indefiniteness : CAFC Alert

CLAIMS ARE VIEWED AND UNDERSTOOD IN THE CONTEXT OF THE SPECIFICATION AND THE PROSECUTION HISTORY

| March 7, 2022

Nature Simulation Systems Inc., v. Autodesk, Inc.

Before NEWMAN, LOURIE, and DYK, Circuit Judges. Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge NEWMAN. Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge DYK.

Summary

      The Federal Circuit ruled in a split decision that the United States District Court for the Northern District of California erred in invalidating Nature Simulation System’s patents as indefinite.  

Background

      NSS sued Autodesk for allegedly infringing US Patents No. 10,120,961 (“the ’961 patent”) and No. 10,109,105 (“the ’105 patent”). The ’961 patent is a continuation-in-part of the ’105 patent, and both are entitled “Method for Immediate Boolean Operations Using Geometric Facets” directed to a computer-implemented method for building three-dimensional geometric objects using boolean operation.

      The district court held a claim construction (Markman) hearing and subsequently ruled the claims invalid on the ground of claim indefiniteness, 35 U.S.C. § 112(b).  In the hearing, Autodesk presented an expert declaration to request the construction of eight claim terms. NSS argued that construction is not necessary and the challenged terms should receive their ordinary meaning in the field of technology. The district court did not construe the terms. The district court explained that a claim term is indefinite, as a matter of law, if there are any “unanswered questions” about the term. The decision of the district court was based on two of the challenged terms in clauses [2] and [3] of Claim 1:

1. A method that performs immediate Boolean operations using geometric facets of geometric objects
implemented in a computer system and operating with a computer, the method comprising:
[1] mapping rendering facets to extended triangles that contain neighbors;
[2] building intersection lines starting with and ending with searching for the first pair of triangles that hold a start point of an intersection line by detecting whether two minimum bounding boxes overlap and performing edge-triangle intersection calculations for locating an intersection point, then searching neighboring triangles of the last triangle pair that holds the last intersection point to extend the intersection line until the first intersection point is identical to the last intersection point of the intersection line ensuring that the intersection line gets closed or until all triangles are traversed;
[3] splitting each triangle through which an intersection line passes using modified Watson method, wherein the modified Watson method includes removing duplicate intersection points, identifying positions of end intersection points, and splitting portion of each triangle including an upper portion, a lower portion, and a middle portion;
[4] checking each triangle whether it is obscure or visible for Boolean operations or for surface trimming;
[5] regrouping facets in separate steps that includes copying triangles, deleting triangles, reversing the normal of each triangle of a geometric object, and merging reserved triangles to form one or more new extended triangle sets; and
[6] mapping extended triangles to rendering facets.

      The two terms are “searching neighboring triangles of the last triangle pair that holds the last intersection point” and “modified Watson method.” The district court stated that even if the questions are answered in the specification, the definiteness requirement is not met if the questions are not answered in the claims. NSS argued that on the correct law the claims are not indefinite.

Discussion

      The Federal Circuit cited the opinion in Nautilus and emphasized that the claims are viewed and understood in the context of the specification and the prosecution history, as the Court summarized in Nautilus (Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 572 U.S. 898, 909 (2014) ).

      The district court held the claims indefinite based on the “unanswered questions” that were suggested by Autodesk’s expert, as stated in the Declaration:

¶ 27. [T]he claim language, standing alone, does not specify which of those neighboring, intersecting triangles should be used to identify additional intersection points. Nor does the claim specify (where there are multiple potential intersection points for a given pair of neighboring triangles) which of the multiple potential intersection points should be used to extend the intersection line. Thus, the claim language is indefinite.

      The Federal Circuit states that the “unanswered questions” is an incorrect standard and specifically pointed out that “ ‘Claim language, standing alone’ is not the correct standard of law, and is contrary to uniform precedent.” The Federal Circuit found that the district court did not consider the information in the specification that was not included in the claims and the district court misperceived the function of patent claims.

      The Federal Circuit also noted that the court did not discuss the Examiner’s Amendment. During the prosecution of the ‘961 patent, the examiner discussed with the inventor and later suggested an amendment in the Notice Of Allowance to clarify the disputed language. The examiner suggested amending claim 1 and then withdrew the rejection based on the amendment. The amendment includes the limitation of the term in  clause [3] as follows:

[3] splitting each triangle through which an intersection line passes using modified Watson method, wherein the modified Watson method includes removing duplicate intersection points, identifying positions of end intersection points, and splitting portion of each triangle including an upper portion, a lower portion, and a middle portion;

      The Federal Circuit noted that the district court did not discuss the Examiner’s Amendment and held that the claims are invalid since the questions raised by Autodesk’s expert were not answered. The Federal Circuit found that the district court fails to give proper weight to the prosecution history showing the resolution of indefiniteness by adding the designated technologic limitations to the claims. The Federal Circuit further explained that “[a]ctions by PTO examiners are entitled to appropriate deference as official agency actions, for the examiners are deemed to be experienced in the relevant technology as well as the statutory requirements for patentability.” The Federal Circuit stated that “[i]t is not disputed that the specification describes and enables practice of the claimed method, including the best mode. The claims, as amended during prosecution, were held by the examiner to distinguish the claimed method from the prior art and to define the scope of the patented subject matter.”

      Judge Dyk dissented from the majority and opined that the district court had read the patent claims in light of the specification to determine if it would inform those skilled in the art about the scope of the invention with reasonable certainty, which is exactly what is required under Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 572 U.S. 898, 910 (2014). Judge Dyk also states that the majority simply does not address the problem that the limitations are “not describe[d]” in the patent, “ambiguous” and “unclear,” and “inconsistent with” Figure 13 and the accompanying text. In his view, the test for definiteness is whether the claims “inform those skilled in the art about the scope of the invention with reasonable certainty,” but the majority relied on the fact that these limitations were suggested by the patent examiner.

Takeaway

  • Claims are viewed and understood in the context of the specification and the prosecution history.
  • Patent claims must provide sufficient clarity to inform about the scope of the invention with reasonable certainty.

Make Sure Patent Claims Do Not Contain an Impossibility

| March 12, 2021

Synchronoss Technologies, Inc., v. Dropbox, Inc.

February 12, 2021

PROST, REYNA and TARANTO

Summary

       Synchronoss Technologies appealed the district court’s decisions that all asserted claims relating to synchronizing data across multiple devices are either invalid or not infringed. The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgments of invalidity under 35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph 2, with respect to certain asserted claims due to indefiniteness. The Federal Circuit also found no error in the district court’s conclusion that Dropbox does not directly infringe by “using” the claimed system under § 271(a). Thus, the Federal Circuit affirmed on non-infringement.

