GENERAL KNOWLEDGE OF A SKILLED ARTISAN COULD BE USED TO SUPPLY A MISSING CLAIM LIMITATION FROM THE PRIOR ART WITH EXPERT EVIDENCE IN THE OBVIOUSNESS ANALYSIS
| February 5, 2020
Koninklijke Philips N.V. v. Google LLC, Microsoft Corporation, Microsoft Mobile Inc.
January 30, 2020
Summary:
The Federal Circuit affirmed the PTAB’s final decision that claims of Philips’ ‘806 patent are unpatentable as obvious. The Federal Circuit held that the PTAB did not err in relying on general knowledge to supply a missing claim limitation in the IPR if the PTAB relied on expert evidence corroborated by a cited reference. The Federal Circuit also held that the PTAB did not have discretion to institute the IPR on the grounds not advanced in the petition.
Details:
The ‘806 Patent
Philips’ ‘806 patent is directed to solving a conventional problem where the user cannot play back the digital content until after the entire file has finished downloading. Also, the ‘806 patent states that streaming requires “two-way intelligence” and “a high level of integration between client and server software,” thereby excluding third parties from developing software and applications.
The ‘806 patent offers a solution that reduces delay by allowing the media player download the next portion of a media presentation concurrently with playback of the previous portion.
Representative claim 1 of the ‘806 patent:
1. A method of, at a client device, forming a media presentation from multiple related files, including a control information file, stored on one or more server computers within a computer network, the method comprising acts of:
downloading the control information file to the client device;
the client device parsing the control information file; and based on parsing of the control information file, the client device:
identifying multiple alternative flies corresponding to a given segment of the media presentation,
determining which files of the multiple alternative files to retrieve based on system restraints;
retrieving the determined file of the multiple alternative files to begin a media presentation,
wherein if the determined file is one of a plurality of files required for the media presentation, the method further comprises acts of:
concurrent with the media presentation, retrieving a next file; and
using content of the next file to continue the media presentation.
PTAB
Google filed a petition for IPR with two grounds of unpatentability. First, claims of the ‘806 patent are anticipated by SMIL 1.0 (Synchronized Multimedia Integration Language Specification 1.0). Second, claims of the ‘806 patent would have been obvious in view of SMIL 1.0 in view of the general knowledge of the skilled artisan regarding distributed multimedia presentation systems as of the priority date. Google cited Hua (2PSM: An Efficient Framework for Searching Video Information in a Limited-Bandwidth Environment, 7 Multimedia Systems 396 (1999)) and an expert declaration to argue that pipelining was a well-known design technique, and that a skilled artisan would have been motivated to use pipelining with SMIL.
The PTAB instituted review on three grounds (including two grounds raised by Google and additional ground). In other words, the PTAB exercised its discretion and instituted an IPR on the additional ground that claims would have been obvious over SMIL 1.0 and Hua based on the arguments and evidence presented in the petition.
In the final decision, the PTAB concluded that while Google had not demonstrated that claims were anticipated, Google had demonstrated that claims would have been obvious in view of SMIL 1.0 and that they would have been obvious in view of SMIL 1.0 in view of Hua as well.
CAFC
First, the CAFC held that the PTAB erred by instituting IPR reviews based on a combination of prior art references not presented in Google’s petition. Citing 35 U.S.C. § 314(b) (“[t]he Director shall determine whether to institute an inter partes review . . . pursuant to a petition”), the CAFC held that it is the petition, not the Board’s discretion, that defines the metes and bounds of an IPR.
Second, the CAFC held that while the prior references that can be considered in IPR are limited patents and printed publications only, it does not mean that the skilled artisan’s knowledge should be ignored in the obviousness inquiry. Distinguishing this case from Arendi (where the CAFC held that the PTAB erred in relying on common sense because such reliance was based merely upon conclusory statements and unspecific expert testimony), the CAFC held that the PTAB correctly relied on expert evidence corroborated by Hua in concluding that pipelining is within the general knowledge of a skilled artisan.
Third, with regard to Philips’ arguments that the PTAB’s combination fails because the basis for the combination rests on the patentee’s own disclosure, the CAFC held that the PTAB’s reliance on the specification was proper and that it is appropriate to rely on admissions in the specification for the obviousness inquiry. The CAFC held that the PTAB supported its findings with citations to an expert declaration and the Hua reference. Therefore, the CAFC found that the PTAB’s factual findings underlying its obviousness determination are supported by substantial evidence.
Accordingly, the CAFC affirmed the PTAB’s final decision that claims of the ‘806 patent are unpatentable as obvious.
Takeaway:
- In the obviousness analysis, the general knowledge of a skilled artisan could be used to supply a missing claim limitation from the prior art with expert evidence.
- Patentee’s own disclosure and admission in the specification could be used in the obviousness inquiry. Patent drafters should be careful about what to write in the specification including background session.
- Patent owners should check whether the PTAB instituted IPR on the grounds not advanced in the IPR petition because the PTAB does not discretion to institute IPR based on grounds not advanced in the petition.
Tags: anticipation > General Knowledge > inter partes review > obviousness > Petition > Skilled Artisan
A Claimed Range May be Anticipated and/or Obviousness When the Lower Limit of the Range of the Reference Abuts the Upper limit of the Disputed Claim Range
| January 31, 2020
Genentech, Inc., v. Hospira, Inc.
Prost, Newman and Chen. Opinion by Chen; Dissenting opinion by Newman.
Summary
At an inter partes review (IPR) proceeding, the Board held that a reference that discloses a range where the lower limit of said range abuts the upper limit of the disputed claim range was sufficient to render the disputed patent invalid for anticipation and obviousness. The Majority Opinion of the CAFC affirmed the holding of anticipation and obviousness. The Dissenting Opinion held that there was insufficient evidence to establish anticipation, the wrong reasoning was used to establish obviousness and the findings of Board and the Majority Opinion were based on hindsight.
Details
Background
Protein A affinity chromatography is a purification method, wherein “a composition comprising a mixture of the target antibody and undesired impurities often present in harvested cell culture fluid (HCCF) is placed into the chromatography column…. The target antibody binds to protein A, which is covalently bound to the chromatography column resin, while the impurities and rest of the composition pass through the column…. Next, the antibody of interest is removed from the chromatography column….” Id. at 3. A known problem of protein A affinity chromatography is leaching, wherein protein A detaches from the column and contaminates the purified antibody solution. Thus, further purification steps of the antibody solution retrieved from the column are necessary. Patent 7,807,799 (hereinafter “‘799”), owned by Genentech, addresses the known problem of protein A leaching, with regards to antibodies and other proteins that comprises a CH2/CH3 region. By reducing the temperature of the composition that is subjected to chromatography, leaching can be prevented and/or minimized to an acceptable level of impurity for commercial purposes. Claim 1, herein presented below, is the representative claim.
A method of purifying a protein which comprises CH2/CH3 region, comprising subjecting a composition comprising said protein to protein A affinity chromatography at a temperature in the range from about 10°C to about 18°C.
See Patent ‘799, Col. 35, Lines 44-47.
IPR
Hospira sought an inter partes review (IPR) of claims 1-3 and 5-11 of Patent ‘799. The Board instituted a trial of unpatentability and held that WO95/22389 (hereinafter “WO ‘389) anticipated and WO ‘389, both solely and in combination with secondary references, rendered obvious all of the challenged claims.
WO ‘389 discloses a method for purifying similar antibodies by a protein A affinity chromatography step and then a washing step, comprising washing with at least three column volumes of buffer. WO ‘389 discloses that “[a]ll steps are carried out at room temperature (18-25oC).” Id. at 6.
