public use）のケースについてＣＡＦＣは判断を避けており、これらのケースについては別の判例を待つ必要があるであろう。
The Federal Circuit indirectly imports limitations from the specification into the claims through claim construction
| April 24, 2017
The Medicines Company v. Mylan Inc. Etc.
April 6, 2017
Before Dyk Wallach, and Hughes. Opinion by Dyk.
Summary
Mylan submitted two Abbreviated New Drug Applications (“ANDA”) to seek approval of Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) for selling generic bivalirudin drug products before the expiration of patents-in-suit: the ‘727 patent and the ‘343 patent. In its ANDA, Mylan stated that it would limit the Asp9 level of its generic product to less than 2.0 percent. Medicines sued Mylan for infringement of the ‘727 and ‘343 patents. Mylan filed counter-claims seeking declaratory judgments of invalidity. The district court held that Mylan infringed the ‘727 patent, but not the ‘343 patent. The Federal Circuit reverses in part, and held that Mylan does not infringe both patents.
Back to Basics: In re Chudik offers a refresher on the law of anticipation for functional limitations
| April 17, 2017
In re Chudik
March 27, 2017
Before Dyk, Reyna, and Stoll. Opinion by Reyna.
Summary
This decision is a refresher on the basic law of anticipation for functional claim elements. A prior art does not anticipate a functional claim element merely because it is “capable of” performing the recited function, but rather, such capability must be achieved without “distortion” or “modification” to the prior art.
CAFC refuses to second guess a district court determination on a motion for attorney fees under 285.
| April 13, 2017
University of Utah v. Max-Planck-Gesellschaft zur Foerderun der Wissenschaften E.V., et al.
March 23, 2017
Before O’Malley, Reyna and Wallach. Precedential Opinion by Reyna, joined by O’Malley and Wallach
Summary:
University of Utah (UUtah) sued Max-Planck et al. (Max-Planck) for correction of ownership for several of Max-Planck patents (the Tuschl II patents). The district court granted Max-Planck’s motion for summary judgment but refused to grant its motion for attorney fees under 285. The CAFC found that the district court did not abuse its discretion and affirmed the refusal to grant the 285 motion.
Derivation not demonstrated by conception of an idea different from claimed invention, even where the idea would make the claimed invention obvious
| April 5, 2017
Cumberland Pharmaceuticals v. Mylan Institutional LLC
January 26, 2017
Before Moore, Reyna and Taranto. Opinion by Taranto.
Summary
In an unusual argument, Mylan posited that Cumberland’s employee was not the inventor of a patent, but rather that the inventor was “someone at the FDA”. Mylan based this assertion on the FDA’s seeking justification for an ingredient in an earlier formation which was excluded—without a direct substitute—in the claimed later formulation.
Using Specific Data Structures Does Not Necessarily Survive Alice
| March 16, 2017
Intellectual Ventures I LLC, et al. v. Capital One Financial Corp., et al.
March 7, 2017
Before: Prost, Wallach and Chen. Opinion by Prost.
Summary
This is the companion case to Intellectual Ventures I LLC, et al. v. Erie Indemnity Co. et. al., also decided on March 7, 2017. Here, the court held that the claims are directed to the abstract idea of collecting, displaying, and manipulating data. The recitation of specific XML data structures did not make the claims any less abstract or satisfy Alice step 2. The claims also merely recited goals of the patent, in result-oriented language, without detailed features for how those goals are to be achieved. As such, the claims did not provide the requisite inventive concept under Alice step 2.
Claims reciting generic, computer implementation of abstract idea found lacking “inventive concept”
| March 13, 2017
Intellectual Ventures I LLC, et al. v. Erie Indemnity Co., et al.
March 7, 2017
Before Prost, Wallach, Chen. Opinion by Prost.
Summary:
The CAFC affirmed the district court’s determination that claims of both U.S. Patent No. 6,510,434 (“’434 patent”) and U.S. Patent No. 5,546,002 (“’002 patent”) are patent ineligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Applying the two-part analysis from Alice, the District Court found and the CAFC affirmed the claims of both patents as being abstract ideas lacking in “inventive concept,” concluding that the claims are patent ineligible. In addition, regarding U.S. Patent No. 6,519,518 (“’518 patent”), the CAFC affirmed that Appellants did not own rights to the patent, and therefore Appellants lacked standing to assert infringement.