Background

       Synchronoss sued Dropbox for infringement of three patents, 6,757,696 (“’696 patent”), 7,587,446 (“’446 patent”), and U.S. Patent Nos. 6,671,757 (“’757 patent”), all drawn to technology for synchronizing data across multiple devices.

       The ’446 patent discloses a “method for transferring media data to a network coupled apparatus.” The indefinite argument of Dropbox targets on the asserted claims that require “generating a [single] digital media file” that itself “comprises a directory of digital media files.” Synchronoss’s expert conceded that “a digital media file cannot contain a directory of digital media files.” But Synchronoss argued that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have been reasonably certain that the asserted ’446 patent claims require a digital media that is a part of a directory because a file cannot contain a directory.” The district court rejected the argument as “an improper attempt to redraft the claims” and concluded that all asserted claims of the ’446 patent are indefinite.

       The ’696 patent discloses a synchronization agent management server connected to a plurality of synchronization agents via the Internet. The asserted claims of the ‘696 patent all include the following six terms, “user identifier module,” “authentication module identifying a user coupled to the synchronization system,” “user authenticator module,” “user login authenticator,” “user data flow controller,” and “transaction identifier module.” The district court concluded that all claims in the ’696 patent are invalid as indefinite. The decision leaned on the technical expert’s testimony that all six terms are functional claim terms. The specification failed to describe any specific structure for carrying out the respective functions.

       The asserted claim 1 of ‘757 patent recites “a system for synchronizing data between a first system and a second system, comprising …” The district court found that hardware-related terms appear in all asserted claims of ‘757 patent. The hardware-related terms include “system,” “device,” and “apparatus,” all that means the asserted claims could not cover software without hardware. Dropbox argued that it distributed the accused software with no hardware. The district court granted summary judgment of non-infringement in favor of Dropbox.

Discussion

i. The ‘446 Patent – Indefiniteness

       The Federal Circuit noted that the claims were held indefinite in circumstances where the asserted claims of the ’446 patent are nonsensical and require an impossibility—that the digital media file contains a directory of digital media files. As a matter of law under § 112, paragraph 2, the claims are required to particularly point out and distinctly claim the invention. “The primary purpose of this requirement of definiteness of claim language is to ensure that the scope of the claims is clear so the public is informed of the boundaries of what constitutes infringement of the patent.” (MPEP 2173)

       Synchronoss argued that a person of ordinary skill would read the specification to interpret the meaning of the media file. However, the Federal Circuit rejected the argument since Synchronoss’s proposal would require rewriting the claims and also stated that “it is not our function to rewrite claims to preserve their validity.”

ii. The ‘696 Patent – Indefiniteness

       The ‘696 patent was focused on whether the claims at issue invoke § 112, paragraph 6.  The Federal Circuit applied a two-step process for construing the term, 1. identify the claimed function; 2. determine whether sufficient structure is disclosed in the specification that corresponds to the claimed function.

       However, the asserted claims were found not to detail what a user identifier module consists of or how it operates. The specification fails to disclose an “adequate” corresponding structure that a person of ordinary skill in the art would be able to recognize and associate with the corresponding function in the claim. The Federal Circuit held that the term “user identifier module” is indefinite and affirmed the district court’s decision that asserted claims are invalid.

iii. The ‘757 Patent – Infringement

       The ‘757 patent is the only one focused on the infringement issue. Synchronoss argued that the asserted claims recite hardware not as a claim limitation but merely as a reference to the “location for the software.” However, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s founding that the hardware term limited the asserted claims’ scope.

       The Federal Circuit explained that “Supplying the software for the customer to use is not the same as using the system.” Dropbox only provides software to its customer but no corresponding hardware. Thus, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment of non-infringement.

Takeaway

  • Make sure patent claims do not contain an impossibility
  • Supplying software alone does not infringe claims directed to hardware.
  • “Adequate” structures in the specification are required to support the functional terms in the claims.

Be careful in translating foreign applications into English, particularly with respect to uncommon terms

| September 18, 2020

IBSA Institut Biochimique, S.A., Altergon, S.A., IBSA Pharma Inc. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc.

July 31, 2020

Prost (Chief Judge), Reyna, and Hughes.  Opinion by Prost.

Summary

In a U.S. application claiming priority to an Italian application, the term “semiliquido” was translated as “half-liquid.”  This term was found to be indefinite, in view of a lack of a clear meaning in the art, as well as the statements of the prosecution history and specification.  Further, attempts to argue that the term “half-liquid” should be interpreted as “semi-liquid” failed due to inconsistencies with the specification.

Details

            IBSA is the owner of U.S. Patent No. 7,723,390, which claims priority to an Italian application.  Claim 1 of the ‘390 patent is as follows:

1.  A pharmaceutical composition comprising thyroid hormones or their sodium salts in the form of either:

a)  a soft elastic capsule consisting of a shell of gelatin material containing a liquid or half-liquid inner phase comprising said thyroid hormones or their salts in a range between 0.001 and 1% by weight of said inner phase, dissolved in gelatin and/or glycerol, and optionally ethanol, said liquid or half-liquid inner phase being in direct contact with said shell without any interposed layers, or

b)  a swallowable uniform soft-gel matrix comprising glycerol and said thyroid hormones or their salts in a range between 0.001 and 1% by weight of said matrix.

Teva filed an ANDA with a Paragraph IV certification asserting that the patent is invalid.  In particular, Teva asserted that claim 1 is invalid as being indefinite.  Upon filing of the ANDA, IBSA filed suit against Teva.

            The key issue in this case is the meaning of the term “half-liquid.”  IBSA asserted that this term should mean “semi-liquid, i.e., having a thick consistency between solid and liquid.”  Meanwhile, Teva argued that the term is either invalid, or should be interpreted as a “non-solid, non-paste, non-gel, non-slurry, non-gas substance.” 

District Court

            At the district court, all parties agreed that the intrinsic record does not define the term “half-liquid.”  However, IBSA asserted that its construction is supported by intrinsic evidence, including the Italian priority application.  The Italian priority application used the term “semiliquido” at all places where the ‘390 patent used the term “half-liquid.”  In 2019, IBSA obtained a certified translation in which “semiliquido” was translated as “semi-liquid.”  IBSA asserted that “semi-liquid” and “half-liquid” would be understood as synonyms. 

            However, the district court noted that there were other differences between the Italian priority application and the ‘390 patent specification, beyond the “semiliquido”/“half-liquid” difference.  These differences included the “Field of Invention” and “Prior Art” sections.  Because of these other differences, the district court concluded that the terminology in the U.S. specification reflected the Applicant’s intent, and that any difference was deliberate.