The Board held that WO ‘389 overlaps the claimed range of “about 10oC to about 18oC”, regardless of the claim construction of “about 18oC”. Further, the Board held that Genentech failed to establish the criticality of the claimed range to the operability of the claimed invention and thus did not overcome the prima facie case of anticipation. Also, the Board held that the claimed temperature range was in reference to the temperature of the composition both prior to and/or during chromatography. The Board held that the disclosed temperature range (18-25oC) of WO ‘389 applied to all components of the purification process and that the temperature of the HCCF composition both prior to and during chromatography were within said range.
Genentech appealed the Board’s holding of unpatentable due to anticipation and obviousness over WO ‘389. Of note, in the Appeal, Genentech did not challenge the Board’s holding that criticality of the claimed temperature range was not established.
CAFC
Anticipation
Genentech argued that the meaning of “all steps are carried out at room temperature (18-25oC)” is applicable only to the temperature of the laboratory and is not applicable to the temperature of the HCCF composition. Genentech asserted that 1) WO ‘389 discloses “steps” where the HCCF composition was cold or frozen, 2) Genentech’s expert and Hospira’s expert testified that typically HCCF coming from a bioreactor, are at a temperature of 37oC, 3) both experts testified WO ‘389 is silent regarding how long HCCF was held prior to chromatography and 4) Genentech’s expert testified that a skilled artisan in industrial processing would perform chromatography of the HCCF as soon as possible, i.e. without waiting for the HCCF to cool to room temperature, unless there were explicit instructions to do so. Id. at 8. Hospira argued that the explicit disclosure of “room temperature (18-25oC)” is with regards to the temperature of performing chromatography and all the components of said purification process, including the HCCF composition. Hospira noted that WO ‘389 disclosed specific temperatures for when the composition was not at room temperature. Further, Hospira’s expert testified that a skilled artisan would perform experiments at “ambient temperature with all materials equilibrated in order to obtain robust scientific data.” Id. at 9. The CAFC affirmed the Board and held that there was substantial evidence that the HCCF composition was within the claimed temperature of “about 10oC to about 18oC.” The CAFC agreed with the Board’s findings that 1) the statement “[a]ll steps are carried out at room temperature (18-25oC)” was a blanket statement and thus, specifying the temperature of HCCF during chromatography is redundant, 2) it disagreed with Genentech’s expert because said opinion was based upon large-scale industrially standards, and 3) it agreed with Hospira’s expert that a skilled artisan would not use HCCF at 37oC in a chromatography column and then report that all steps were performed at room temperature because the warm HCCF would raise the temperature of the entire system. Id. at 10. Lastly, the CAFC disagreed with Genentech’s argument that there was no anticipation because there was a missing limitation in WO ‘389 and agreed with the Board’s finding that WO ‘389 discloses a composition that is at the claimed temperature of “about 10oC to about 18oC” either prior to or during chromatography. (Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Board Ocean Motor Co., cited by Genentech, holds that a reference missing a limitation cannot anticipate even if a skilled artisan would ‘at once envisage’ the missing limitation. 851 F.3d 1270, 1274–75 (Fed. Cir. 2017).” Id. at 10.)
Obviousness
The Board, citing the secondary references, determined that the temperature at which chromatography is performed is a result-effective variable and that when temperature is lowered, leaching is reduced. Thus, a skilled artisan would have been motivated to optimize temperature. Genentech argued that there was no reason or motivation to optimize the temperature because “the desire to reduce protein A leaching applies only to the large-scale, industrial purification of therapeutic antibodies for clinical applications…[and] that chilling HCCF for largescale, industrial processes would have been inconvenient, costly, and impractical.” Id. at 13. Hospira argued that a skilled artisan in non‑clinical applications would have been motivated to reduce leaching because leaching damages chromatography columns. The CAFC held that the Board was correct in holding that neither the ‘799 patent nor WO ‘389 are limited to large-scale industrial applications. The CAFC affirmed the Boards’ finding that temperature is a “result-effective variable” and that it would have been routine experimentation for a skilled artisan to optimize the temperature to reduce protein A leaching.
Dissent
Newman dissented and asserted that affirming the holding of invalidity for anticipation and obviousness was an error because none of the prior art shows or suggest the claimed method. Id. at 9. According to Newman, the determination by the Board and the CAFC is based on hindsight. Newman noted that the “retrospective simplicity of the solution apparently led the Board to find it obvious to them, despite the undisputed testimony that no reference suggests this solution to the contamination problem here encountered, as the experts for both sides acknowledged.” Id. at 3. Newman noted that the ‘799 patent disclosed in detail the complexities with regards to obtaining and purifying antibodies, the many factors to consider when performing chromatography, the problems associated with the leaching of protein A, and explained their discovery of the cause of said leaching and their solution to said problem. At the Board, Genentech argued the advantages of their claimed method, i.e. prevent leaching of protein A in protein A affinity chromatography, in contrast to the need to perform additional purification chromatography to remove protein A, as in WO ‘389. Both experts agreed that the reference to room temperature (18-25oC) was in reference to the ambient temperature and was not in reference to the chilled material in the column. “Nonetheless, the PTAB and now my colleagues hold that this ‘room temperature’ range anticipates the ‘799 patent’s chilled range of 10oC-18oC, ignoring the significantly different results in the recited ranges.” Id. at 6.
According to Newman, mere abutment of the 18oC is not anticipation. “Anticipation requires that the same invention, including all claim limitations, was previously described. Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 851 F.3d 1270, 1274– 75 (Fed. Cir. 2017). The “anticipating reference must describe the entirety of the claimed subject matter.” Id. at 7. Newman holds that the affirmation of anticipation fails to consider the “absence of identify of these ranges” (18-25oC vs. about 10oC-about 18oC), fails to consider “the different results at the lower range” and fails to consider “the significance of the purity of the eluted antibody.” Id. at 8 Regarding obviousness, Newman holds that there is no evidence that it was known or suggested that cooling the HCCF composition either prior to or during chromatography would minimize or prevent leaching of the protein A in the purified antibody solution. According to Newman, “the question is not whether it would have been easy to cool the material to the 10ºC–18ºC range; the question is whether it would have been obvious to do so. Contrary to the Board’s and the court’s view, this is not a matter of optimizing a known procedure to obtain a known result; for it was not known that cooling the material for chromatography would avoid contamination of the purified antibody with leached protein A.” Id. at 9. That is, even if it is possible to modify the temperature, Newman asserts that there is no reason or motivation to optimize the temperature to prevent leaching of protein A.
Takeaway
- If possible, establish the criticality of a claimed range. One is encouraged to rebut a prima facie case of anticipation or obviousness by establishing that the claimed range is critical to the operability of the claimed invention.
- If there is an overlap of a disputed claim range and the range disclosed in the prior art, but the results are different, this may be evidence of the criticality of the range.
One correct way of reciting a Markush group in the claim
| January 24, 2020
Amgen Inc. v. Amneal Pharmaceuticals LLC
January 7, 2020
Lourie (Opinion author), Newman, and Taranto
Summary
The Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s claim construction of the Markush groups as being closed to unrecited elements because the claim recites “comprising” as the transitional phrase and “at least one” in front of each of the Markush groups. Furthermore, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding of noninfringement under the doctrine of equivalents by one of the Defendants’ products due to prosecution history estoppel.