連邦巡回裁判所（CAFC）は、特許法第101条に基づき、地裁の米国特許第6,510,434号及び5,546,002号には特許適格性がないという判決を支持した。地裁及びCAFCは、最高裁判決Alice事件の二段階分析（two-part analysis）を適用した上で、特許クレームは、抽象的概念（abstract ideas）であり、発明的概念（inventive concept）がないため、特許適格性がないと判断した。また、米国特許第6,519,518号については、上訴人は、当該特許の特許所有者ではないため、当事者適格がないと判示した。
The Supply of a Single Component of a Multicomponent Invention Is Not an Infringing Act Under 35 U.S.C. §271(F)(1)
| March 6, 2017
Life Technologies Corp. et al. v. Promega Corp.
February 22, 2017
Opinion by Sotomayor
Summary:
Promega sued Life Technologies for patent infringement under §271(f)(1) because Life Technologies assembled a kit for genetic testing in the U.K. with a single component manufactured in the U.S. and sold the product worldwide. The Supreme Court reversed the Federal Circuit’s holding and held that §271(f)(1) does not cover the supply of a single component of a multicomponent invention. The Supreme Court held that the term “substantial” in §271(f)(1) should have a quantitative meaning rather than a qualitative meaning.
Details:
Promega’s U.S. Reissue Patent No. 37,984 (“the Tautz patent”) is directed to a kit for genetic testing that can be used in various fields. Promega (exclusive licensee of the Tautz patent) sublicensed the Tautz patent to Life Technologies, but limited the license to a specific field of use. The patented kit has five components including a polymerase enzyme. Life Technologies manufactured the polymerase enzyme in the U.S. and shipped it to the U.K. Life Technologies manufactured other components, assembled all five components in the U.K, and sold the final product worldwide. After discovering that Life Technologies was selling the product in the U.S. and overseas outside of the license, Promega sued Life Technologies for patent infringement, claiming that patent infringement liability was triggered under 35 U.S.C. §271(f)(1).
35 U.S.C. §271(f)(1):
Whoever without authority supplies or causes to be supplied in or from the United States all or a substantial portion of the components of a patented invention, where such components are uncombined in whole or in part, in such manner as to actively induce the combination of such components outside of the United States in a manner that would infringe the patent if such combination occurred within the United States, shall be liable as an infringer.
35 U.S.C. §271(f)(2):
Whoever without authority supplies or causes to be supplied in or from the United States any component of a patented invention that is especially made or especially adapted for use in the invention and not a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use, where such component is uncombined in whole or in part, knowing that such component is so made or adapted and intending that such component will be combined outside of the United States in a manner that would infringe the patent if such combination occurred within the United States, shall be liable as an infringer.
District Court:
The jury returned a verdict for Promega, finding that Life Technologies willfully infringed the patent. Life Technologies then moved for judgment as a matter of law, arguing that 35 U.S.C. §271(f)(1) should not be applied because the phrase “all or a substantial portion” does not encompass the supply of a single component (polymerase enzyme). The district court granted Life Technologies’ motion.
The Federal Circuit:
The Federal Circuit reversed and reinstated the jury’s verdict finding Life Technologies liable for infringement. The Federal Circuit held that since the dictionary definition of “substantial” is “important” or “essential,” a single component (polymerase enzyme) could be a “substantial portion of the components.”
The Supreme Court:
The Supreme Court held that the supply of a single component (polymerase enzyme) of a multicomponent invention (genetic testing kit) is not an infringing act under 35 U.S.C. §271(f)(1).
The Supreme Court held that the term “substantial” has a quantitative meaning because neighboring terms “all” and “portion” convey a quantitative meaning, and the phase “substantial portion” is modified by “of the components of a patented invention.” The Supreme Court rejected Promega’s suggestion to adopt both quantitative and qualitative aspects of the components (“case-specific approach”) because it is too complicated.
The Supreme Court held that reading §271(f)(1) to refer “components” as plural and §271(f)(2) to “any component” as singular allows two provisions to work in tandem.
Finally, the Supreme Court held that the history of §271(f) and Congress’s intent support the conclusion. §271(f)(1) was enacted by Congress in response to the decision in Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp. case, where the Court held that it was “not an infringement to make or use a patented product outside of the U.S.”
Takeaway:
Shipping a single component of a patented invention to be combined with other components overseas is not patent infringement. This means that companies can ship only one component of a product abroad without patent infringement liability.
How about shipping two components? The Supreme Court left open the question of how many components are required to be “substantial portion of the components.”
In addition, the Supreme Court did not reach the issue of how to identify a component part of a patented invention under §271(f)(1).
The Supreme Court finally provided a bright-line patent law rule: liability under §271(f)(1) requires more than one component.
Tags: §271(f)(1) > §271(f)(2) > extraterritoriality > qualitative meaning > quantitative meaning