            Furthermore, the district court noted that during prosecution, there was at one point a dependent claim using the term “semi-liquid” which was dependent on an independent claim using the term “half-liquid.”  Even though the term “semi-liquid” was eventually deleted, this was interpreted as evidence that the terms are not synonymous. 

            Additionally, the specification cited to pharmaceutical references that used the term “semi-liquid.”   According to the district court, this shows that the Applicant knew of the term “semi-liquid,” but chose to use the term “half-liquid” instead.

            Finally, all extrinsic evidence was considered by the district court to be unpersuasive.  The extrinsic evidence used the term “half-liquid” in a different context than the present application.  As such, the district court concluded that the term “half-liquid” was “exceedingly unlikely” to be a term of art at the time of filing. 

            Next, the district court analyzed whether a skilled artisan would nevertheless be able to determine the meaning of the term “half-liquid.”  First, the court noted that the claims do not clarify what qualifies as a half liquid, other than the fact that it is neither liquid nor solid.  The district court concluded that one skilled in the art would only understand “half-liquid” to be something that is not a gel or paste. This conclusion was based on a passage in the specification that stated:

In particular, said soft capsule contains an inner phase consisting of a liquid, half-liquid, a paste, a gel, an emulsion, or a suspension comprising the liquid (or half-liquid) vehicle and the thyroid hormones together with possible excipients in suspension or solution.

Additionally, during prosecution, the Applicant responded to an obviousness rejection by including the statement that the claimed invention “is not a macromolecular gel-lattice matrix” or a “high concentration slurry.”   As such, the Applicant disclaimed these from the scope of “half-liquid.”

            Finally, the district court commented on the expert testimony.  IBSA’s expert had “difficulty articulating the boundaries of ‘half-liquid’” during his deposition.  Meanwhile, Teva’s expert stated that “half-liquid is not a well-known term in the art.”

Based on the above, the district court concluded that one having ordinary skill in the art would find it impossible to know “whether they are dealing with a half-liquid within the meaning of the claim,” and concluded that the claims are invalid as being indefinite. 

CAFC

            The CAFC agreed with the district court on all points.  First, the CAFC agreed that the claim language does not clarify the issue.  Rather, the claim language only clarifies that “half-liquid” is not the same as liquid.

As to the specification, the CAFC agreed with the district court that the portion of the specification noted above clarifies that “half-liquid” cannot mean a gel or paste.  Moreover, the CAFC cited another passage, which refers to “soft capsules (SEC) with liquid, half-liquid, paste-like or gel-like inner phase.”  The CAFC concluded that the use of the word “or” in these passages shows that “half-liquid” is an alternative to the other members of the list, such as pastes and gels.  Meanwhile, since gels and pastes have a thick consistency, IBSA’s proposed claim construction is in contradiction with these passages of the specification.  

Additionally, the CAFC refuted IBSA’s argument that the specification includes passages that are at odds with the description of “half-liquid” as an alternative to pastes and gels.  These passages include:

…an SEC capsule containing an inner phase consisting of a paste or gel comprising gelatin and thyroid hormones or pharmaceutically acceptable salts thereof…in a liquid or half liquid.

However, this argument conflates the inner phase and the vehicle within the inner phase, and does not explain why these are the same.

            Additionally, the CAFC noted that the specification includes a list of examples of liquid or half-liquid vehicles, and a reference to a primer on making “semi-liquids.”  However, even if some portions of the specification could support the position that “half-liquid” and “semi-liquid” are synonyms, the specification fails to describe the boundaries of “half-liquid.”

Next, the CAFC discussed the prosecution history.  As in the district court, IBSA asserted that “half-liquid” means “semi-liquid.”  This was because the term “half-liquid” was used in all places where “semiliquido” was used, and a certified translation showed that “semiliquido” is translated as “semi-liquid.”

The CAFC agreed the use of “half-liquid” was intentional, relying on not only the differences between the Italian application and the U.S. application noted by the district court, but others as well.  In particular, claim 1 of the U.S. application differed from claim 1 of the Italian application, and incorporated an embodiment not found in the Italian application.   Further, the Italian application does not use the term “gel” in the first passage noted above. 

The CAFC also agreed with the district court that the temporary presence of a claim reciting “semi-liquid” dependent on a claim reciting “half-liquid” further demonstrates that these terms are not synonymous.

Finally, the CAFC reviewed the extrinsic evidence. The CAFC noted the IBSA’s expert’s inability to explain the boundaries of the term “half-liquid.”  The CAFC also pointed out that only one dictionary of record had a definition including the term “half liquid,” and this was a non-scientific dictionary.  This dictionary defined “semi-liquid” as “Half liquid; semifluid.”  But, IBSA’s expert stated that “semifluid” and “half-liquid” are not necessarily the same. 

Further, although other patents using the term “half-liquid” were cited, these patents used the term in a different context, and thus were not helpful to define the term in the context of the ‘390 patent.  IBSA’s expert acknowledged the lack of any other literature such a textbook or a peer-reviewed journal using the term “half-liquid.”   Additionally, IBSA’s expert stated that he was uncertain about whether his construction of “half-liquid” would exclude gels or slurries. 

Based on the above, the CAFC concluded that the term “half-liquid” does not have a definite meaning.  As such, the claim is invalid as failing to comply with §112.

Takeaways

-When translating a specification from a foreign language to English, it is preferable that the specifications are as close to identical as possible.  

-If there are differences between a foreign language specification and the U.S. specification, these differences should ideally be limited to non-technical portions of the specification.

-If using a term that is not widely used, it is recommended to clearly define this term in the record.  Failure to do so may result in the term being interpreted in an unintended manner, or worse, the term being considered indefinite. 

-Where there are discrepancies between a foreign priority application and a US application, such differences may be interpreted as intentional.

CAFC Remands Back To PTAB Instructing Them To Conduct The Analysis And Correct The Mistakes In Wearable Technology IPR Case

| July 22, 2020

Fitbit, Inc., v. Valencell. Inc.

July 8, 2020

Before Newman, Dyk and Reyna. Opinion by Newman

Background:

Apple Inc., petitioned the Board for IPR (Inter Partes Review) of claims 1 to 13 of the U.S. Patent No., 8,923,941 (the ‘941 patent) owned by Valencell, Inc. The Board granted the petition in part, instituting review of claims 1, 2 and 6 to 13, but denying claims 3 to 5.

Fitbit then filed an IPR petition for claims 1, 2 and 6 to 13, and moved for joinder with Apple. The Board granted Fitbit’s petition and granted the motion for joinder.

After the PTAB trial, but before the Final Written Decision, the Supreme Court decided SAS Insitute, Inc., v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct 1348 (2018), holding that all patent claims challenged in an IPR petition must be reviewed by the Board, if the petition is granted. Thus, the Board re-instituted the Apple/Fitbit IPR to add claims 3 to 5.