Details
Amneal, Piramal, and Zydus each filed an Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA), seeking approval of a generic version of Sensipar®, a formulation of cinacalcet hydrochloride used to treat secondary hyperparathyroidism in adult patients with chronic kidney disease who are on dialysis and to treat hypercalcemia in patients with parathyroid cancer and primary and secondary hyperparathyroidism. Amgen holds the approved New Drug Application for Sensipar®, and sued them for infringing U.S. Patent No. 9,375,405 (the ‘405 patent).
The ‘405 patent is directed to a rapid dissolution formulation of cinacalcet. Claim 1 of the ‘405 patent is as follows:
A pharmaceutical composition comprising:
(a) from about 10% to about 40% by weight of cinacalcet HCl in an amount of from about 20 mg to about 100 mg;
(b) from about 45% to about 85% by weight of a diluent selected from the group consisting of microcrystalline cellulose, starch, dicalcium phosphate, lactose, sorbitol, mannitol, sucrose, methyl dextrins, and mixtures thereof,
(c) from about 1% to about 5% by weight of at least one binder selected from the group consisting of povidone, hydroxypropyl methylcellulose, hydroxypropyl cellulose, sodium carboxymethylcellulose, and mixtures thereof; and
(d) from about 1% to 10% by weight of at least one disintegrant selected from the group consisting of crospovid[o]ne, sodium starch glycolate, croscarmellose sodium, and mixtures thereof,
wherein the percentage by weight is relative to the total weight of the composition, and wherein the composition is for the treatment of at least one of hyperparathyroidism, hyperphosphonia, hypercalcemia, and elevated calcium phosphorus product.
The ‘405 patent issued from U.S. Patent Application 12/942,646 (the ‘646 application). The original ‘646 application contained only one claim, which recited a “pharmaceutical composition comprising an effective dosage amount of a calcium receptor-active compound and at least one pharmaceutically acceptable excipient, wherein” the composition achieved a specific dissolution profile. Later, Amgen filed a Preliminary Amendment, which cancelled claim 1 and added new claims 2-24. The newly filed claim 2, which ultimately issued as claim 1, is as follows:
A pharmaceutical composition comprising:
(a) from about 10% to about 40% by weight of cinacalcet HCl;
(b) from about 45% to about 85% by weight of a diluent selected from the group consisting of microcrystalline cellulose, starch, dicalcium phosphate, lactose, sorbitol, mannitol, sucrose, methyl dextrins, and mixtures thereof,
(c) from about 1% to about 5% by weight of at least one binder; and
(d) from about 1% to 10% by weight of at least one disintegrant,
wherein the percentage by weight is relative to the total weight of the composition.
The Examiner rejected the new claims. Then, Amgen filed an amendment of the independent claim 2, reciting “from about 10% to about 40% by weight of cinacalcet HCl in an amount of from about 20 mg to about 100mg.” Then, Amgen conducted a phone interview with the Examiner. During the interview, the Examiner proposed an Examiner’s Amendment of the independent claim 2, and Amgen accepted the Examiner’s Amendment. Specifically, the Examiner’s Amendment revised the binder and the disintegrant limitations into their current, Markush group format. Then, the claims are allowed. After the Notice of Allowance was issued, Amgen filed a number of RCE Requests with new IDS submission. In one of the RCE Requests, with regard to the previous Examiner’s Amendments, Amgen remarked that “[t]hese amendments have not been made in response to a prior art rejection but rather to place the claims in proper format and to better define the claimed subject matter, including equivalents.” The Examiner issued a Notice of Allowance after each RCE Request.
In the district court proceeding, one key issue is the construction of the binder and disintegrant Markush groups. The district court held that the Markush groups for the binder and disintegrant elements are closed to unrecited binders and disintegrants, relying on Multilayer Stretch Cling Film Holdings, Inc. v. Berry Plastics Corp., 831 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Furthermore, the district court held that Amneal does not infringe the ‘405 patent because Amneal uses Opadry Clear YS-1-7006 as the binder, a product that contains PEG 400 and PEG 8000 in addition to hydroxypropyl methylcellulose, which is a listed binder in claim 2. Furthermore, the district court held that Piramal does not infringe the ‘405 patent under the doctrine of equivalents because prosecution history estoppel barred Amgen’s argument that the cold-water soluble fraction of the preglatinized starch used by Piramal is equivalent to providone, a listed binder in claim 2.
On appeal, first, the Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s claim construction regarding the binder and disintegrant Markush groups. Specifically, contrary to the district court’s interpretation, because claim 1 uses “comprising” as the transitional phrase and “at least one” in front of each Markush group, the binder and disintegrant Markush groups do not preclude other binders and disintegrants in the claimed composition. Without more, such language is satisfied when an accused product contains a component that is from the Markush group and that meets the limitation’s other requirements such as concentration requirement for the component. Furthermore, the Federal Circuit held that Opadry used as a binder by Amneal contains HPMC, which is a listed binder in claim 1. Thus, irrespective of whether other components such as PEG are present, provided that Amneal’s formulation contains from about 1 to about 5% HPMC, the formulation literally infringes. Accordingly, the Federal Circuit vacates and remands those findings by the district court.
Next, the Federal Circuit held that Amgen’s doctrine of equivalents argument is barred by prosecution history estoppel. During the prosecution, Amgen accepted the Examiner’s Amendment that revised the claim’s disintegrant and binder limitations to be in Markush group format. Such an amendment narrows the scope of the claim, and Amgen failed to carry its burden to demonstrate that the Examiner’s Amendment was made for a reason unrelated to patentability. The Amgen’s statement in the later RCE Request was made over eight months after the Examiner’s Amendment was accepted, and accordingly does not provide any insight on the reasons for the Examiner’s Amendment. Furthermore, the tangential exception to prosecution history estoppel does not apply here because the use of pregelatinized starch as a binder is taught in the cited prior art. An amendment made to avoid prior art that contains the equivalent in question is not tangential.
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit vacated and remanded the district court’s judgment that Amneal does not infringe the ‘405 patent, and affirmed the district court’s judgment that Piramal does not infringe the ‘405 patent.
Take away
- The claims should recite “comprising” as the transitional phrase and “at least one” in front of the Markush groups to avoid being constructed to be closed to unrecited elements in the Markush groups.
- The original specification should contain a complete set of claims instead of one claim because later amendments may inevitably invoke prosecution history estoppel, which would bar most of the doctrine of equivalents arguments.
- The patent drafter should be mindful of an independent claim with an overly broad scope. Any later amendments during the patent prosecution may invoke prosecution history estoppel. Accordingly, the applicants have the risk of losing any protection afforded by patent infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.
Post-filing examples, even if made by different method than prior art, may be relied upon to show inherency, particularly if patent owner fails to show that inherent feature is absent in prior art
| January 21, 2020
Hospira, Inc. v. Fresenius Kabi USA, LLC
January 9, 2020
Lourie, Dyk, Moore. Opinion by Lourie.
Summary
The CAFC upheld the obviousness of claims based on an inherency theory. In particular, the CAFC saw no fault in the conclusion that the combination of prior art possessed an inherent property even though the data demonstrating the inherent property was from post-filing examples made by a different method than the combination of cited art. This is because the patent owner failed to demonstrate any situation where the inherent property was not present.
