Inventorship disputes raise difficult issues; involvement of State universities adds layers of complexity
Nicolas Seckel | September 6, 2013
University of Utah v. Max-Planck-Gesellschaft
August 19, 2013
Panel: Moore, Reyna and Wallach. Opinion by Reyna. Dissent by Moore.
This case started with the University of Utah suing the University of Massachussetts and others to obtain correction of inventorship in a group of patents co-owned by UMass and the other defendants. But the main issues in this appeal relate to the status of the plaintiff UUtah and initial co-defendant UMass as State entities.
To overcome UMass’ sovereign immunity defense (a State can be sued by another State only in the Supreme Court under Article III of the Constitution), UUtah amended its complaint to name individual UMass officials, instead of UMass itself.
The District Court held that the lawsuit could proceed, and the Federal Circuit affirms on the grounds that (1) UMass is not a “real party of interest” because deciding inventorship does not involve a core state interest, and (2) UMass is not an “indispensable party” because the officials can adequately represent the interest of UMass as co-owner of the patents.
Lee Wright | February 28, 2013
Caron and Spellbinders Paper Arts Company, LLC vs. QuicKutz, Inc.
United States District Court for the District Of Arizona
November 13, 2012, Decided
In Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Company, 649 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2011) the CAFC ruled that District Courts must find intent and materiality separately, i.e., weighing the evidence of intent to deceive independently from analysis of materiality.
Here, in one of the few cases since Therasense, a District Court applies separate analyses for each of intent and materiality. In addition, the District Court applied the exception to the but-for materiality requirement in cases of affirmative egregious misconduct.
Knowingly not naming the inventors was held to be inequitable conduct.
Declarations by persons not skilled in the art were held to be inequitable conduct.
Declarations that did not disclose financial relationships with the inventors were held to be inequitable conduct.
A Declaration where the Declarant, when he made the declaration, did not know whether the statements in the declaration were true or not was held to be inequitable conduct.
CAFC Allows Willful Infringer to Continue Infringements for an “Ongoing Royalty” Due to “the Public’s Interest to Allow Competition in the Medical Device Arena”
Stephen Parker | February 16, 2012
Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc., et al. v. W.L. Gore & Associates, Inc.
February 10, 2012
Panel: Gajarsa, Linn and Newman. Opinion by Gajarsa. Dissent by Newman.
This decision concludes a forty-year-long story that began in 1973 between two cooperating individuals that independently filed patent applications for vascular grafts in 1974. Those applications went to interference in 1983 and have been the subject of ongoing litigation since, concluding now in the current CAFC decision. The Arizona district court from which the present case was appealed expressed that this was “the most complicated case the district court has [ever] presided over.” In this case, the Gore inventor was the first to both 1) conceive of the invention and 2) file a patent application in 1974 (i.e., filing 6 months prior to the Bard inventor), but Gore lost in an interference before the Patent Office. Now, Gore is found to be willfully infringing the patent that was awarded to Bard, and is subjected to doubled damages (i.e., totaling $371 million) and attorney’s fees (i.e., totaling $19 million). However, despite these findings, the CAFC allows Gore to continue infringing, declining a permanent injunction and awarding reasonable royalties in the amount of between 12.5% to 20% for future infringements due to the weight of “the public interest to allow competition in the medical device arena.”
Joint Inventorship of a novel compound may exist even if co-inventor only developed method of making
Bernadette McGann | January 25, 2012
Falana v. Kent State University and Alexander J. Seed
January 23, 2012
Panel: Linn, Prost and Reyna. Opinion by Linn.
The CAFC held that a putative inventor who envisioned the structure of a novel chemical compound and contributed to the method of making that compound is a joint inventor of a claim covering that compound. One may be a joint inventor even if co-inventor’s contribution to conception is merely a method of making the claimed product and said co-inventor does not synthesize the claimed compound.