The Board issued a Final Written Decision that held claims 1, 2 and 6 to 13 unpatentable, and claims 3 to 5 not unpatentable. Apple withdrew and Fitbit appealed the decision on claims 3 to 5. Valencell challenged Fitbit’s right to appeal claims 3 to 5.

Issues:

I. JOINDER AND RIGHT OF APPEAL

“Valencell’s position was that Fitbit did not have standing to appeal the portion of the Board’s decision that related to claims 3 to 5, because Fitbit’s IPR petition was for claims 1, 2 and 6 to 13.”  Citing Wasica Finance GmbH v. Continental Automotive Systems, Inc., 853 F.3d 1272, 1285 (Fed. Cir. 2017), Valencell argued that Fitbit had “waived any argument it did not present in its petition for IPR.” That is, Valencell argued that Fitbit does not have the status of “party” for the purpose of the appeal because “Fitbit did not request review of claims 3 to 5 in its initial IPR petition.”

Fitbit countered that although it did not “seek to file a separate brief after claims 3 to 5 were added to the IPR” the briefs were not required in order to present the issues, and the CAFC agreed that the circumstances do not override Fitbit’s statutory right of appeal.

The CAFC concluded that “Fitbit’s rights as a joined party applies to the entirety of the proceeding” including the right of appeal.

II. CONSTRUCTION OF THE CLAIMS ON APPEAL

Claims 3 to 5 at issue are as follows:

3. The method of claim 1, wherein the serial data output is parsed out such that an application-specific interface (API) can utilize the physiological information and motion-related information for an application.

4. The method of claim 1, wherein the application is configured to generate statistical relationships between subject physiological parameters and subject physical activity parameters in the physiological information and motion-related information.

5. The method of claim 4, wherein the application is configured to generate statistical relationships between subject physiological parameters and subject physical activity parameters via at least one of the following: principal component analysis, multiple linear regression, machine learning, and Bland-Altman plots.

  • CLAIM 3

The Board did not review patentability of claim 3 on the asserted grounds of obviousness holding that the claim is “not unpatentable” based solely on their “rejection of Fitbit’s proposed construction of the term application-specific interface (API).

Specifically, Fitbit argued that the “broadest reasonable interpretation of “application-specific interface (API)…include[s] at least an application interface that specifies how some software component should interest with each other.” Fitbit’s interpretation was based heavily on the use of “API” which followed application-specific interface. API meaning ‘application programming interface.’  

Valencell argued for a narrower meaning, based upon the specification and the prosecution history. In particular, during prosecution the applicant had relied upon the narrow scope to distinguish from a cited reference.

The Board concluded the narrower claim construction was correct, and rejected Fitbit’s broader construction. The CAFC agreed with the Boards conclusion as to the correct claim construction.

However, following the Boards rejection of Fitbit’s claim construction they did not review the patentability of claim 3, as construed, on the asserted ground of obviousness. The Board explained that because “Petitioner’s assertions challenging claim 3 are based on the rejected construction…the evidentiary support relied upon is predicated upon the same” and so “[W]e do not address this claim further.”

CAFC held this was erroneous, vacated the Board’s decision and remanded for determination of patentability in light of the cited references. 

  • CLAIMS 4 AND 5 – ANTECEDENT BASIS OF ‘THE APPLICATION’

The Board held that claims 4 and 5 were “not unpatentable” because “the Board could not determine the meaning of the claims due to the term “the application” lacking antecedent basis.

The mistake had occurred due to the cancellation of claim 2, and erroneous renumbering of claim 4. Both Fitbit and Valencell agreed to this. Board declined to accept the parties’ shared view, stating:

Although we agree that the recitation of the term “the application” in claim 4 lacks antecedent basis in claim 1, we declined to speculate as to the intended meaning of the term.   Although Petitioner and Patent Owner now seem to agree on the nature of the error in claims 4 and 5 [citing briefs], we find that the nature of the error in claims 4 and 5 is subject to reasonable debate in view of the language of claims 1 and 3–5 and/or that the prosecution history does not demonstrate a single interpretation of the claims.

The CAFC disagreed with the Board, holding that althoughthe Board states that the intended meaning of the claims is “subject to reasonable debate,” we perceive no debate. Rather, the parties to this proceeding agree as to the error and its correction.”

The CAFC concluded that on remand the Board shall fixed the error and determine patentability of corrected claims 4 and 5:

The preferable agency action is to seek to serve the agency’s assignment under the America Invents Act, and to resolve the merits of patentability. Although the Board does not discuss its authority to correct errors, there is foundation for such authority in the America Invents Act, which assured that the Board has authority to amend claims of issued patents. See 35 U.S.C. § 316(d). . . . The concept of error correction is not new to the Agency, which is authorized to issue Certificates of Correction.

Comments:

A joined party has full rights to appeal a PTAB final decision.

During an IPR, the Board has authority to correct mistakes in the claims of an issued patents, in particular those where a certificate of correction would be fitting. 

Always, be careful when renumbering claims for antecedent issues.  

A Patent Claim Is Not Indefinite If the Patent Informs the Relevant Skilled Artisan about the Invention’s Scope with Reasonable Certainty

| April 23, 2020

NEVRO CORP. v. BOSTON SCIENTIFIC

April 9, 2020

Before MOORE, TARANTO, and CHEN, Circuit Judges. MOORE, Circuit Judge

中文标题

权利要求的不确定性判定

中文摘要

内夫罗公司(Nevro)起诉波士顿科学公司和波士顿科学神经调节公司(合称波士顿科学)侵犯了内夫罗公司的七项专利。 内夫罗公司对地方法院的专利无效判决提出上诉。根据专利说明书及其申请历史,联邦巡回法院认定“paresthesia-free,” “configured to,” “means for generating,” 和 “therapy signal” 等术语并未使内夫罗公司的权利要求产生不确定性,因此撤销专利无效判决并发回重审。

小结

  • 仅因其为功能用语或仅通过专利权利的诠释不能将功能性语言判定为不确定。
  • 功能性语言的确定性重要体现在专利说明书中需要有解释或支持功能术语的相关结构,特别是侧重方法的专利申请,如果这些申请中存在着系统或设备的权利要求, 而这些系统或设备权利要求由方法的权利要求转化而来,对系统或设备的必要描述是需要的。1
  • 不确定性的判定标准存在于是否权利要求通过说明书和申请历史以合理的确定性向本领域技术人员告知了本发明的范围。

1:许多专利申请通常使用诸如“模块”(module)和“单元”(unit)的术语,并将方法权利要求转换为系统或设备的权利要求。但是,在说明书中如果没有相关的结构说明,由于不确定性,通常这些权利要求会被拒绝。因此,专利说明书中有必要对“模块”或“单元”进行必要的描述,例如电子、通讯及软件类的专利申请,可添加一些与通用处理器,集成芯片或现场可编程门阵列有关的描述,以定义“模块”或“单元”并描述相关功能。

Summary

       Nevro Corporation (Nevro) sued Boston Scientific Corporation and Boston Scientific Neuromodulation Corporation (collectively, Boston Scientific) for infringement of eighteen claims across seven patents. Nevro Corporation appealed the district court’s judgment of invalidity. The Federal Circuit found that the terms “paresthesia-free,” “configured to,” “means for generating,” and “therapy signal” are not rendering the asserted claims indefinite in view of the specifications and prosecution history, vacating and remanding the district court’s judgment of claim invalidity.