Details
Background
Hospira is the owner of U.S. Patent No. 8,648,106. Fresenius filed an Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) stipulating to infringement of claim 6 of the ‘106 patent, but arguing that this claim is invalid. Claim 6 (which depends on claim 1) recites as follows:
6. [A ready to use liquid pharmaceutical composition for parenteral administration to a subject, comprising dexmedetomidine or a pharmaceutically acceptable salt thereof disposed within a sealed glass container, wherein the liquid pharmaceutical composition when stored in the glass container for at least five months exhibits no more than about 2% decrease in the concentration of dexmedetomidine,]
[] wherein the dexmedetomidine or pharmaceutically acceptable salt thereof is at a concentration of about 4 μg/mL.
Dexmedetomidine is a sedative that was originally patented in the 1980’s. In 1989, safety studies were performed using a 20 µg/mL dosage in humans, but were eventually abandoned due to adverse side effects.
In 1994, FDA approval was granted to market a 100 µg/mL dose of dexmedetomidine under the name “Precedex Concentrate.” Precedex Concentrate was provided in 2 mL sealed glass vials/ampoules with coated rubber stoppers. Precedex Concentrate was sold with instructions for diluting to a concentration of 4 µg/mL prior to use.
Additionally, in 2002, a 500 µg/mL “ready to use” formulation of dexmedetomidine was granted approval for veterinary use in Europe. This product was called Dexdomitor, and was stored in 10 mL glass vials sealed with a coated rubber stopper. Dexdomitor has a 2 year shelf life.
The ‘106 patent explained that the prior art dexmedetomidine was problematic due to the requirement for dilution, and disclosed a premixed, “ready to use” formulation, which can be administered without dilution. The ‘106 patent stated that the invention was based in part on the discovery that the premixed dexmedetomidine “remains stable and active after prolonged storage.” The specification included studies of dexmedetomidine potency over time under different storage conditions, such as the material of the container. Further, the specification disclosed a manufacturing method that provided nitrogen gas into the headspace of the bottle.
District Court
The district court concluded that claim 6 was obvious in view of (a) the combination of Precedex Concentrate (100 µg/mL requiring dilution) and the knowledge of a person skilled in the art, and (b) the combination of Precedex Concentrate (100 µg/mL requiring dilution) and Dexdomitor (500 µg/mL not requiring dilution). In particular, the district court focused on the “4 µg/mL preferred embodiment”: a glass container made of glass and a rubber-coated stopper with ready to use 4 µg/mL dexmedetomidine. The main issue related to the “about 2%” limitation.
The district
court concluded that the “about 2%” limitation was inherent in the prior art’s
“4 µg/mL preferred embodiment.” To reach this conclusion, the district court
relied on evidence of 20+ tested samples, all of which met the “about 2%”
limitation. The court also relied on
expert testimony that the concentration of dexmedetomidine does not impact its
stability. Further, the court relied on the fact that neither the label of
Precedex Concentrate nor the label of Dexdomitor mentions chemical
stabilizers. Importantly, the district
court found insufficient evidence that it would have been expected that a lower
concentration of dexmedetomidine would reduce stability, or that oxidation
would occur in the absence of a nitrogen gas environment. The district court concluded that dexmedetomidine
is a “rock stable molecule” and that claim 6 is therefore invalid as obvious in
view of the prior art.
CAFC
At the CAFC, the main issue raised was whether the inherency conclusion of the district court was improper because it relied on non-prior art embodiments, rather than the alleged obvious combination of prior art. In particular, the data relied upon by the district court was entirely from Hospira’s NDA for Precedex Premix and Fresenius’s ANDA product. Both of these are after the filing date of the application. Both were made using the nitrogen gas environment method as described in the specification. As such, Hospira argued that it cannot be said that the data demonstrate the inherency of a preferred embodiment which may or may not be made using this manufacturing process.
However, the CAFC agreed with Fresenius that it was not an error to point to post-filing data in support of an inherency conclusion. Although the later evidence is not prior art, it can nonetheless be used to demonstrate the properties of the prior art. The NDA and ANDA data merely served as evidence to show whether there was the decrease in concentration over time of the 4 µg/mL preferred embodiment.
Additionally, the CAFC noted that claim 6 is not a method claim or a product-by-process claim. Since claim 6 includes no limitations relating to a nitrogen gas environment in the glass container, such limitations should not be read into the claim. Thus, the district court properly ignored the process by which the samples were prepared when considering inherency.
The CAFC then highlighted that the record included evidence that concentration does not affect the stability of dexmedetomidine, and also criticized Hospira for failing to present any examples of the 4 µg/mL preferred embodiment which did not satisfy the “about 2%” limitation. Furthermore, Hospira failed to demonstrate that the reason why the 20+ examples satisfied the “about 2%” limitation was because of the nitrogen gas in the glass container, and likewise that samples made by a different method would fail to satisfy the “about 2%” limitation.
Additionally, Hospira argued that the district court applied the wrong standard to inherency by applying a “reasonable expectation of success” standard. Although the CAFC agreed that the district court conflated two issues, they found that the district court’s “unnecessary analysis” was a harmless error and does not impact the outcome of the case. In other words, if a property is inherently present, there is no further question of whether one has a reason expectation of success in obtaining this property.
Returning to the merits, the CAFC concluded that claim 6 is obvious. Since there are no other relevant limitations recited in claim 6, the mere recitation of the inherent “about 2% limitation” cannot render the claim nonobvious. Rather, the patent was merely based on a discovery that dexmedetomidine is stable after long-term storage, but does not require any additional manufacturing limitations or the like.
Takeaway
-Applicants and patent owners should be aware that post-filing data can demonstrate inherency of prior art in some situations.
-When facing an issue of inherency, the Applicant or patent owner should focus on providing evidence to demonstrate the lack of an allegedly inherent feature in some situations, rather than criticizing the experimental design of the data alleged to show inherency.
-Applicants and patent owners should take care that non-inherency arguments are commensurate in scope with the claims. Here, the patent owner should have presented evidence relating to differences between drug potency in a nitrogen gas environment (as in the data relied upon by the court) as compared to a normal air environment (as in the combination of prior art). Although the claims do not require any particular environment, such data could have shown that even if the nitrogen gas environment (not prior art) satisfied the “about 2% limitation,” the non-nitrogen gas environment (prior art) did not necessarily satisfy the “about 2% limitation.”
-Applicants should be sure to claim all disclosed important features. In this case, positively reciting the nitrogen gas environment and the container at a minimum level of detail may have been sufficient to save the claims from obviousness.
Disavowal – Construing an element in a patent claim to require what is not recited in the claim but is described in an embodiment of the specification
| January 14, 2020
Techtronic Industries Co. Ltd. v. International Trade Commission
December 12, 2019
Lourie, Dyk, and Wallach, Circuit Judges. Court opinion by Lourie.
Summary
The Federal Circuit reversed the Commission’s claim construction order reversing the ALJ’s construction of the term “wall console” in each of claims in the patent in suit, holding that the ALJ properly construed the term “wall console” as “wall-mounted control unit including a passive infrared detector” because each section of the specification evinces that the patent disavowed coverage of wall consoles lacking a passive infrared detector. Consequently, the Court reversed the Commission’s determination of infringement as well because the parties agreed that the appellants do not infringe the patent under the ALJ’s claim construction.
Details
I. background
1. The Patent in Suit – U.S. Patent 7,161,319 (the “‘319 patent”)
Intervenor Chamberlain Group Inc. (“Chamberlain”) owns the ‘319 patent, which discloses improved “movable barrier operators,” such as garage door openers. Claim 1, a representative claim, reads as follows:
1. An improved garage door opener comprising
a motor drive unit for opening and closing a garage door, said motor drive unit having a microcontroller
and a wall console, said wall console having a microcontroller,
said microcontroller of said motor drive unit being connected to the microcontroller of the wall console by means of a digital data bus.