Background

       Nevro owns seven patents having method and system claims directed to high-frequency spinal cord stimulation therapy for inhibiting an individual pain. Nevro sued Boston Scientific in the Northern District of California for patent infringement related to U.S. Patent Nos. 8,359,102; 8,712,533; 8,768,472; 8,792,988; 9,327,125; 9,333,357; and 9,480,842.

       In a joint claim construction and summary judgment order, the district court held twelve claims invalid as indefinite. Though six asserted claims survived and were found definite, the district court granted Boston Scientific noninfringement. On appeal, the Federal Circuit concluded the district court erred in holding indefinite the claims reciting the terms “paresthesia-free,” “configured to,” and “means for generating.” The Federal Circuit also found the district court erred in its construction of the term “therapy signal,” though determined not indefinite by the district court. The Federal Circuit, therefore, vacated and remanded the district court’s judgment of invalidity of claims 7, 12, 35, 37 and 58 of the ’533 patent, claims 18, 34 and 55 of the ’125 patent, claims 5 and 34 of the ’357 patent and claims 1 and 22 of the ’842 patent.

Discussion

I. “paresthesia-free”

       Several of Nevro’s asserted claims relate to methods and systems comprising a means for generating therapy signals that are “paresthesia-free.” Claim 18 of the ’125 patent and Claim 1 of the ’472 patent recite as follow:

18.  A spinal cord modulation system for reducing or eliminating pain in a patient, the system comprising:

means for generating a paresthesia-free therapy signal with a signal frequency in a range from 1.5 kHz to 100 kHz; and 

means for delivering the therapy signal to the patient’s spinal cord at a vertebral level of from T9 to T12, wherein the means for delivering the therapy signal is at least partially implantable.

1.    A method for alleviating patient pain or discomfort, without relying on paresthesia or tingling to mask the patient’s sensation of the pain, comprising:

implanting a percutaneous lead in the patient’s epidural space, wherein the percutaneous lead includes at least one electrode, and wherein implanting the percutaneous lead includes positioning the at least one electrode proximate to a target location in the patient’s spinal cord region and outside the sacral region;

implanting a signal generator in the patient; electrically coupling the percutaneous lead to the signal generator; and

programming the signal generator to generate and deliver an electrical therapy signal to the spinal cord region, via the at least one electrode, wherein at least a portion of the electrical therapy signal is at a frequency in a frequency range of from about 2,500 Hz to about 100,000 Hz.

       The district court presented its findings based on extrinsic evidence that “[a]lthough the parameters that would result in a signal that does not create paresthesia may vary between patients, a skilled artisan would be able to quickly determine whether a signal creates paresthesia for any given patient.” While holding that the term “paresthesia-free” does not render the method claims indefinite, the district court held indefiniteness regarding the asserted system and device claims. The Federal Circuit disagreed the indefiniteness holdings because the test of indefiniteness should be simply based on whether a claim “inform[s] those skilled in the art about the scope of the invention with reasonable certainty.” The Federal Circuit states that the district court applied the wrong legal standard and the test for indefiniteness is not whether infringement of the claim must be determined on a case-by-case basis.

       The Federal Circuit states that “paresthesia-free,” a functional term defined by what it does rather than what it is, does not inherently render it indefinite. Furthermore, the Federal Circuit instructs that

i. functional language can “promote[] definiteness because it helps bound the scope of the claims by specifying the operations that the [claimed invention] must undertake.” Cox Commc’ns, 838 F.3d at 1232.

ii. the ambiguity inherent in functional terms may be resolved where the patent “provides a general guideline and examples sufficient to enable a person of ordinary skill in the art to determine the scope of the claims.”  Enzo Biochem. Inc. v. Applera Corp., 599 F.3d 1325, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2010).

II. “configured to”

Nevro’s asserted claim 1 of the ’842 patent relates to a spinal cord modulation system, which recites:

1.  A spinal cord modulation system comprising: 

a signal generator configured to generate a therapy signal having a frequency of 10 kHz, an amplitude up to 6 mA, and pluses having a pulse width between 30 microseconds and 35 microseconds; and

an implantable signal delivery device electrically coupleable to the signal generator and configured to be implanted within a patient’s epidural space to deliver the therapy signal from the signal generator the patient’s spinal cord.

       The district court held indefiniteness because it determined that “configured to” is susceptible to meaning one of two constructions: “(1) the signal generator, as a matter of hardware and firmware, has the capacity to generate the described electrical signals (either without further programing or after further programming by the clinical programming software); or (2) the signal generator has been programmed by the clinical programmer to generate the described electrical signals.”

       The Federal Circuit pointed out that “the test [of indefiniteness] is not merely whether a claim is susceptible to differing interpretations” because “such a test would render nearly every claim term indefinite so long as a party could manufacture a plausible construction.” Further, the Federal Circuit states that the test for indefiniteness is whether the claims, viewed in light of the specification and prosecution history, “inform those skilled in the art about the scope of the invention with reasonable certainty.”  Nautilus, 572 U.S. at 910. (emphasis added).

       The specifications of the asserted patents and prosecution history, indeed, help Nevro win the argument on “configured” means. Nevro’s asserted patents not only recites that “the system is configured and programmed to,” but also Nevro agreed with the examiner that “configured” means “programmed” as opposed to “programmable.” The limitation specifies the interpretation of the term “configured” and leads to this favorable decision towards Nevro. The “programmed” and “programmable” may sound similar. However, “programmable” would be appliable to a general machine, since any general signal generator would have the capacity to generate the described signals. The term “programmed” sets out its specific settings of the signal generator and limits such broad interpretation.