2. Prior Proceedings
In July 2016, Chamberlain filed a complaint at the Commission, alleging that Techtronic Industries Co. Ltd. and others (collectively, “Appellants”) violated Section 337(a)(1)(B) of the Tariff Act of 1930 by the “importation into the United States, the sale for importation, and the sale within the United States after importation” of Ryobi Garage Door Opener models that infringe the ‘319 patent.
The only disputed term of the ‘319 patent was “wall console.” The ALJ concluded that Chamberlain had disavowed wall consoles lacking a passive infrared detector because the ‘319 patent sets forth its invention as a passive infrared detector superior to those of the prior art by virtue of its location in the wall console, rather than in the head unit, and that the only embodiment in the ‘319 patent places the passive infrared detector in the wall console as well.
The Commission reviewed the ALJ’s order and issued a decision reversing the ALJ’s construction of “wall console” and vacating his initial determination of non-infringement. The Commission presented following reasons for the reversal: (i) while “the [‘319] specification describes the ‘principal aspect of the present invention’ as providing an improved [passive infrared detector] for a garage door operator,” the specification discloses other aspects of the invention, and a patentee is not required to recite in each claim all features described as important in the written description; (ii) the claims of U.S. Patent 6,737,968, which issued from a parent application, expressly located the passive infrared detector in the wall console, “demonstrat[ing] the patentee’s intent to claim wall control units with and without [passive infrared detectors];” and (iii) the prosecution history of the ‘319 patent lacked “the clear prosecution history disclaimer.”
Under the Commission’s construction, the ALJ found that Appellants infringed the ‘319 patent. Accordingly, the Commission entered the Remedial Orders against the Appellants.
The appeal followed.
II. The Federal Circuit
The Federal Circuit unanimously sided with the Appellants, concluding that Chamberlain disavowed coverage of wall consoles without a passive infrared detector because “the specification, in each of its sections, discloses as the invention a garage door opener improved by moving the passive infrared detector from the head unit to the wall console.”
The court opinion authored by Judge Lourie started scrutiny of the ‘319 specification with the background section. The court opinion found that the background section discloses that the prior art taught the use of passive infrared detectors in the head unit of the garage door opener to control the garage’s lighting, but that locating the detector in the head unit was expensive, complicated, and unreliable (emphases added). The court opinion moved on to state, [t]he ‘319 patent therefore sets out to solve the need for “a passive infrared detector for controlling illumination from a garage door operator which could be quickly and easily retrofitted to existing garage door operators with a minimum of trouble and without voiding the warranty.”
The court opinion further stated, “[t]he remaining sections of the patent—even the abstract—disclose a straightforward solution: moving the detector to the wall console” (emphasis added).
The court opinion dismissed the Commission’s argument that “[n]owhere does the ‘319 patent state that it is impossible or even infeasible to locate a passive infrared detector at some other location” by pointing out, “the entire specification focuses on enabling placement of the passive infra-red detector in the wall console, which is both responsive to the prior art deficiency the ’319 patent identifies and repeatedly set forth as the objective of the invention.”
As for the “other aspects of the invention” partially relied on by the Commission, the court opinion stated, “[t]he suggestion that the patent recites another invention—related to programming the microcontroller—in no way undermines the conclusion that the infrared detector must be on the wall unit .” More specifically, in response to Chamberlain’s and the Commission’s argument that portions of the description, particularly col. 4 l. 60–col. 7 l. 26, concern an exemplary method of programming the microcontroller to interact with the head unit by means of certain digital signaling techniques, matters not strictly related to the detector, the court opinion stated, “the entire purpose of this part of the description is to enable placement of the detector in the wall console, and it never discusses programming the microcontroller or applying digital signaling techniques for any purpose other than transmitting lighting commands from the wall console.”
Finally, the court opinion rejected the contention of Chamberlain and the Commission that the ‘319 patent’s prosecution history is inconsistent with disavowal, by stating, “there is [n]o requirement that the prosecution history reiterate the specification’s disavowal.”
In view of the above, the Court concluded that the ‘319 patent disavows wall consoles lacking a passive infrared detector. Accordingly, the Court reversed the Commission’s claim construction order and the determination of infringement.
Takeaway
· Disavowal, whether explicit or implicit, may cause a claim term to be construed narrower than an ordinary meaning of the term.
· Disavowal may be found with reference to an entire portion of the specification including an abstract and background section.
The United States Patent and Trademark Office cannot recover salaries of its lawyers and paralegals in civil actions brought under 35 U.S.C. §145
| December 26, 2019
Peter v. Nantkwest, Inc.
December 11, 2019
Opinion by Justice Sotomayor (unanimous decision)
Summary
The “American Rule” is the principle that parties are responsible for their own attorney’s fees. While the Patent Act requires applicants who choose to pursue civil action under 35 U.S.C. §145 to pay the expenses of the proceedings, the Supreme Court found that the American Rule’s presumption applies to §145, and the “expenses” does not include salaries of its lawyers and paralegals.
Details
There are two possible ways in which a dissatisfied applicant may appeal the final decision of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board. One option is to appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit under 35 U.S.C. §141. In choosing this avenue, the applicant will not be able to offer new evidence that was not presented before the USPTO. The other option is to seek remedy in filing a civil action against the Director of the USPTO in federal district court under 35 U.S.C. §145. Unlike under 35 U.S.C. §141, the applicant may introduce new evidence, and the district court would make de novo determinations based on the new evidence and the administrative record before the USPTO. Because 35 U.S.C. §145 allows for an applicant to introduce new evidence, the litigation can be lengthy and expensive. For this reason, the Patent Act requires applicants who choose to file a civil action under 35 U.S.C. §145 to pay “[a]l the expenses of the proceedings.” 35 U.S.C. §145.
In this case, the USPTO denied NantKwest, Inc’s patent application, which was directed to a method for treating cancer. NantKwest Inc. then filed a complaint against the Director of the USPTO in the Eastern District of Virginia under 35 U.S.C. §145. The District Court granted summary judgment to the USPTO, which the Federal Circuit affirmed. The USPTO moved for reimbursement of expenses, including the pro rata salaries of the USPTO attorneys and paralegals who worked on the case. The Supreme Court noted in its opinion that this was “the first time in the 170-year history of §145” that the reimbursement of such salaries were requested as a part of expenses. The District Court denied the USPTO’s motion. NantKwest, Inc. v. Lee, 162 F. Supp. 3d 540 (E.D. Va. 2016). Then a divided Federal Circuit panel reversed. NantKwest, Inc. v. Matal, 860 F. 3d 1352 (2017). The en banc Federal Circuit voted sua sponte to rehear the case, and reversed the panel over a dissent, holding that the “American Rule” (the principle that parties are responsible for their own attorney’s fees) applied to §145, after examining the plain text, statutory history, the judicial and congressional understanding of similar language, and policy considerations. NantKwest, Inc. v. Iancu, 898 F. 3d 1177 (2018). The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
The Supreme Court first notes as the “basic point of reference” the principle of the “American Rule” which is that “[e]ach litigant pays his own attorney’s fees, win or lose, unless a statute or contract provides otherwise.” While the USPTO did not dispute this principle, it argued that the presumption applies only to prevailing-party statutes, and as §145 requires one party to pay all expenses, regardless of outcome, it is therefore not subject to the presumption. However, the Supreme Court stated that Sebelius v. Cloer, 569 U.S. 369 (2013) confirm that the presumption against fee shifting applies to all statutes, including statute like §145 that do not explicitly award attorney’s fees to “prevailing parties.”