III. “means for generating”

       Several asserted claims of the ‘125 patent recite “means for generating,” in which claim 18 recites as follow:

18.  A spinal cord modulation system for reducing or eliminating pain in a patient, the system comprising:

means for generating a paresthesia-free therapy signal with a signal frequency in a range from 1.5 kHz to 100 kHz; and

means for delivering the therapy signal to the patient’s spinal cord at a vertebral level of from T9 to T12, wherein the means for delivering the therapy signal is at least partially implantable.

       Nevro argued that the specification discloses a signal generator as the structure. The Federal Circuit agreed with Nevro and explained the difference comparing a general-purpose computer or processor. If the identified structure is a general-purpose computer or processor, it does require a specific algorithm. A signal or pulse generator is not considered as a general-purpose computer or processor, since it has the structure for the claimed “generating” function. Further, “the specification teaches how to configure the signal generators to generate and deliver the claimed signals using the recited parameters, clearly linking the structure to the recited function.” Hence, the Federal Circuit held that the district court erred in holding indefinite claims with the terms “means for generating.”

       The terms such as “module” and “unit” are commonly used in many patent applications to convert method claims to system or device claims in electronic applications. However, without structural description in the specification, such claims are usually rejected due to indefiniteness. Hence, some may add some description related to general-purpose processors, integrated chips, or field-programmable gate arrays to define the “module” or “unit” and describe the functions.

IV. “therapy signal”

       The Federal Circuit agreed that claims reciting a “therapy signal” are not indefinite, but held that the district court incorrectly construed the term. The Federal Circuit reiterated the context of the specification and prosecution history for understanding the words of a claim. It stated that “[t]he words of a claim are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning as understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art when read in the context of the specification and prosecution history.”  Thorner v. Sony Comput. Entm’t Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 

       Boston Scientific argued that the asserted claims reciting a “therapy signal” are indefinite because “two signals with the same set of characteristics (e.g., frequency, amplitude, and pulse width) may result in therapy in one patient and no therapy in another.”  The Federal Circuit noted that “the fact that a signal does not provide pain relief in all circumstances does not render the claims indefinite.” Geneva, 349 F.3d at 1384.

Takeaway

  • Functional language won’t be held indefinite simply for that reason or simply by interpreted in the claims.
  • It is of importance to describe a related structure to support the functional terms in the specification, especially for applications having system or device claims converted from method claims.
  • The test for indefiniteness is whether the claims, viewed in light of the specification and prosecution history, “inform those skilled in the art about the scope of the invention with reasonable certainty.” Nautilus, 572 U.S. at 910.

Examples and procedures in the specification may provide necessary objective boundaries for a term of degree in the claims

| September 18, 2019

Guangdong Alison Hi-Tech Co., v. ITC, Aspen Aerogels, Inc. (intervenor)

August 27, 2019

Wallach, Hughes, and Stoll (Opinion author).

Summary

The ALJ at ITC held, later affirmed by the Commission, that the claims of U.S. Patent No. 7,078,359 were not invalid due to indefinites and anticipation and were infringed by Alison’s importation of the accused products. The Federal Circuit affirmed the validity determination.

Details

The ‘359 patent, titled “Aerogel Composite with Fibrous Batting,” is directed to an improvement in aerogel composite products. Specifically, the ‘359 patent specifically discloses an aerogel composite that uses a lofty batting to reinforce the aerogel in a way that maintains or improves the thermal properties of the aerogel while providing a highly flexible, drapeable form. The ‘359 patent is an improvement over prior aerogel composites, which suffer from low flexibility, low durability, and degraded thermal performance. Independent claim 1 of the ‘359 patent is:

1. A composite article to serve as a flexible, durable, light-weight insulation product, said article comprising a lofty fibrous batting sheet and a continuous aerogel through said batting.

Regarding the indefinites, the ALJ and the Commission rejected the Alison’ indefinite argument arguing that the phrase “lofty fibrous batting” in claim 1 is indefinite. The Federal circuit affirmed based on the “reasonable certainty” indefiniteness standard. Specifically, as set forth in Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., a patent’s claims are definite if the claims, viewed in light of the specification and prosecution history, inform those skilled in the art about the scope of the invention with reasonable certainty. A patentee need not define his invention with mathematical precision in order to comply with the definiteness requirement. Patents with claims involving terms of degree must provide objective boundaries for those of skill in the art in the context of the invention. Intrinsic evidence such as the claims, figures, written description, or prosecution history of a patent can provide the necessary objective boundaries. In this case, the Federal Circuit acknowledges that the phrase “lofty … batting” is a term of degree. However, the Federal Circuit held that the written description of the ‘359 patent provides objective boundaries for the term. The ‘359 patent specification first expressly defines “lofty … batting” as “a fibrous material that shows the properties of bulk and some resilience (with or without full bulk recovery).” The specification explains that “bulk” refers to the air or openness created by the web of fibers in a lofty batting. It further explains that a batting is “sufficiently resilient” if it “can be compressed to remove the air (bulk) yet spring back to substantially its original size and shape.” Furthermore, the specification details functional characteristics of a “lofty … batting.” Furthermore, the specification provides specific examples of commercial products that can qualify as a lofty batting, and a detailed discussion of seven examples of aerogel composites manufactured in accordance with the claimed invention, along with corresponding test results. Furthermore, during the prosecution, in the Statement of Reasons for allowance, the examiner distinguished the prior art based on the phrase “lofty fibrous batting.” Thus, the Federal Circuit categorize this case in the same class as previous cases like Sonix and Enzo, where examples and procedures in the written description provided sufficient guidance and points of comparison to render claim terms not indefinite.

The Federal Circuit also specifically rejected several Alison’ arguments in support of its indefiniteness challenge. First, Alison argued that the ‘359 patent provides no objective boundary between “some resilience,” which would infringe, and “little to no resilience,” which would not. In other words, in Alison’ view, the ‘359 patent fails to disclose precisely how much resilience is enough to satisfy the claim. The Federal Circuit dismissed this argument by holding that Alison was seeking a level of numerical precision beyond that required when using a term of degree. Next, Alison argued that the  ‘359 patent offers two independent approaches, a thermal properties’ approach and a compressibility and resilience approach, to assess loftiness, without indicating which approach to use. The Federal Circuit dismissed this argument by holding that Alison has not provided any evidence that the different methods of measurement described in the ‘359 patent lead to different results. Lastly, Alison argued that the Commission’s indefiniteness analysis is irreconcilable contradiction with its claim construction. The ALJ provided a single reason for holding the claim term not indefinite because the specification states that “a lofty batting is sufficiently resilient if after compression for a few seconds it will return to at least 70% of its original thickness.” Yet, in construing the term, the ALJ declined to limit “lofty … batting” to this specific example of “resilience” in the specification, namely, “it will return to at least 70% of its original thickness.” The Federal Circuit dismissed this argument by holding that examples in the specification may be used to inform those skilled in the art of the scope of the invention with reasonable certainty, thus demonstrating that the term is not indefinite, without being directly construed into the claim.