The Supreme Court then analyzed whether Congress intended to depart from the American Rule presumption. The Supreme Court first looked at the plain text, reading the term alongside neighboring words in the statute, and concluded that the plain text does not overcome the American Rule’s presumption against fee shifting. The Supreme Court also looked at statutory usage, and found that “expenses” and “attorney’s fees” appear in tandem across various statutes shifting litigation costs, indicating “that Congress understands the two terms to be distinct and not inclusive of each other.” While some other statutes refer to attorney’s fees as a subset of expenses, the Supreme Court stated that they show only that attorney’s fees can be included in “expenses” when defined as such.
Based on the foregoing, the Supreme Court concluded that the USPTO cannot recover salaries of its lawyers and paralegals in civil actions brought under 35 U.S.C. §145.
Takeaway
The USPTO has recovered attorney costs under a similar trademark law, 15 U.S.C. 1071, in the 2015 Fourth Circuit decision of Shammas v. Focarino, 114 USPQ2d 1489 (4th Cir. 2015). While the Supreme Court does not mention the applicability of the interpretation of “expenses” under 35 U.S.C. §145 to the interpretation of “expenses” in 15 U.S.C. 1071(b)(3), we would expect the Supreme Court to interpret “expenses” the same way in both of these statutes.
Heightened “original patent” written description standard applies for reissue patents
| December 20, 2019
Forum US Inc., v. Flow Valve, LLC.
June 17, 2019
Before Reyna, Schall, and Hughes. Opinion by Reyna.
Summary
The CAFC affirmed a district court decision holding that Flow Valve’s Reissue Patent No. RE 45,878 (“the Reissue patent”) is invalid because of insufficiently supported broadening claims. The original patent “must clearly and unequivocally disclose the newly claimed invention as a separate invention,” otherwise the claims in the reissue patent do not comply with the original patent requirement of 35 USC 251.
Details
Flow Valve’s original Patent No. 8,215,213 (“the original patent), entitled “Workpiece Supporting Assembly” relates to machined pipe fittings typically used in the oil and gas industry. The written description and drawings disclose only embodiments with arbors.
Figs. 4 and 5 from the original patent with arbors circled in red:
Claim 1 of the original patent also expressly claimed the arbors (emphasis added):
A workpiece machining implement comprising:
a body member having an internal workpiece channel, the body member having a plurality of body openings communicating with the internal workpiece channel;
means supported by the body member for positioning a workpiece in the internal work piece in the internal workpiece channel so that extending workpiece portions of the workpiece extend from selected ones of the body openings;
a plurality of arbors supported by the body member, each arbor having an axis coincident with a datum axis of one of the extending workpiece portions; and
means for rotating the workpiece supporting assembly about the axis of a selected one of the arbors.
When Flow Valve filed the reissue patent application, the patentees broadened the claims by adding seven new claims, where the arbor limitations were replaced by a “pivotable” limitation. Claim 14 is representative of the reissue patent:
Claim 14 of the reissue patent:
A workpiece supporting assembly for securing an elbow during a machining process that is performed on the elbow by operation of a workpiece machining implement, the workpiece supporting assembly comprising:
a body having an internal surface defining a channel, the internal surface sized to receive a medial portion of the elbow when the elbow is operably disposed in the channel; and
a support that is selectively positionable to secure the elbow in the workpiece supporting assembly, the body pivotable to a first pivoted position, the body sized so that a first end of the elbow extends from the channel and beyond the body so the first end of the elbow is presentable to the workpiece machining implement for performing the machining process, the body pivotable to a second position and sized so that a second end of the elbow extends from the channel beyond the body so the second end of the elbow is presentable to the workpiece machining implement for performing the machining process.
Forum US, Inc. sued Flow Valve for a declaratory judgment of invalidity of the reissue patent, arguing that the added reissue claims were invalid because they did not comply with the original patent requirement under 35 USC 251.
In particular, Forum argued that the claims broadened the original patent claims by omitting the arbor limitations, which is a violation of the original patent requirement of Reissue patent because the original patent did not disclose an invention without arbors.
In response, Flows Valve supplied an expert declaration asserting that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood from the specification that not every embodiment requires “a plurality of arbors” and that the arbors are an optional feature.
The district court granted Forum’s summary judgement, holding that “no matter what a person of ordinary skill would recognize, the specification of the original patent must clearly and unequivocally disclose the newly claimed invention in order to satisfy the original patent rule.”
Flows Valve appealed but the CAFC affirmed the district court’s decision.
In affirming the district court’s decision, the CAFC relied on two cases U.S. Indus. Chems., Inc. v. Carbide & Carbon Chems. Corp., 315 U.S. 668 (1942), and Antares Pharma, Inc. v. Medac Pharma Inc., 771 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir 2014), to the effect that, for broadening reissue claims, “it is not enough that an invention might have been claimed in the original patent because it was suggested or indicated in the specification”, instead, the original patent “must clearly and unequivocally disclose the newly claimed invention as a separate invention.”
Like the District Court, the Appeals Court discounted the expert declaration, commenting that “when a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand ‘does not aid the court in understanding what the’ patent actually say.”
Take away
- Heightened “original patent” written description standard applies for reissue patents.
- Expert testimony on the understanding of a person of skill in the art as evidence is insufficient.
- If it is likely in the foreseeable future to have the needs to broaden the claims, use a continuation application so that applicant does not have to meet the additional “clear and unequivocal disclosure as separate invention” requirement of a broadening reissue.
WHEN IS PRIOR ART ANALOGOUS?
| November 29, 2019
Airbus v. Firepass
November 8, 2019
Lourie, Moore, and Stoll
Summary:
To determine whether a reference is “analogous prior art,” one must first ask whether the reference is from the same “field of endeavor” as claimed invention. If not, one must ask whether the reference is “reasonably pertinent” to the particular problem addressed by the claimed invention.
As phrased by the CAFC here, a reference is “reasonably pertinent” if
an ordinarily skilled artisan would reasonably have consulted in seeking a solution to the problem that the inventor was attempting to solve, [so that] the reasonably pertinent inquiry is inextricably tied to the knowledge and perspective of a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention.
Thus, one should consider (i) in which areas one skilled in the art would reasonably look, and (ii) what that skilled person would reasonably search for, in trying to address the problem faced by the inventor. Accordingly, courts or examiners should consider evidence cited by the parties or the applicant that demonstrates “the knowledge and perspective of a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention.”
If a reference fails both the “field of endeavor” and the “reasonably pertinent” tests, it is not analogous prior art and not available for an obviousness rejection.
Background:
Challenger Airbus filed an inter partes reexamination against a patent owned by Firepass. The examiner rejected the claims at issue here as being obvious over the Kotliar reference in view of other prior art. The examiner also rejected other claims, not in issue here, as being obvious over Kotliar in view of four prior references (Gustafsson, the 1167 Report, Luria, and Carhart).
The claimed invention is an enclosed fire prevention and suppression system (for instance, computer rooms, military vehicles, or spacecraft), which extinguishes fire with an atmosphere of breathable air. The inventor found that a low-oxygen atmosphere (16.2% or slightly lower), maintained at normal pressure, would inhibit fire and yet be breathable by humans. Normal pressure is maintained by added nitrogen gas.