Regarding the anticipation, Alison uses the same reference Ramamurthi, which was considered by the patent examiner during prosecution and later by the Board in denying Alison’s IPR petition. One of Alison’s argument is that Ramamurthi recites “glass wool” as a preferred fiber, which should be synonymous with the “fiber glass” expressly identified as a lofty batting by the ‘359 patent. However, the Commission rejected Alison’s anticipation argument based on Aspen’s detailed expert testimony, which demonstrated that “fiberglass” and “glass wool” each describe broad categories of materials that are not inherently “lofty.” the Federal Circuit held that the Commission’s determination is supported by substantial evidence, and rejected to reweight the evidence.

In conclusion, the Federal Circuit affirmed that the claims of the ‘359 patent are valid.

Take away

  1. In drafting specification, the drafter should provide some detailed examples of the invention, which can provide sufficient guidance and points of comparison to render certain claims terms definite.
  2. In defining claims terms in the specification, numerical precision is not necessarily needed to satisfy the definiteness requirement.

When the acts of one are attributable to the other.

| February 16, 2017

Eli Lilly and Company, v. Teva Parenteral Medicines, Inc., APP Pharmaceuticals LLC., Pliva Hrvatska D.O.O., Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., Barr Laborites, Inc.

January 12, 2017

Before Prost, Newman and Dyk.  Opinion by Prost.

Summary:

The case centered on Eli Lilly’s patent directed to methods of administering a chemotherapy drug after pretreatment with two common vitamins. The drug was marketed under the brand name ALIMTA®. The Defendants had submitted ANDAs seeking approval of a generic version of ALIMTA®. The CAFC upheld the district counts findings, in favor of Eli Lilly’s patent, in full. The issues addressed were induced infringement, and invalidity issues of indefiniteness, obviousness and obvious-type double patenting.

Details:

Eli Lilly is the owner of U.S. Patent No., 7,772,209 (patent ‘209), directed to methods of administering the chemotherapy drug “pemetrexed’ after pretreatment with two common vitamins (folic acid and vitamin B12). The purpose of the dual vitamin pretreatments is to reduce the toxicity of the pemetrexed to the patients. The drug was marketed under the brand name ALIMTA®.

The Defendants notified Eli Lilly that they had submitted ANDAs seeking approval of a generic version of ALIMTA®. After the ‘209 patent issued, Defendants sent Eli Lilly notices that they had filed Paragraph IV certifications under 21 U.S.C. §355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV), declaring that the patent was invalid, unenforceable or would not be infringed. Eli Lilly subsequently brought a consolidated action against the Defendants for infringement, alleging that the generic drug would be administered with folic acid and vitamin B12 pretreatments.

Eli Lilly asserted a number of claims at trial, all of which required patient pretreatment by ‘administering’ or ‘administration of’ folic acid, and a number of dependent claims which defined dosage restrictions.

The parties agreed for the purpose of appeal that no single actor performs all steps, rather they are divided between patient and physician.  Specifically, physicians administered vitamin B12 and pemetrexed, while the patient folic acid.

Initially, in June 2013, Defendants conditionally conceded induced infringement under the then-current law set forth in Akamai II (Akamai II held that “induced infringement can be found even if there is no single party who would be liable for direct infringement”). At the time, Akamai was subject of a petition to the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. The parties’ stipulation included a provision reserving Defendants right to litigate infringement if the Supreme Court reversed or vacated Akamai II.  While an appeal on invalidity was pending (district court had held the claims were not invalid), the Supreme Court reversed Akamai II, holding the liability for inducement cannot be found without direct infringement. In view of this, the parties in this case filed a joint motion to remand the matter to the district court for the limited propose of litigating infringement. CAFC granted the motion. The district court held a second bench trial and concluded that Defendants would induce infringement of the ‘209 patent. The court had applied the intervening Akamai V decision, which had broadened the circumstances in which others’ acts may be attributed to a single actor to support direct infringement liability.

Defendants timely appealed. The CAFC upheld the district courts findings, addressing each issue in turn.

(I) “Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as an infringer.” Importantly, liability for induced infringement “must be predicated on direct infringement.” (Akamai III). The patentee must also show that the alleged infringer “knew or should have known his actions would induce actual infringements.” A patentee seeking relief under §271(e)(2) bears the burden of prove.

The district court relied in part on the Defendants’ proposed product labeling as evidence of infringement. The labeling consisted of two documents: the Physician Prescribing Information and the Patient Information. Amongst other things, the information provides the following:

Instruct patients to initiate folic acid 400 [m]g to 1000 [m]g orally once daily beginning 7 days before the first dose of [pemetrexed]…

Instruct patients on the need for folic acid and vitamin B12 supplementation to reduce treatment-related hematologic and gastrointestinal toxicity…

To lower your chances of side effects of [pemetrexed], you must also take folic acid and vitamin B12 prior to and during your treatment with [pemetrexed].

It is very important to take folic acid and vitamin B12 during your treatment with [pemetrexed] to lower your chances of harmful side effects.  You must start taking 400-1000 micrograms of folic acid every day for at least 5 days out of the 7 days before your first dose of [pemetrexed].

The CAFC held that where, as here, no single actor performs all the steps of the method claim, direct infringement only occurs if “the acts of one are attributable to the other such that a single entity is responsible for the infringement.” Akamai V. In Akamai V, the CAFC held that directing or controlling other’s performance includes circumstances in which an actor (1) conditions participation in an activity or receipt of a benefit upon another’s performance of one or more steps of a patented method, and (2) establishes the manner or timing of that performance. The district court applied this two-point prong test to the subject case.

With respect to the first prong – the CAFC agreed with the district court’s findings. Specifically, the labeling information repeatedly instructs the patients to take folic acid and provides information about the dosage range and schedule. The labeling information explains that the folic acid is a “requirement for premedication” in order to “reduce the treatment-related hematologic and gastrointestinal toxicity” of pemetrexed. Eli Lilly’s expert testified that it is “the physician’s responsibility to initiate the supplementation of folic acid.” The patient information also informs patients that a physician may withhold pemetrexed treatment based on blood tests. Eli Lilly’s expert testified that a physician would withhold treatment if the patient had not taken their required dosage of folic acid to avoid toxicity.

The Defendants argued that the product labeling was mere guidance and insufficient to show conditioning. The Defendants also argued there is no evidence that physicians go further to “verify compliance” with their instructions. The CAFC replied that conditioning does not necessarily require double checking.