The patent contains the following independent claim that was added during the reexamination:
A system for providing breathable fire-preventive and fire suppressive atmosphere in enclosed human-occupied spaces, said system comprising:
an enclosing structure having an internal environment therein containing a gas mixture which is lower in oxygen content than air outside said structure, and an entry communicating with said internal environment;
an oxygen-extraction device having a filter, an inlet taking in an intake gas mixture and first and second outlets, said oxygen-extraction device being a nitrogen generator, said first outlet transmitting a first gas mixture having a higher oxygen content than the intake gas mixture and said second outlet transmitting a second gas mixture having a lower oxygen content than the intake gas mixture;
said second outlet communicating with said internal environment and transmitting said second mixture into said internal environment so that said second mixture mixes with the atmosphere in said internal environment;
said first outlet transmitting said first mixture to a location where it does not mix with said atmosphere in said internal environment;
said internal environment selectively communicating with the outside atmosphere and emitting excessive internal gas mixture into the outside atmosphere;
said intake gas mixture being ambient air taken in from the external atmosphere outside said internal environment with a reduced humidity; and
a computer control for regulating the oxygen con-tent in said internal environment.
The Board of Appeals reversed the examiner’s rejection, finding that Kotliar is not analogous prior art. The Board stated that the examiner had not articulated a “rational underpinning that sufficiently links the problem [addressed by the claimed invention] of fire suppression/prevention confronting the inventor” to the disclosure of Kotliar, “which is directed to human therapy, wellness, and physical training.” Significantly, the Board did not consider Airbus’ argument that “breathable fire suppressive environments [were] well-known in the art,” stating that the four references, relied on by Airbus, were not used by the examiner for the rejection of the claims in issue here.
Discussion:
The CAFC began its analysis by citing the “field of endeavor” and the “reasonably pertinent” tests mentioned above.
With respect to “field of endeavor,” the CAFC agreed with the Board. The Court explained that the disclosure of the references is the primary focus, but that courts and examiners must also consider each reference’s disclosure in view of the “the reality of the circumstances” and “weigh those circumstances from the vantage point of the common sense likely to be exerted by one of ordinary skill in the art in assessing the scope of the endeavor.”
Here, the Board found that the “field of endeavor” for the patent to be “devices and methods for fire prevention/suppression,” citing the preamble of the claim, the title and specification of the patent. Kotliar, on the other hand, concerns “human therapy, wellness, and physical training,” based on its title and specification. The Board concluded that Kotliar was outside the field of endeavor of the claimed invention, particularly in view of the fact that Kotliar never mentions “fire.”
The CAFC found that the Board’s conclusion is supported by substantial evidence.
Airbus argued that the Board should have considered the four references—Gustafsson, the 1167 Report, Luria, and Carhart—to which show that “a POSA would have known and appreciated that the breathable hypoxic air produced by Kotliar is fire-preventative and fire-suppressive, even though Kotliar does not state this” (emphasis in original). The CAFC disagreed, stating that Board’s failure to consider these references, if error, was harmless error. The CAFC explained that
a reference that is expressly directed to exercise equipment and fails to mention the word “fire” even a single time—falls within the field of fire prevention and suppression. Such a conclusion would not only defy the plain text of Kotliar, it would also defy “common sense” and the “reality of the circumstances” that a factfinder must consider in determining the field of endeavor.
The CAFC, however, came to the opposite conclusion with respect to the “reasonably pertinent” test. As with the “field of endeavor” test, the Board had failed to consider the four references. The CAFC found that this was a mistake.
In determining whether a reference is “reasonably pertinent” to the particular problem addressed by the claimed invention, for assessing whether a reference is analogous prior art, the court or the examiner should consider (i) in which areas one skilled in the art would reasonably look, and (ii) what that skilled person would reasonably search for, in trying to address the problem faced by the inventor. A court or examiner should therefore consider evidence cited by the parties or the applicant that demonstrates “the knowledge and perspective of a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention.”
Here, the four references are relevant to the question of whether one skilled in the art of fire prevention and suppression would have reasonably consulted references relating to normal pressure, low-oxygen atmospheres to address the problem of preventing and suppressing fires in enclosed environments. As stated above, the four references—Gustafsson, the 1167 Report, Luria, and Carhart—to which show that “a POSA would have known and appreciated that the breathable hypoxic air produced by Kotliar is fire-preventative and fire-suppressive, even though Kotliar does not state this” (emphasis in original). These references, the CAFC stated, could therefore lead a court or an examiner to conclude that one skilled in the field of fire prevention and suppression would have looked to Kotliar for its disclosure of a hypoxic room, even though Kotliar itself is outside the field of endeavor.
The CAFC therefore vacated the Board’s decision and remanded the case for the Board to consider whether Kotliar is analogous prior art in view of the four references.
Takeaway:
In resolving the “reasonably pertinent” test, courts and examiners must look at all the evidence of record.
Preamble Reciting a Travel Trailer is a Structural Limitation – Avoiding Assertions of Intended Use
| November 26, 2019
In Re: David Fought, Martin Clanton.
November 4, 2019
Newman, Moore and Chen
Summary
This decision provides an excellent example of when a limitation in a preamble is given patentable weight. The decision also illustrates arguments which will not be successful. The Federal Circuit held that not only was the preamble limiting, but also held that a “travel trailer” is considered a specific type of recreation vehicle having structural distinctions.
Background
The patent application contains two independent claims:
1. A travel trailer having a first and second compartment therein separated by a wall assembly which is movable so as to alter the relative dimensions of the first and second compartments without altering the exterior appearance of the travel trailer.
2. A travel trailer having a front wall, rear wall, and two side walls with a first and a second compartment therein, those compartments being separated by a wall assembly, the wall assembly having a forward wall and at least one side member,
the side member being located adjacent to and movable in parallel with respect to a side wall of the trailer, and
the wall assembly being moved along the longitudinal length of the trailer by drive means positioned between the side member and the side wall. (Emphasis added)
The examiner rejected claim 1 as anticipated by a reference describing a conventional truck trailer such as a refrigerated trailer, and rejected claim 2 as anticipated over another reference describing a bulkhead for shipping compartments. The applicants appealed the rejections by (1) arguing that the claims do not have a preamble, (2) arguing that a travel trailer is a type of recreational vehicle, as supported by extrinsic evidence, and (3) arguing that the Examiner erred by rejecting the claims without addressing the level of ordinary skill.
Discussion
The CAFC reviewed the Board’s legal conclusions (involving claim construction) de novo and reviewed the factual findings (involving the extrinsic evidence) for substantial evidence.
The effect of a preamble is treated as a claim construction issue. The CAFC was not persuaded by the argument that the claims do not have a preamble because a traditional transitional phrase such as “comprising” was not used. The CAFC explained that although a traditional transitional phrase was not used, the word “having” performs the role of a transitional phrase. As such, this argument was not persuasive.
The next argument, however, was found persuasive. In particular, the CAFC has repeatedly held that a preamble is limiting when it serves as antecedent basis for a term appearing in the body of the claim. See, e.g., C.W. Zumbiel Co., 702 F.3d at 1385; Bell Commc’ns Re-search, Inc. v. Vitalink Commc’ns Corp., 55 F.3d 615, 620–21 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Electro Sci. Indus., Inc. v. Dynamic De-tails, Inc., 307 F.3d 1343, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Pacing Techs., LLC v. Garmin Int’l, Inc., 778 F.3d 1021, 1024 (Fed. Cir. 2015). As seen in claims 1 and 2 above, each claim refers back to the preamble.
With respect to the meaning of “travel trailer”, the PTAB quoted relevant portions of the extrinsic evidence:
“Recreational vehicles” or “RVs,” as referred to herein, can be motorized or towed, but in general have a living area which provides shelter from the weather as well as personal conveniences for the user, such as bathroom(s), bedroom(s), kitchen, dining room, and/or family room. Each of these rooms typically forms a separate compartment within the vehicle . . . . A towed recreational vehicle is generally referred to as a “travel trailer.”
Probably the single most-popular class of towable RV is the Travel Trailer. Spanning 13 to 35 feet long, travel trailers are designed to be towed by cars, vans, and pickup trucks with only the addition of a frame or bumper mounted hitch. Single axles are common, but dual and even triple axles may be found on larger units to carry the load.
In regard to the meaning of “travel trailer”, the extrinsic evidence shows that “travel trailer” connotes a specific structure of towability which is not an intended use. In addition, the extrinsic evidence shows that recreational vehicles and travel trailers have living space rather than cargo space, which also is not an intended use. As such, “travel trailer” is a specific type of recreational vehicle and the term is a structural limitation.
The CAFC thus concludes:
“There is no dispute that if “travel trailer” is a limitation, Dietrich and McDougal, which disclose cargo trailers and shipping compartments, do not anticipate. Just as one would not confuse a house with a warehouse, no one would confuse a travel trailer with a truck trailer.”
The argument that the PTAB erred for failing to explicitly state the level of ordinary skill was a loser:
“Unless the patentee places the level of ordinary skill in the art in dispute and explains with particularity how the dispute would alter the outcome, neither the Board nor the examiner need articulate the level of ordinary skill in the art. We assume a proper determination of the level of ordinary skill in the art as required by Phillips.”
Takeaways
- The preamble is limiting when it serves as antecedent basis for a term appearing in the body of the claim.
- A term in the preamble can be construed as a structural limitation and not merely a statement of intended use when the evidence supports such meaning.
Is a claim limitation functional or merely an intended use?
| November 21, 2019
Quest USA Corp. v. PopSockets LLC (Patent Trial and Appeal Board)
August 12, 2019
Zado, Kaiser and Margolies (Administrative Patent Judges)
Summary:
This case is a Final Written Decision by the Patent Trial and Appeal Board of an inter partes review (“IPR”) filed by Quest USA Corp (“Petitioner”) against U.S. Patent No. 8,560,031 owned by PopSockets LLC (“Patent Owner”). One issue in the IPR was whether a limitation in claim 9 of the ‘031 patent is a functional limitation that should be given patentable weight or whether the limitation is just an intended use that is not given patentable weight. The noted limitation is a securing element “for attaching the socket to the back of the portable media player.” As part of its finding that the claims are anticipated, the PTAB held that the noted limitation is an intended use and that Grinfas is inherently capable of satisfying the noted limitation.
Details:
The ‘031 patent is to an “Extending Socket for Portable Media Player” and describes extending sockets for attaching to the back of a portable media player or media player case. The extending sockets can be used for, e.g., storing headphone cords and preventing cords from tangling. Figure 3A from the ‘031 patent is provided:
Claims 9-11, 16 and 17 of the ‘031 patent are at issue in this IPR. Claim 9 is provided below, and the limitation relevant to this summary is highlighted:
9. A socket for attaching to a portable media player or to a portable media player case, comprising:
[a] a securing element for attaching the socket to the back of the portable media player or portable media player case; and
[b] an accordion forming a tapered shape connected to the securing element, the accordion capable of extending outward generally along its [axis] from the portable media player and retracting back toward the portable media player by collapsing generally along its axis; and
[c] a foot disposed at the distal end of the accordion.
Petitioner asserted that claims 9-11, 16 and 17 are anticipated by Grinfas (UK Patent Application GB 2 316 263 A). Grinfas discloses a collapsible sound conduit for attaching to a cellular telephone. The idea of Grinfas is to provide a spaced distance between the telephone and a user’s head to reduce radiation exposure. Figures 2, 3 and 4A of Grinfas are provided below:
Grinfas discloses using an adhesive pad or straps to attach the collapsible sound conduit to the asserted media player. Patent Owner did not dispute that Grinfas discloses “a securing element” for attaching the socket to the earpiece of a telephone. However, Patent Owner, attempting to characterize the limitation as functional, argued that Grinfas does not disclose a securing element “for attaching the socket to the back of the portable media player” as recited in claim 9.
The PTAB stated that the issue is whether the noted limitation recites “1) functional language that must be given patentable weight, or 2) an intended use that is not limiting.” The PTAB also provided these two legal principles:
(1) “Where all structural elements of a claim exist in a prior art product, and that prior art product is capable of satisfying all functional or intended use limitations, the claimed invention is nothing more than an unpatentable new use for an old product.” Bettcher Indus., Inc. v. Bunzl USA, Inc., 661 F.3d 629, 654 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
(2) “[A] prior art reference may anticipate or render obvious an apparatus claim—depending on the claim language—if the reference discloses an apparatus that is reasonably capable of operating so as to meet the claim limitations, even if it does not meet the claim limitations in all modes of operation.” ParkerVision, 903 F.3d at 1361.
Petitioner argued that the “for attaching” language merely recites an intended use and is not entitled to patentable weight and that the structures disclosed in Grinfas are inherently capable of attaching to the back of a phone or phone case. The PTAB agreed with Petitioner that Grinfas is inherently capable of performing the function of attaching the asserted socket to the back of the portable media player. They relied on expert testimony that stated that the adhesive pad described in Grinfas has an adhesive that would stick to either side of the telephone, and that the straps could be used to fasten the sound conduit to either side of a telephone.
Patent Owner did not dispute that Grinfas’s securing elements are inherently capable of attaching the collapsible sound conduit to the back of a telephone. Patent Owner argued that Grinfas does not actually disclose the function of attaching to the back of a phone, and that the expert failed to provide evidence that the claimed function is necessarily present in Grinfas. The PTAB stated that Petitioner is not required to show the claimed function is actually performed or must be performed.
Patent Owner further argued that the “for attaching the socket to the back” limitation is entitled to patentable weight “because … this language recites a fundamental characteristic without which the invention would be of little use.” However, the PTAB looked at the specification and the prosecution history and concluded that the limitation does not recite a fundamental characteristic without which the invention would be of little use. The PTAB said that the specification did not describe a securing structure as being specific for attaching to the back, as opposed to some other portion, of a portable media player or case. The PTAB further stated that the specification indicates that the invention would be useful when attached to the media player generally, but does not specify attachment to the back as a requirement.
Thus, the PTAB concluded that Grinfas discloses a securing element inherently capable of being attached to the back of a portable media player, and that Grinfas discloses the securing element limitation of claim 9. The PTAB also found that Grinfas discloses all other limitations of claim 9 and that Grinfas anticipates all of the disputed claims.
Comments
The opinion pointed out that there is a risk in choosing to define an element functionally in an apparatus claim. A functional claim limitation in an apparatus claim may be considered as an intended use, and the prior art will satisfy the limitation if it is reasonably capable of performing the function.
The ‘031 patent also included a method claim (claim 16). The method claim recited attaching the socket to a portable media player; selectively extending the socket; and selectively retracting the socket. However, the method claim did not recite attaching the socket to the “back” of the portable media player.
It appears from the PTAB decision that the patent owner may have had a chance to avoid anticipation if they could actually show that the function “recites a fundamental characteristic without which the invention would be of little use.” The decision appears to give weight to the patent owner’s argument that if the function “recites a fundamental characteristic without which the invention would be of little use,” then the prior art must actually disclose performing the function.
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