Next, the Defendants argued that an actor can only condition the performance of a step by imposing a legal obligation to do so. The CAFC rejected this argument, stating that infringement is not limited solely to contractual arrangements, and the like.

With respect to the second prong – the CAFC agreed with the district court’s findings. Specifically, the Physician Prescribing Information instructs physicians to tell patients to take folic acid at specific dosages and at a specific schedule. Moreover, the testimony of a Dr. Chabner was highlighted in part affirming that “it is the doctor” who “decided how much” the patient takes.

Defendants argued that patients are able to seek additional outside assistance regarding folic acid administration, but the CAFC held this was immaterial.

Thus, the two-point prong test of Akamai V was met. However, the mere existence of direct infringement by physicians is not sufficient to find liability for induced infringement. Eli Lilly carried this burden.

The district court held that the administration of folic acid before pemetrexed administration was ‘not merely a suggestion or recommendation, but a critical step,’ in light of the Defendants proposed labeling.

Defendants argued that Eli Lilly has not offered any evidence of what physicians do in general but only speculation about how they may act. They argued that physicians must go beyond labeling. The CAFC found this argument unavailing. For the purpose of inducement “it is irrelevant that some users may ignore the warnings in the proposed label,” if the label “encourage(s), recommend(s) or promote(s) infringement.” The product labeling included repeat instructions and warning regarding the importance of folic acid.

(II) Indefiniteness of “vitamin B12” – the Defendants argued in view of Nautilius that vitamin B12 is indefinite as the term is used in two different ways in the intrinsic record (vitamin B12 and Cyanocobalamin).

The district count accepted the testimony of Eli Lilly’s expert that one of ordinary skill in the art would understand in the context of the patent claims vitamin B12 to mean Cyanocobalamin. The CAFC saw no error in the districts court findings, holding that vitamin B12 has a plain meaning to one of skill in this particular art.

In addition, it was noted that claim 1 required administering a “methylmalonic acid lowering agent…” and claim 2 “vitamin B12.” Therefore, if vitamin B12 was to refer to a whole class of compounds it would be the same scope as claim 1. However, the doctrine of claim differentiation presumes that dependent claims are of narrower scope, and so reading the claims as to require ‘vitamin B12’ of claim 2 to be a specific compound within the scope of “methylmalonic acid lowering agent” avoids this problem.

The Defendants argued that if vitamin B12 means Cyanocobalamin, the given Markush group in claim 1 of the “methylmalonic acid lowering agent,” lists the same compound twice. The CAFC held that the mere fact that a compound may be embraced by more than one member of a Markush group recited in the claim does not necessarily render the scope unclear. The CAFC held the redundancy is support by the prosecution history (the Examiner had stated they were the same, in response the patentee removed Cyanocobalamin, but later put the term back into the claim).

(III) Obviousness – the CAFC agreed with the district counts finding that a skilled artisan would have concluded that vitamin B12 deficiency was not the problem in pemetrexed toxicity.

In brief, the Defendant had relied upon an Abstract published from an Eli Lilly scientist that showed homocysteine levels served as an indicator of either a folic acid or vitamin B12 deficiency and that such levels were elevated with increased pemetrexed toxicities. However, the levels of another marker methylmalonic acid (MMA), which more specifically is an indicator of just vitamin B12 deficiency, showed no correlation. The CAFC indicated this was sufficient for the claims not to be rendered obvious.

(V) Obviousness-type double patenting – the Defendants argued that the claims are not valid over an Eli Lilly’s earlier patent (US 5,271,974 – ‘974). The district court disagreed, and the CAFC upheld.

In brief, the ‘974 patent more broadly claimed a much greater amount of folic acid with an antifolate agent administrated to a mammal.  The claims of the subject patent are much more specific with regards to the amount of folic acid and the administration of a specific antifolate agent to a patient. The CAFC held this was sufficient for the claims to be patentably distinct.

Comments:

Method claims drafted to encompass actions of a single entity are still preferable, in order to reduce burden of proving infringement. However, where no single entity performs all the steps, direct infringement can be found if the steps of the method claim are performed under the control or direction by a single entity.

Naturally, patent specification drafters should always endeavor to be careful in their use of claim terminology.  Even so, where claim terms are have a specific meaning in their relevant arts, the courts tend to not apply those terms contrary to their common understanding, unless the applicant clearly intended to redefine the term.

Full Opinion

The term “processing system” does not render the claims indefinite

| October 14, 2016

Cox Communications, Inc., et al. v. Sprint Communication Company LP, et. al.

September 23, 2016

Before Prost, Newman, and Bryson. Opinion by Prost. Concurring opinion by Newman

Summary:

The District Court for the District of Delaware granted a summary judgment of invalidity, finding that the claim term “processing system” renders the asserted patents indefinite under 35 U.S.C. 112, ¶ 2.  On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (“the CAFC”) reversed, finding that the term “processing system” does not render the claims indefinite, because the scope of the claims can be understood, and the meaning would not discernably change, even if the word “processing system” were removed from the claims.  The CAFC held that reading the claims in light of the specification and the prosecution history, the term “processing system” does not prevent a person of ordinary skill in the art from understanding the scope of the invention with reasonable certainty.

デラウェア州地裁は、クレーム中の「processing system」という用語は不明瞭であるとして、特許法第112条第2段落に基づき、主張特許は無効であるというサマリージャッジメントを下した。控訴審において、連邦巡回控訴裁判所(CAFC)は、クレームより「processing system」という語を削除したとしても、クレーム範囲を理解することができるため、「processing system」という用語はクレームを不明瞭していないとして、地裁の判断を覆した。また、CAFCは、明細書と中間手続の内容をクレームと照らし合わせると、「processing system」という用語が、当業者の発明範囲についての理解を妨げることはないと結論付けた。


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UltimatePointer v. Nintendo

| March 7, 2016

UltimatePointer v. Nintendo

March 1, 2016

Before Lourie, Dyk and Wallach.  Opinion by Lourie.

Summary:

The trial judge issued summary judgment that Nintendo’s Wii console did not infringe the asserted claims and that most of those claims were invalid as indefinite. On appeal, the CAFC agreed with the trial judge’s claim construction and affirmed the non-infringement judgment, but reversed the indefiniteness judgment.


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Guidance on the standard for “reasonable certainty” in an indefiniteness evaluation

| February 4, 2016

Akzo Nobel Coatings, Inc. v. Dow Chemical Co.

January 29, 2016

Before Lourie, Reyna and Chen. Opinion by Lourie.

Summary

The CAFC affirmed the District Court’s holding that the claims of the ‘956 patent are valid and not indefinite and affirmed the holding that the process of Dow does not infringe, either literally or DOE, the ‘956 patent. This case provides additional guidance on the reasonable certainty standard of Nautilus.


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